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Reflections on "Salvadorians, Sandinistas, and Superpowers" Adam M. Garfinkle 3

The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission, Legitimacy, and Dynamics of the Soviet Empire in the 1980s Colin S. Gray 13

Choice and Consequence in Sino-American Relations Thomas W. Robinson 29

The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals, and Constraints Sheldon W. Simon 53

Japan's Security, Defense Responsibilities, and Capabilities Taketsugu Tsurutani 89

What the Saudis Really Want: A Primer for the Reagan Administration Bruce R. Kuniholm 107

The European Community in 1981: Pondering at the Crossroads Paula Scalingi 123

The United States and South Africa: Barriers to Communication John Chettle 145

Lessons from Aerospace: The Prospects for Rationalization in NATO Bernard Udis 165

The United Nations Secretariat Revisited Seymour Maxwell Finger and Nina Hanan 197

Issues in Soviet-American Relations: Conference Report Nils H. Wessell 209

Reader Feedback: Letters to the Editor 225

Review: Poland, the Permanent Crisis F. Stephen Larrabee 233

Selected Publications Received 247

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reflections
ON THE QUARTER

SALVADORIANS, SANDINISTAS, AND SUPERPOWERS

By the end of the Reagan administration's first month in office, U.S. policy toward El Salvador had leaped unexpectedly to center stage. As the first major foreign-policy initiative of the new administration, which had entered vowing to deal firmly with those professing hostility to U.S. interests, the new policy toward El Salvador was bound to be scrutinized meticulously by critics friendly and not-so-friendly, foreign and domestic. Not surprisingly, U.S. policy in Central America, if only because it has set off in a new direction, seems destined to attract both criticism and acclaim on a scale far beyond its intrinsic importance. In this the first distillation of specific policy from the impulses and images of the campaign trail, many observers have sought, perhaps prematurely, the answers to a dizzying array of questions. Inevitably, too, what the political partisan seeks, he shall find.

While the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Persian Gulf war, SALT, and U.S. relations with important allies and adversaries all awaited the unveiling of a policy initiative, the White House announced the increase, almost immediately after Reagan's inauguration, of "lethal" military assistance to El Salvador. (Such assistance had already been approved by Congress but was suspended briefly by the Carter administration in its final weeks, partly because of the suspected complicity of the Salvadorian junta in the murders of four Catholic missionaries from the United States.) Less than a month later, after a series of signals that a change in U.S. policy toward Central America was imminent — signals mostly having to do with the administration's attitude toward the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and President Carter's man in San Salvador, Robert E. White — the State Department published its White Paper "Communist Interference in El Salvador."

In the White Paper, State sought to demonstrate, amid much fanfare, that El Salvador was a "textbook case," as White House Press Secretary James Brady later put it, of communist subversion. The White Paper, said by the State Department to have been compiled from captured documents, outlined an international flow

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of weapons to Central America guided by the Soviet Union and Cuba. (Castro's successful efforts to pull together a squabbling Salvadorian Left were essential to this logistical plan.) Fraternal assistance, discreetly arranged by Moscow with a view to maintaining plausible deniability, flowed from Soviet stalwarts as far away as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Vietnam, and Ethiopia. Even Yasir Arafat and the Iraqis managed to involve themselves. Most crucial to delivery of the arms, however, was Nicaragua's Sandinista regime, whose virtuous image has for some reason retained its luster despite Managua's vigorous support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its use, according to the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission, of "methods of torture and repression very similar to those prevailing during the Somoza dictatorship." Later, in March, before a senatorial committee, Secretary of State Alexander Haig elaborated on this theme, asserting that the Soviets and the Cubans had a "hit list" for Central America: Nicaragua being the first target, El Salvador the second and, looking down the road, Guatemala, Honduras, and even Mexico. The administration made it known that it intended to ask Congress for sizable increases in aid for El Salvador, with emphasis firmly placed on military assistance. At the same time, the State Department announced that the number of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador would be raised from about a dozen to fifty-four.

As the administration pushed its case, portraying the Salvadorian conflict in explicitly globalist terms, the State Department's approach fell into step with its emphasis on fighting soviet-sponsored international terrorism and its determination to "talk tough" with Moscow in order to repair the eroded balance of resolve in superpower relations. The hard-line rhetoric seems to have been aimed at several audiences. First and foremost among them were the Soviet Union and Cuba. The secretary of state and the president were firmly on record that public posture matters, that words properly put into action are the stuff of international politics. It was necessary to show the Soviets that the rhetoric of the campaign was indeed the harbinger of a new policy.

This naturally raised an interesting question: Why El Salvador? The answer seemed to be: partly force of circumstance, partly the seizing of opportunity. When the Reagan team took office, they soon became aware that for the foreign-policy bureaucracies beneath them, El Salvador was an issue of some urgency. In March 1980, following on the heels of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua,

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the Carter administration had quietly resumed shipments of "non-lethal" military aid to the Duarte junta, at the same time urging upon the junta, through Ambassador White, political reforms designed to undercut growing popular support for leftist forces. In January 1981, the guerrillas — Marxists and non-Marxists alike — armed to the teeth by the Soviet Union and Cuba with the help of Nicaragua, began a self-described "final offensive" to overthrow the government. The offensive was a dismal failure, crippled by a lack of support from the Salvadorian peasantry. Yet, the government was unable to assert its own authority at the Left's expense. It seemed that the Duarte junta, no less than the Left, suffered from a debilitating lack of legitimacy. Thus, when President Reagan assumed office, the situation in El Salvador had entered a dénouement that called for the kind of high-level political guidance that the bureaucracy alone could not provide.

To supply such guidance seemed all the more attractive because, by most accounts, the rebels were defeated and in disarray. If it came to a fight, the United States had some assurance of victory. It is difficult to say, however, whether the administration actually expected such an encounter. Arrayed against the desire to remove a piece from the chessboard and thereby demonstrate that Moscow had better take the United States seriously was the inevitable domestic turbulence such a clash would cause. Either way, the weakness of the leftist forces seemed to reduce the risks entailed by any activist U.S. policy in El Salvador.

Yet another item not to be overlooked is that an interdepartmental team was already hard at work on the problem — this in sharp contrast to the staffing situation in other areas. The interdepartmental group, moreover, seemed to be leaning in the direction that the secretary of state wished to go, a direction the Carter administration would probably have taken had it not been for the twin obstacles of election-year politics and Ambassador White. For all these reasons, then, El Salvador became the issue the administration was searching for in order to communicate a practical lesson to the Soviet Union and Cuba.

A second audience for the tough line emanating from the White House and Foggy Bottom was the United States' nervous allies. It was the Reagan administration's general view that the policy flip-flops and general timidity of the Carter administration toward the Soviet Union had given the United States the image of an untrustworthy, even dangerous, benefactor. It was not long before pro-

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Western countries in the Middle East and important foreign ministries in Western Europe were saying — some publicly, most privately — that the United States was finally back on the right track. The French, curiously enough, were particularly complimentary about the general line, and when (on February 23) General Secretary Brezhnev presented what was widely interpreted as a conciliatory speech at the Soviet Party Congress, the United States and its allies congratulated themselves and each other on having helped elicit it.

A third audience may have been the most conservative wing of the president's domestic political supporters, who feared early on that the apparent Reagan sprint toward the political center would leave them standing flat-footed. Indeed, the patron saint of the New Right, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, threatened obliquely to block the confirmation of most of Secretary Haig's foreign-policy team on account of their association — disreputable in Helms's view — with Henry Kissinger or, worse, Jimmy Carter. He had also muttered that while the New Right had done well in the November elections, it had "not yet captured the White House." In this regard, a tough policy toward Central America might pacify the New Right. Senator Helms, head of the Latin American Affairs subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was pushing one of his own staffers, John Carbaugh, for the post of assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs.

Nonetheless, despite hopeful signs that the Reagan administration had started off on the right foot with respect to its most important international relationships, the focus on El Salvador, if anything, threatened to undermine the domestic consensus buoying the administration during its traditional honeymoon. In order to demonstrate that the Reagan administration would consult with its European allies before the fact and not merely present them with *faits accomplis* — behavior that Haig, in testimony before the Senate had found characteristic of the Carter presidency's SALT negotiations — the secretary of state dispatched Lawrence Eagleburger, assistant secretary–designate for European affairs, to brief the allies. Eagleburger left for Europe on February 18, *before* the State Department made public its White Paper. The gesture of sending a confidante of the secretary of state to Europe in advance of a planned series of visits by West European presidents, foreign ministers, and heads of state was not lost on the leaders of Europe, nor was it meant to be. Yet, Eagleburger was unable to rouse the support intended. He was treated to a variety of diplomatic circumlocutions,

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raised eyebrows, and vague promises to "study the matter further." Eagleburger's only practical accomplishment was to persuade the European Community not to supply humanitarian food aid to El Salvador until the issues were more fully discussed.

It was not hard to see why the Europeans demurred from vigorous public avowals of support. The Socialist International, strong in most West European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, supported the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front against what they considered was an increasingly repressive Salvadorian government. With Europe's Social Democratic parties already badly divided over the theater-nuclear modernization issue, public support for the United States on El Salvador could only have made matters worse. Although the Europeans could excuse the inexperience of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his unfortunate public remarks about the "neutron bomb," they were somewhat perplexed by Haig, a man they respected and knew well from his recent tour as supreme allied commander in Europe.

Finally, the consensus in Western Europe and in much of Latin America was that a military emphasis was likely to be counterproductive, even starting from realpolitik premises. The last thing the Europeans wanted to see was the United States involved in a guerrilla war in Central America. Not only did such a specter conjure up dangerous images of Vietnam, which would only make it more difficult for pragmatic Europeans to fight the postimperial senility ravaging the continent's body politic, it would, like Vietnam, divert U.S. attention and treasure away from Europe. If the administration's emphasis on the military aspects of the problem in El Salvador, as opposed to the socioeconomic ones, was only *tactical* — designed to stop the flow of arms to the rebels from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union in order to facilitate a negotiated settlement — this was something that Europeans and Latin Americans alike might live with and perhaps even support. If the emphasis on the globalist, East-West dimension of the situation was just a *tactic* to put the Soviets on notice that U.S. actions would match U.S. words, if it was not indicative of a dangerous blindness to the indigenous sources of the struggle, then this, too, would be understood. But the problem — for the Europeans, for the Mexicans, for the Venezuelans, and for supporters of the new administration — is that those seeking the answers to these critical questions have been confounded by mixed signals. A short review of events makes this clear.

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The very first actions of the Reagan administration were interpreted by critics as indicating an emphasis on military solutions at the expense of any other. A shift in the U.S. attitude toward the neighboring Sandinista government in Nicaragua did, in fact, take place. On January 22, the United States halted its economic aid to Nicaragua in order to punish the Sandinistas for supporting the Salvadorian Left and to persuade them to stop. On February 11, a $9.6-million wheat sale to Nicaragua was "delayed." Some critics of the new administration immediately took issue with this tactic, saying that such pressures would push the Nicaraguan junta further toward the left and throw the country into the arms of the Soviet Union; analogies with U.S. policy toward Cuba in 1959 abounded. Nevertheless, as was widely reported, the pressure on Nicaragua was effective. Forced to choose between U.S. aid and helping the Salvadorian Left, the Sandinistas urged the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front to lay down its arms and talk turkey with the junta.

On February 1, Secretary Haig had removed Ambassador White from San Salvador and had replaced him temporarily with Frederic L. Chapin, formerly U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia. This move was significant because it was well known that Ambassador White had for more than a year blocked efforts by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to increase military aid for El Salvador. It became known, as well, that Chapin had been working in the Pentagon on contingency plans to aid the Salvadorian junta against the guerrillas. Perhaps most interesting of all, the State Department retained Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs John A. Bushnell and allowed James Cheek (another holdover from the Carter administration) to remain in charge of the interdepartmental group reviewing U.S. policy toward El Salvador.

When it became known, after the release of the White Paper on February 19, that the *Carter* administration had collected the captured material that the Haig State Department later made public, some things became clearer. El Salvador was clearly a "front burner" issue during the Carter administration's last months in office. Many observers speculated that when Carter found that the Sandinistas were indeed aiding the Salvadorian Left, he recanted somewhat the policy of encouraging stable, centrist governments in Latin America. To sack Ambassador White and expand U.S. military support for El Salvador would clearly not have been prudent in an election year. Had Carter been re-elected, however, changes in U.S.

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policy might well have occurred anyway. Just three days before the end of Carter's tenure, the president resumed "nonlethal" military aid and began modest "lethal" aid to El Salvador. Thus, there was more continuity between the two administrations than at first met the eye. This continuity was obscured by the Reagan administration's apparent decision to use El Salvador as a signal in the superpowers' global struggle. Yet, as much reformed as Carter was after the Afghanistan invasion, this was not quite the approach that he or his administration would have been likely to adopt.

Though speculation about what the Carter men would or would not have done, had they been given the chance, may be more idle than interesting, the reaction from the countries south of the United States was anything but idle. While the Reagan administration's consultations in Europe had pleased its allies there, U.S. envoys to Mexico and Venezuela were less successful. Mexico and Venezuela had been supporting opposite sides in the Salvadorian civil war. Mexico had backed the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front; Venezuela, the Duarte junta. Nervousness about a possibly broader conflict suddenly brought them together, at least temporarily. As did the West Europeans, Caracas and Mexico City favored a negotiated settlement of the conflict and opposed even the hint of an active U.S. military intervention. Mexico's support for the Left was prompted less by ideological affinity or by enthusiasm for movements aimed at ousting incumbent governments than by a desire on the part of President López Portillo to co-opt the rising tide of radicalism in the region. Although the Mexicans and the Venezuelans disagreed on which side to support, both saw considerable danger in any further polarization of the region. Given the melancholy history of U.S.-Latin American relations, *military* intervention from the north, no matter how small, threatened to prompt just such a polarization, whereas a negotiated settlement was believed capable of reducing it. Even more dangerous, though less likely in Mexican eyes, a military answer threatened a regional war, Nicaragua and Guatemala taking opposite sides.

Thus, while the Reagan administration took the rhetorical offensive against the Soviet Union and Cuba, at the same time protecting its flank against domestic political opposition from its right, it risked alienating several of its neighbors and allies and provided a focus for domestic political opposition on its left. Even from a realpolitik perspective, neither of these latter developments, foreign or domestic, was very healthy. To shatter the possibility for a hemi-

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spheric consensus on El Salvador would probably provide the Soviets with far more opportunity than they could hope to reap from their limited meddling in Central America. Beyond that, the Democratic opposition in Congress was treating the president's much-vaunted economic program with guarded respect, an asset not to be squandered because of a row over foreign policy.

At about this time, the administration showed that it understood something of the domestic situation in El Salvador and that it had social and economic policies to go along with its military one. The State Department issued a strong statement in favor of social reform, which read in part: "the United States, with its long tradition of democratic change, recognizes and supports the need for democratic change in El Salvador." In practice, this meant approval of the land reform that the Carter administration had urged upon the junta in March 1980. Although there was some evidence that the pace of change had slowed (in part because of a belief on the part of the Salvadorian Right that Washington cared not a whit for the reforms), the reforms were widely credited with stealing the thunder from the Left and helping to foil the "final offensive."

By January 1981, several hundred of the largest estates in the country had been declared peasant cooperatives. In addition, the junta imposed tight banking and export controls preventing rich landowners from transferring capital outside the country. The Carter administration deserves some credit for this development; it is therefore all the more foolish that, in testimony before a House subcommittee, "liberal" Congressmen Gerry Studds, Barbara Mikulski, and Robert Edgar urged that "economic assistance to El Salvador's land reform program should be suspended." Thus it was that opposition to the Reagan administration's policy would find little common ground in the early going. Senator Alan Cranston, former Senate majority whip, noted that the opposition probably lacked the power to stop the administration's plan. Cranston was proved correct when, in late March, a House appropriations subcommittee approved the administration's request for an additional $5 million in military aid to El Salvador by an 8-7 vote. This could not have happened without the support of two members of the subcommittee's Democratic majority.

In February, Secretary Haig had warned Cuba, in the ambiguous but unmistakable language of diplomacy, that the United States would "go to the source" of the aggression. This message was reinforced by Edwin Meese, counselor to the president, and again in March by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Walter J.

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Stoessel, before a House committee. Both Meese and Stoessel refused to rule out anything with respect to actions being considered against Havana.

These threats against Cuba, including barely muffled talk of blockades, may have sent the proper message to Moscow and Havana, but they did not play well in Bonn or Mexico City. In West Germany, when blockades are mentioned, most people think not of Cuba but of Berlin. With the possibility of a Soviet intervention in Poland growing daily, this kind of language understandably made the West Germans a bit anxious. Meanwhile, Mexico's López Portillo took it upon himself to express his high regard for Cuba. Finally, opposition in Congress and in the country at large began slowly to coalesce. A fight loomed. Along with grumbling over the proposed Reagan budget, this might give the Democrats something they heretofore lacked — a political program in opposition.

Just as the battle was about to be joined at a series of congressional hearings, President José Napoleón Duarte said that El Salvador needed U.S. economic aid far more than it needed military aid. Disputing Secretary of State Haig and a Pentagon study, Duarte opined that the Salvadorian Army could readily take care of the military problem if the flow of arms into the country were stopped. Even Colonel José Guillermo García, the military strongman within the junta and very probably at least an equal with Duarte, echoed these comments. The administration's efforts to halt the communist arms flow and fix world attention on extrahemispheric interference in El Salvador appeared to be making progress toward its objective: to create the conditions for a political settlement. In March, when the Socialist International suggested that Willy Brandt assist in bringing about a negotiated settlement to the problem, Duarte quickly stated his willingness to pursue such a mediation.

Apparently chastened by the administration's combination of toughness and flexibility, the Moscow-Havana-Managua partners began to show signs of backing off. On February 23, Bushnell announced U.S. intelligence reports that the rebels were receiving fewer arms. At the same time, the Reagan administration moved to defuse opposition developing within the United States and without. The president assured journalists that the United States would not get "locked in" in El Salvador, and Secretary Haig told the Congress that the United States would not get involved in "another Vietnam." Even more instructive, the State Department seized upon the intemperate assertions of Roberto D'Aubuisson and emphasized its sup-

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port for President Duarte and social reform. D'Aubuisson, generally acknowledged to be the mastermind of right-wing terrorist groups, had stated that the Reagan administration would not oppose a rightist coup, and went so far as to call for such a coup. Secretary Haig responded that a coup would have "serious consequences" for continued U.S. aid to El Salvador and "does not represent U.S. policy in any way."

As the communist arms flow subsided and White House officials grew apprehensive about the possibility that domestic contention over El Salvador might undermine public support for the Reagan economic package, the administration concluded that it would be wise to play down the issue. There followed a curious scene: Assistant Secretary Bushnell's telling reporters at a background briefing that *they* had blown the issue out of proportion. The next day, Secretary Haig partially disavowed the statement, as did the White House. Press Secretary Brady suggested that Bushnell must have been "talking for himself."

It is still not clear how the Reagan administration will work its way out of, or around, the cross-currents that its policy toward El Salvador has set in motion. Happily, if the administration decides to cooperate with its European allies and its friends in Latin America, it has a reform-minded Christian Democrat in President Duarte with whom it can work.

This does not mean that a negotiated settlement would be easy, or even possible. The first trick will be to separate the liberal and non-Marxist antigovernment groups from the totalitarian elements now dominating the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front. The second will be to separate the powerful antidemocratic elements in the Salvadorian Army from those in the junta who can see their way toward compromise. It is by no means a foregone conclusion, as many critics seem to believe, that merely by arranging for negotiations one guarantees their success. It may very well be that Guillermo Manuel Ungo, the titular head of the antigovernment movement, is even more a figurehead than Mr. Duarte. (Lenin, it will be recalled, referred to bourgeois leftists as "useful idiots.") Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the Reagan administration is how it might help create the preconditions, on both sides, for a stable negotiated settlement without undermining the present junta prematurely.

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THE MOST DANGEROUS DECADE: HISTORIC MISSION, LEGITIMACY, AND DYNAMICS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE IN THE 1980s

by Colin S. Gray

We will be fortunate if we survive the 1980s. Professionals in foreign-policy and defense commentary are habituated to the prediction of crisis. Indeed, the prediction of crisis tends to be their stock-in-trade. How many times has NATO approached a "crossroads"? How many "countdowns" have there been to decisions in Sino-Soviet or German-American relations? Like the boy who cried wolf, eventually even the paranoid foreign-policy commentator collides with a real danger. Similarly, so many have been the (generally false) alarms called over the past thirty-five years that it is difficult to gain attention for yet another period of maximum danger — almost no matter how persuasive the evidence. Few, if any, pieces of evidence are assessed "on their merits"; instead, they are assayed on the basis of previous experience with such "evidence," and tend to be depreciated accordingly.

It is my contention that the 1980s will be uniquely dangerous to the United States not so much because of the strength of the Soviet Union but, rather, because of its weaknesses. This is not an argument only about the military weakness, or strength, of the United States and its allies and friends; rather, it is a net appraisal of all of the influences that work upon the character of the foreign policy of a superpower.

II

A principal reason for Western misunderstanding of the Soviet Union is the continuing failure to appreciate that the USSR is a true empire. Legalistically important American questions concerning the "right" of the USSR to prosecute its goals in particular ways have no relevance in the Soviet context. A student of the dynamics of imperialism, be he political scientist or historian, need look no further than to the contemporary Soviet Union to find a

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classic example. As with all empires, the Great Russian has a core area (Muscovy, Byelorussia) and succeeding layers, each protecting the others. Time after time since the early 1950s, the Soviet Union has shown that it is trapped in the dynamics of empire. It dare not contract from insecure "holdings" (East Germany, 1953; Hungary and Poland, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland, 1980) because any contraction, aside from the intrinsic loss, would cast political doubt on the legitimacy of other "holdings." The Soviet empire thrives on success or, at least, on the absence of undeniable failure. Unfortunately, as with all empires, the extant boundaries of imperial hegemony can never provide true security. In Europe, for example, the Soviet Union is obliged — for good *defensive* reasons — to aim for a hegemonic relationship with West European countries, if only in order to manipulate that part of the external environment of East European countries which can be disturbing to orderly development.

The USSR is not merely a country surrounded by potential enemies, it is an empire that virtually by definition can have no settled relations of relative influence with its neighbors. It is the geopolitical inheritance of the USSR to believe that "boundaries are fighting places."[1] That is a natural belief for a country without natural frontiers. Many Western commentators have yet to understand that "the Soviet threat" in the 1980s flows from the dynamics of empire, from geopolitics — and fundamentally from weakness. Outside of Muscovy and Byelorussia (to be generous), it is improbable that the Soviet state has any popular roots worth mentioning. Even within the Muscovy-Byelorussia core area, the regime is vulnerable to religious and political-national movements that can claim solid connections with local history.

The USSR is a military, and then colonial, creation that is not confronted — though she may be challenged (as in Poland)— so long as the Moscow center is seen to be successful. Moscow may not be loved, but it is respected. The imperial holdings in Eastern Europe have a Janus-like quality about them. They are a defensive glacis, physically separating the peoples of the USSR from Western Europe; but they are also a constant source of weakness. Although the West has long abandoned them to the Soviet sphere of influence, and even gave quasi-legal recognition to that fact in Helsinki; from time to time, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and even East Germans are wont to forget that they are wholly owned subjects of the Soviet empire.

The imperial thesis is vital because it settles, persuasively,

[1] Karl Haushofer, quoted in Derwent Whittlesey, *German Strategy of World Conquest* (London: Robinson, 1942), p. 73.

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arguments above Soviet intentions. Paul Nitze wrote recently that "The Kremlin leaders do not want war; they want the world."[2] This is true, but not so much for the essentially aggressive reasons identified by conservative commentators in the West. The Soviet Union has to seek to expand her area of control precisely because nothing she holds is, or can be, secure enough. Everything in the USSR (and beyond) protects everything else. The legitimacy of the Soviet state has nothing to do with a social contract of any kind; it rests instead upon the bizarre facts that a handful of adventurers, having turned some nineteenth-century political-economic theorizing on its head, seized a historic opportunity to acquire a country as the vehicle for their Historic Mission. Their right to rule rests on the validity of the Historic Mission. If the Historic Mission, to effect socialism worldwide, comes generally to be seen as misconceived, then what right has the CPSU to be obeyed? The domestic authority of the Soviet government, today, depends upon a habit of obedience, fraud, force when needed and, to the extent to which such a dangerous sentiment can be invoked in a severely multinational country, national pride.

These supports for the regime are none too fragile. After all, the Soviet state has existed for sixty-four years — and longevity bequeaths legitimacy of a kind. Most Soviet citizens have known no other political authority — save, for some, during the period of German occupation[3] — and while they are intensely cynical about political life, they are also intensely respectful of the Soviet "will to rule." In addition, although the official philosophy has no local roots, and is almost universally disdained, the oppressive character of Soviet rule has been anything but alien to Russian soil.

No matter how robust CPSU authority may really be at home, Soviet leaders perpetually are prone to exaggerate the dangers. This exaggeration is reflected in their domestic and foreign-policy actions. The Soviet empire has to expand, in influence if not physically, or risk collapse. At home and abroad the entire structure rests on force, though generally latent force. Soviet leaders are more fearful than ambitious. They know they cannot govern a universal empire, even if they could establish one, but they are condemned by circumstance to try. The world beyond Moscow's control threatens, if only by its manifold attractions, the world that Moscow does control. *Festung Russland* is protected by the East European marches,

[2] "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980, p. 90.

[3] And, for some, the experience of national independence in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia between the wars.

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but those marches contain, endemically, the seeds of revolt—which, if not suppressed, could have unpredictable, though certainly very dangerous, consequences for political stability within the USSR itself.

Because of their sense of domestic, and imperial, insecurity, Soviet leaders (*any* Soviet leaders) are compelled to seek to improve the quality of their control over "the world outside." There is, and can be, no perimeter to Soviet interests, because any independent power center that abuts the Soviet sphere is seen as posing a threat to an empire believed (in Moscow) to be fundamentally fragile. It is in these terms that the United States, her friends, and her allies must address the reality of Soviet imperialism.

III

It is paradoxical that the Western defense debate of recent months has been driven by images of Soviet strength, really Soviet military strength, when the Soviet-related dangers of the 1980s will flow, rather, from Soviet weakness. It should not be supposed from the argument advanced thus far that I undervalue the importance of the Soviet military build-up of the past fifteen years. Indeed, it is precisely the historical meeting of contemporary Soviet military circumstances with the trend lines of structural weakness that renders the 1980s so dangerous. Through its longstanding, cumulative deficiency in defense preparations of all kinds, the Western alliance has offered to a fearful, though admittedly cautious and pragmatic, Soviet leadership, the possibility of effecting a favorable systemic alteration in its (in)security condition. To repeat, Soviet leaders in the 1980s will not be adventurous robber barons, willing to take high risks in the hope of gain. Too much, however, can be made of Soviet caution and pragmatism. Risks do not remain constant over time. Skeptical readers are invited to compare the risks the USSR would have assumed had her Ethiopian venture been launched in 1958, or even 1968, instead of in 1978. To an important though uncertain degree, Western policy (declarations, *capabilities,* and actions) helps define the risks that Soviet leaders must assay.

1979 and 1980 were replete with Western commentators' reference to a coming Soviet "window of opportunity" in the 1980s. I prefer to characterize the 1980s as revealing a window of Western vulnerability, for it is not clear that Soviet leaders will discern opportunities after the fashion of such Western commentary. Crude mirror-imaging of the Soviet Union besets conservative, as well as

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liberal, commentators in the West. The weakness that may drive Soviet leaders to seek to exploit what may be only a fleeting historical moment of relative military advantage could, scarcely less plausibly, function instead as a policy brake.

There is no great debate today about the military facts of the West's security condition in the early and mid 1980s. The debate pertains rather to the motives underlying the Soviet build-up, to the nature and degree of the danger, and to the character of prudent Western response. In functional, and familiar, Western terms, the Soviet Union has achieved multilevel military superiority.[4] By "superiority" I refer not to the largely meaningless counts of defense inputs (men under arms, missile launchers, warheads, megatonnage, and so forth) but, rather, to the potential defense *output:* the ability to prevail in arms competition, acute crisis, and even war itself.

Soviet political leaders and military planners, like sensible people everywhere, understand that war is always an uncertain enterprise, is rarely so cheap to conduct or swift to bring to a successful conclusion as general staffs tend to predict (witness Afghanistan), and — when unusually stressful — can precipitate the unraveling of whole societies (and empires). That said, the USSR in the 1980s has achieved a relative military condition where not implausible theories of victory can be briefed by general-staff planners who need not make wildly optimistic assumptions.

For several years there has been a running debate among defense professionals over the issue of whether or not a nuclear war could be "won."[5] Supposedly authoritative quotation from Soviet political and military leaders and theorists can be deployed on all sides of this issue. The truth is probably more complex than any single "side" has discerned. The following appear to be the relevant Soviet facts: war, even central nuclear war, while "not fatalistically inevitable" (to quote Nikita Khrushchev), is both possible and even probable; in the event that war occurs, the USSR will try to *win* (Soviet military science entertains no goal short of victory); victory is possible, but the costs of all kinds would certainly be very heavy. While it is true that Soviet spokesmen feel obliged, for reasons of official ideology and morale, to endorse the concept of victory in nuclear war, that fact does not suffice to cast doubt on the genuine-

[4] For a useful general survey, see John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

[5] See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary,* July 1977, pp. 21-35, and Robert Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* September 1979, pp. 172-191.

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ness of the Soviet endorsement. Soviet strategic culture, including careful Soviet appreciation of the probable character of a very large-scale nuclear war, is voluntaristic rather than passive-pessimistic. In the Soviet view, it is their duty to do their best, even in very bad (though not hopeless) cases, and war — even nuclear war — is an *experience* that robust political systems endure, strive to win, and certainly survive.

Where much of the Western debate goes astray is in the way it chooses to frame a central question: Does the Soviet Union accept "nuclear war as an instrument of policy"? Does it "contemplate without flinching the prospect of frightful damage and casualties running into scores of millions if it enables them to achieve their global objectives[?]"[6] It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would choose to go to (nuclear) war, to have resort to the old fashioned phrase, in expectation of positive gain. Instead, the Soviet propensity to view "nuclear war as an instrument of policy" should be understood much as we understand the widely appreciated preemptive theme in Soviet strategy: "to go first *in the last resort*." Soviet leaders may well, and certainly should, flinch as they unleash their armed forces; but there is good reason to believe that, flinching or not, the Soviet Union would risk nuclear war if her leaders believed the integrity of the empire to be at stake. The political occasion for such a drastic *démarche* would be one wherein a choice was confronted between the believed certainty of imperial disintegration, in the (non)event of military inaction, and the well-appreciated risks of nuclear war.

IV

The Soviet Union has not sought "strategic superiority" — as understood in the narrow military terms of the West. Instead, the Soviet Union has sought and achieved a cumulatively dramatic reversal in the "correlation of forces." The "correlation of forces" encompasses political, economic, technological, and psychological dimensions of account that are totally absent from Western assessments of the strategic balance. The fundamental Soviet requirement vis-à-vis the (potentially decisive) nuclear-weapon elements in the East-West competition should be viewed in *counter*deterrent perspective.

Although the Soviet Union aspires to be able to wage war as efficiently and effectively as possible at all levels, almost certainly

[6] Michael Howard, "On Fighting a Nuclear War," the Bernard Brodie Memorial Lecture, delivered at UCLA, November 20, 1980 (unpublished text), p. 6.

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she did not anticipate being granted the degree of superiority she now enjoys with respect to strategic-nuclear and theater-nuclear forces. The Soviet Union has not "outraced" the United States in nuclear weaponry; instead, she has been handed an advantage (possibly a temporary one) courtesy of U.S. and NATO inaction.

Until the late 1960s, and possibly beyond, the Western alliance enjoyed the foreign-policy supportive benefits of escalation dominance with respect to nuclear weapons. With respect to nuclear weapons both for theater and for central war, the Soviet Union needed to cancel out the Western advantage. In short, the Soviet Union needed to arm herself with a nuclear arsenal such that the United States, or NATO, could not anticipate enforcing an improved war outcome through initiating, let alone sustaining, nuclear escalation. By the very late 1970s, the Soviet Union had achieved not merely an all-level nuclear arsenal capable of functioning as a credible counterdeterrent but, also, an arsenal capable, if invoked, of enforcing an improved outcome at more destructive levels of combat.

It is improbable that the Soviet Union sought superiority in nuclear weapons, because the basic strength of American (et al.) high-technology industry should not permit this — always provided the United States chooses to compete. The contemporary facts of Soviet superiority in strategic-nuclear and theater-nuclear weapons, therefore, probably reflect not a Soviet determination to win a nuclear war launched as "an instrument of policy" during a Western "window of vulnerability" but, rather, a very serious and necessary (in Soviet terms) counterdeterrence bid that was permitted by the United States to outreach its minimal objectives.

The Soviet military build-up has been very seriously misassessed by the Left *and* the Right in the United States, in good part because the nature of the Soviet Union has been misassessed. Many American politicians, officials, and voters seem genuinely to have been puzzled by the scale and scope of this build-up. There is no single dominant reason, but I believe that the following reasons suffice by way of a collective explanation.

First, very large armed forces have always been the Russian/Soviet way — as prudently befits a very large continental power. (Imperial Russia, for example, spent more on her army in 1913-1914 than Germany.)[7] Second, in Soviet understanding, more military power is always to be preferred to less military power, both because the Soviet perspective on international politics (derived

[7] Russia spent 1,577 million marks; Germany, 1,496 million. (See Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front: 1914-1917* [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975], p. 29.)

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from geopolitics and ideology) holds that there are always audiences who need to respect Soviet military power and because war is an ever-present possibility. Third, the regeneration of Soviet military power is like a perpetual-motion machine. The Soviet Union is a very highly militarized society, perpetually semimobilized for war, and she could not easily "switch off" much of her defense preparation, even if she so wished. Domestic stability, to a nontrivial degree, depends upon near steady-state defense preparation on what, by Western standards, is a heroic scale.

Fourth, the Soviet Union is an empire sustained, very largely, by the "awe of the power of the state." As proprietor of an unstable empire, the Soviet leadership has impressively substantial military requirements. The Soviet armed forces, in all their various ramifications, are needed: to symbolize and help forge "national" unity (Kazakhs and Georgians become *Soviet* soldiers); to represent the overwhelming power of Moscow; to overcome and, if need be, enforce socialist discipline on East European "allies"; to ensure political respect abroad; and, if need be, to defend the Great Russian Motherland (defined expansively).

Fifth, military power is recognized to be the one dimension of interstate competition by means of which the USSR can control its external environment to a degree useful for benign ends. Military power may be a rather blunt policy instrument, but it seems to guarantee respect. Overall, Soviet grand strategy warrants characterization as prudent and purposeful opportunism. The "prudent" qualification stems from the fact that under Leonid Brezhnev the USSR has endeavored, successfully, to build a military machine of appropriate size and capable of supporting an ambitious foreign policy; the "purposeful" qualification refers to the fact that the Soviet Union has sought, through patient and expensive efforts, to help create opportunities that she could later exploit.

Sixth, and finally, I need mention the pride and enjoyment in military power (almost) for its own sake. Although Russian arms in the past have registered successes of historic proportions (over Sweden in 1709, France in 1813-1814, and Germany in 1945), a Russian sense of inferiority stemming from economic backwardness has always colored Soviet foreign-policy thinking, fed her paranoia, and contributed in a major way to that sense of insecurity which has helped fuel her imperial expansion. Stalin's words in 1931 should be recalled: "Those who fall behind, get beaten."[8]

[8] "The Tasks of Business Executives," in *Works*, vol. 13 (Moscow: 1955), p. 40.

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Even though Soviet industry and agriculture remain backward (as compared with the United States, West Germany, or Japan), in the 1980s, for the first time in her history, the Soviet Union (the vehicle for Great Russian imperialism) is not militarily inferior to her prospective, identified enemies. It is not obvious that there are any relevant antecedents for what is, literally, a militarily unprecedented situation. Such quasi precedents as there are happen not to be reassuring. Resting very substantially indeed upon the confident knowledge of nuclear-escalation dominance, a strategically superior United States insisted upon, and succeeded in effecting, at least minimally satisfactory crisis outcomes over Korea in 1953, Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955 and 1958, Berlin during 1959-1961, and over "offensive" missiles in Cuba during October 1962. On the Soviet side, there is the evidence of the protracted Berlin crisis and, far more relevant, of the succession of moves from Angola through Ethiopia and South Yemen to Afghanistan in the latter half of the 1970s. Soviet grand strategy may be characterized by reference to a dictum of Sun Tzu: "And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy."[9]

At enormous domestic cost, the Soviet Union has invested in a nuclear force posture such that, for a rational Western policy-maker, there should now be no attractive higher rungs to a local crisis. The Soviet Union has competed effectively at the high-technology end of the military competitive spectrum, where she is at every kind of comparative disadvantage. While CIA estimators overprice Soviet manpower, they almost certainly underprice the cost of Soviet military high technology. The Soviet investment in military high technology has not been principally for the purpose of preparing for putative victory in the big European theater war, leading to central nuclear war. Instead, it has been for the purpose of checkmating extant American/NATO military advantages, thereby leaving the Soviet Union free to advance in regions where there are no clear spheres of influence.

V

The principal dangers to the West in the 1980s flow from Soviet long-run pessimism and from the mutual miscalculation that the clash of Soviet and American national styles virtually invites.[10]

[9] *The Art of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 101.
[10] See Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom, Helm, 1979), pass.

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Notwithstanding the (long-run) optimism of their political *philosophy,* in which they probably do not genuinely believe, Soviet leaders today are vulnerable to a "briefing" of the good news/bad news genus. The good news is that virtually regardless of the kind and scale of defense expansion ordered by the Reagan administration, the Soviet Union has a "useful advantage,"[11] through most of the 1980s, in conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic-nuclear power. With good management and some luck, the briefing could continue; the United States should be deterred either from pressing an acute crisis to the point of open military hostilities or from sustaining any process of nuclear escalation beyond an initial symbolic ("commitment") leap.

The bad news would be to the effect that, aside from short-term military trends, virtually every comparative power indicator is near certain to move against the USSR in the medium to long terms. To summarize: the United States is initiating the refurbishment of its defense establishment; China is modernizing (a process that, eventually, will include the military); NATO Europe, though still fertile ground for alliance-divisive détente diplomacy, ultimately has no realistic choice other than to invest somewhat more heavily in defense preparation; and many power-potential factors on the Soviet side of the "correlation of forces" show no signs of improvement in the long term. Not merely do Soviet policymakers face a long-term future naked of genuine friends and allies (an imperial condition very familiar, say, to a British foreign secretary circa 1900), they must also assess their domestic ability to compete effectively with an actually or potentially hostile outside world, an ability certain to decline. The Soviet rate of economic growth, declining since the mid 1960s, seems near certain to approach zero by the mid 1980s — in part by reason of the ethnic composition of the work force (as the relative proportion of non–Great Russians increases markedly) and in part by reason of the sharply increasing cost of energy supply. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that this subject is appropriate only to the most private of Soviet deliberations, the 1980s probably are anticipated to see a protracted near paralysis in policy initiative as a consequence of a bitter struggle over the political succession.

Western political commentators, although ready, even eager, to note the prospect of a Soviet political-succession struggle,

[11] See John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style,' " in Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds., *Soviet Military Power and Performance* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1979), p. 28.

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tend to underestimate the authority-attenuating character of such a struggle in the Soviet Union. A prime military, political, and economic weakness of the USSR is the degree of overcentralization of authority in the Moscow center that flows from its obsession with control. The Soviet command system, military, political and economic, is cumbersome and slow to respond even at the best of times, owing to the political necessity of authorization from above. No great imagination is required to envisage the kind of disruption that can be caused in such a system when, for a period of months or perhaps even years, there is serious doubt at lower levels concerning the authority and legitimacy of senior decisionmakers in the various chains of command.

Argument by historical analogy is always dangerous. Note, however, that the two most recent Soviet succession periods, in the early and mid 1950s and then in the mid 1960s, were characterized by a withdrawal of the USSR from foreign-policy initiatives likely to promote international conflict. I cannot, and do not, predict that the Soviet Union of the mid 1980s will behave in its external relations as did the Soviet Union of 1953-1955 or 1964-1965 — essentially for two reasons. First, the succession crisis of the 1980s is likely to be far more testing of Soviet political stability than the preceding two occasions. The 1980s will see the passing from the political scene of what may be called "the class of 1938." Having disposed definitively of his "old Bolshevik" rivals, and other possibly ambitious office seekers, Stalin promoted into positions of authority the youngest leadership group of any major country. Beyond the mid 1980s, musical chairs within this age cohort will no longer be a political option — a new age cohort will have to contend for power, and there are no established rules to govern that process.[12]

Second, the Soviet domestic political-succession struggles of the past (in the 1920s, 1950s, and 1960s) have never been conducted against a backdrop of militarily advantageous relations with the outside world. This has to be speculation, but there is no law of Soviet politics which states that foreign-policy initiatives are forbidden during a succession crisis. Indeed, as many Western Soviet-area scholars assert, it is very likely that the next generation of Soviet political leaders (and, even more, the one after that) is going to be culturally acclimated to the forward assertion of Soviet power, probably will judge the Brezhnev generation ("the class of 1938") to have been unduly cautious, and — generically — is more attuned to So-

[12] See Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington: Brookings, 1980).

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viet success than to Soviet backwardness and failure. In short, some of the people likely to contend for the Soviet leadership in the 1980s, far from welcoming quiescence on the international political front, might instead seek to advance adventurous foreign-policy ideas as *their platforms for personal political advancement*. A Soviet Union in, say, 1985 or 1986, in the toils of a bitter and protracted political-succession struggle, might not be a Soviet Union paralyzed in foreign policy. Instead, it might be a Soviet Union whose unprecedented military power would be (perhaps very temporarily) at the service of a younger clique of intensely chauvinistic Russian political leaders determined to stake their claim to authority through the mechanism of undeniable foreign-policy success.

VI

The beginning of wisdom for the West has to be recognition of the fact that although we endeavor to understand Soviet political reality on its own terms, we may well err. Whether or not the forthcoming political-succession crisis will be as dangerous as mooted above has to be a matter of conjecture. What is not at all a matter of conjecture is that irresponsible Western defense policies have permitted the Soviet Union to achieve a measure of "useful advantage" at virtually all levels of possible combat — whether or not this "useful advantage" is judged in Moscow to be of a war-winning character has to be a matter of speculation. In most respects, the Soviet-related (and assessed) dangers of the 1980s are beyond American manipulation. One can do next to nothing about the ways in which Soviet leaders analyze the weaknesses in their domestic economy, the fragility of their domestic political system, or the potential for chaos within their extra–(USSR) territorial empire. But, the United States can do, or rather should have done, a great deal about shaping Soviet foreign-policy assessments of the outside world in ways beneficial to the West's understanding of international order.

Although there should be many potent arguments operating to dissuade Soviet leaders in the 1980s from seeking to exploit the window of Western military vulnerability, those arguments tend to flow from the Soviet perception of Soviet weaknesses rather than from Western strengths. Because of its military and political weakness, the West permits the Soviet general staff to design at least theoretically plausible schemes for restructuring the Soviet international security condition *before* the long-term adverse trends really begin to bite in earnest.

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Any competent Soviet security analyst must recognize the bleakness of his country's long-term future. As China modernizes, as Japan eventually rearms, and as the United States and NATO Europe mobilize their defense potential even modestly, the USSR becomes more and more genuinely encircled. The temptation to restructure the terms of this unequal competition, before it places the Soviet Union in an enduring condition of inferiority, has to be substantial. This is said in full acknowledgment of the Soviet abhorrence of adventurism and without demeaning at all Soviet anxiety over the consequences of conflict that may entail nuclear employment. If the Soviet Union promotes crisis or war as an instrument of policy in the 1980s it will not be so much in the calculated expectation of positive gain but, rather, as a deliberate throw intended to restructure more favorably the terms of the long-range security competition.

The dangers of war with the Soviet Union in the 1980s flow essentially from two different kinds of scenarios. First, a cautious and pragmatic Soviet leadership, pursuing its foreign-policy business as usual *après* Afghanistan, may believe, courtesy of its assessment of the correlation of forces, that the United States should not, and hence would not, respond militarily to forward moves in, say, the Persian Gulf. After Afghanistan, it is almost trivially easy to design scenarios for conflict sequences leading to World War III. Afghanistan, and indeed "the next move," wherever it might be, was permitted by the favorable (to the USSR) correlation of forces — a judgment reinforced by the fact of less-than-minimal American military support for the Afghan rebels. If anything, the relative military condition of the Western alliance is even worse today than it was in late 1979; hence, there should be no objective reason for Soviet planners to anticipate any direct American response to the next Soviet advance. What would have changed, of course, between Afghanistan at Christmas 1979 and "the next occasion" in 1981 or 1982 would be analogous to the shift in the British popular mood between late 1938 and the early fall of 1939. In other words, the United States would be determined, almost literally regardless of the assessed state of the military balance, to stand firm next time — whenever and wherever the next time happens to be. In this scenario, both the Soviet Union and the United States would expect the other to back down, and neither would do so.

Much has been made, in recent years, of tenuously drawn analogies between the late 1930s and the 1980s. The analogy, properly made, lies not in the drawing of foolishly inappropriate non-

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parallels between the contemporary Soviet leadership and the "gangsters in a hurry" who ran the Third Reich but, rather, in the character of Western democracies, which — after years of acquiescence — will suddenly draw a line and mean it. It is not clear today that the Moscow leadership understands that the Soviet Union may well have pushed the American body politic exactly to that point — regardless of the apparently adverse state of the multilevel military balance.

Second, contrary though it is to Soviet style, war may occur in the 1980s because of the analytic combination of a short-term Soviet military optimism and the medium- to long-term Soviet pessimism specified above. A Soviet politician could argue, not implausibly in the early 1980s, that the USSR has "a window," lasting only until 1987-1988, in which it should be able forcibly to restructure its security condition. It could defeat NATO in Europe; seize NATO European (and Japanese) energy supplies at their source in the Middle East; dominate, control, and — if need be, albeit very painfully — win any process of nuclear escalation that ensues; and set back Chinese modernization for several generations. Careful students of Soviet style will say, "But this is contrary to the Soviet way!" True, but the conditions and opportunities of the 1980s will be unique.

VII

The United States tends to be an optimistic, problem-solving culture. The character of the Soviet empire, however, is beyond the ability of benign interdiction by American policymakers; and it is already 1981. The Reagan administration does not propose to alter fundamentally the structural relationship between U.S. central forces and theater forces (conventional and theater-nuclear), meaning that the NATO alliance must continue to place deterrent hope upon a U.S. willingness and ability to invoke its strategic-nuclear posture in order to aid, in extremis, a forward deployment that is facing defeat in the theater. The principal, though far from sole, military problem facing the United States is the theoretical first-strike vulnerability of its silo-housed Minuteman and Titan ICBM force. Many people appear to have difficulty understanding just how this admittedly limited vulnerability can have political meaning. The answer, alas, is all too obvious.

There is some irony in the fact that Secretary of Defense Brown, in the very speech where he explained in some detail the

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rationale behind the "new" strategic-nuclear targeting doctrine proclaimed officially in PD-59, also admitted the near-term imminent vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force — as deployed at present.[13] The theory of deterrence to which most members of both political parties had come to subscribe by 1981 was to the effect that the Soviet leadership would be most deterred by the credible prospect of a threat to the continuity of central political control in the USSR. Such a threat, in U.S. targeting terms, entails prompt strikes against Soviet military, paramilitary, and police forces, and against the political-command structure of the Soviet state. This targeting design could be implemented, with confidence, only by a U.S. ICBM force — the very leg of the strategic triad proclaimed by Harold Brown to be under sentence of Soviet first-strike counterforce death.

To whatever degree one believes U.S. strategic-nuclear forces are relevant to the deterrence of the Soviet Union, just about the last element of U.S. military power that one should permit to become (even theoretically) vulnerable to Soviet pre-emptive attention would be the U.S. ICBM force — yet this is exactly what the Carter administration permitted. President Carter inherited a survivable MX ICBM program with an initial-operating-capability date of 1983, and he bequeathed to President Reagan a date of 1986. The MX program (200 missiles deployed in multiple protective structures [MPS]) is not a panacea for America's defense ills, but it could be *the* defense deployment that frustrates Soviet war plans.[14] If properly designed, MX/MPS should deny the Soviet Union any plausible theory of nuclear-escalation dominance. Indeed, if the Soviet general staff cannot find a way to target MX/MPS intelligently, they should lack for a theory of victory in World War III. It is worth mentioning that MX should not merely frustrate Soviet targeteers; it should also pose a potentially deadly threat to Soviet silo-housed ICBM forces (which comprise, altogether, more than 70 per cent of Soviet offensive-force payload).

The United States' political and military options are limited for most of the 1980s. So long as the United States remains on a peacetime "business as usual" basis, every major weapon system takes the better part of ten years to come to full deployment maturity. War will not necessarily occur in the 1980s, but the United States has taken, and is taking, chances that — given its responsibili-

[13] Harold Brown, speech at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, August 20, 1980.

[14] For detailed development of this argument, see Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and the MX* (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1980) and *The MX ICBM and National Security* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming 1981).

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ties and its fundamental economic and political strength — it has no right to take. The ICBM-vulnerability issue is instructive because it is symbolic of the sort of defense issue that prudent American governments would never have permitted to arise; it is important because it may be the key to escalation-control questions in the crises of the 1980s (aside from the plain fact that survivable ICBMs are critical to the U.S. ability to implement its war plans).

Americans have become habituated to a gerontocratic, committee-style Soviet leadership that takes minimal risks. Moreover, Americans appear to have learned from the crises over Berlin and Cuba in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the Soviet Union, when confronted with very firm American opposition, will accede. What about a new, much younger Soviet leadership group which is eager to flex military muscles acquired over the past fifteen years, which is looking for a major foreign-policy success to consolidate its hold on domestic Soviet authority, and which is not overly respectful of the United States? How do we deal with this phenomenon?

By and large, the West does well to assume that it cannot interdict Soviet policymaking processes in benign ways. Nonetheless, we can and should construct an architecture of containment that denies bright colonels on the Soviet general staff the opportunity to devise plausible theories of military victory in the context of pressing Soviet political problems.

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CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS*

by Thomas W. Robinson

With the exchange of visits in the first half of 1980 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Geng Biao, American-Chinese relations entered a new stage. For all intents and purposes, the two had established the foundation for a defense relationship against the Soviet Union. The United States dropped all pretense of treating Beijing and Moscow equally and looked to perfecting the details — indeed, testing the limits — of the new relationship. The proximate cause for Washington was the Afghanistan crisis, but longer-term factors were at work: a deterioration in the American-Soviet balance of military power; a felt American weakness in general; the desire to use China as a makeweight against the Kremlin; and the hope that catering to Chinese military needs would continue Chinese interest in post-Mao liberal pragmatism.

Even before normalization of relations in 1979, the United States and China acted increasingly in parallel in their relations with the Soviet Union. Such terms as "proto coalition" and "quasi alliance" were applied, and from the first Nixon trip forward there was the implication and, to some, the reality of military cooperation. Indeed, from the very onset of formal contacts in 1971, both parties had in mind a joint or parallel policy toward Moscow, as was clearly shown in the antihegemony clause of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué and in every subsequent joint statement. Moscow also realized the nature of the new transpacific connection, charging correctly that China was attempting to construct an anti-Soviet global united front and with some reason that the United States only pretended to treat both communist powers equally.

All three parties, then, thought that a Sino-American coali-

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tion existed, and all three acted on that assumption. The Soviets considered it an accomplished fact. They protested every successive step in Sino-American détente and conducted their political and military strategy accordingly. The Chinese worked hard to convince everyone that the Sino-American-European-Japanese united front was proceeding on schedule, in accord with well-known Chinese principles of diplomacy and under Chinese leadership. The United States, embarrassed in the decline of its relative power, found the Chinese connection a convenience, coming just when Washington needed to augment its own relative strategic position and when it could not do so without enormous additional outlays.

Obviously, elements of charade as well as reality characterized this situation. The Chinese made more out of the new relationship with Washington than the facts warranted. The Soviets converted images and hints into trends and facts, thus confirming their worst suspicions. American policymakers were happy to allow things to move further and faster than intended, for short-term results were beneficial and costs practically nil.

But how far would America lead China into thinking that we saw eye-to-eye with respect to the USSR? Should we go the next few steps and solidify the military basis of anti-Sovietism with hard goods, transferred technologies, and a multitude of "gray area" ties, convincing everyone of the reality of the new alliance? Proposals for joint action probably would follow declarations of explicit parallelism in policies toward Moscow. On the other hand, the transfer to China of substantial amounts of military-related equipment and skills might merely make it easier for Beijing to approach Moscow from strength and propose settlement of both the border dispute and the Indochina question. That, in turn, could free Moscow to become an even greater and more immediate threat to the United States.

In the longer run, a very strong and active China is not necessarily to America's advantage, particularly as concerns our Asian allies and our Taiwan protectorate. Must we pay a high price, in Asia and elsewhere, to make sure that China is with us in the coming decade of relative weakness vis-à-vis the Soviets? In the short to medium term, it is cost effective to pay Beijing to stay on our side, but there is bound to be a reckoning someday. The eventual price could be higher than we now figure. Maybe we should do some figuring now.

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The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle

The basis of world politics, and therefore of American security policy, is the three-sided game we play with China and the Soviet Union. In that relationship, a change in attitude of one toward either or both of the others transforms the triangle. In this regard, several verities should be noted. First, China has put aside, in the face of the Soviet threat, long-felt differences with the United States over a number of issues, Taiwan being only the most obvious. How long will it be before Beijing brings such matters back into full view and demands concessions from us, as a price for its continued co-operation against Moscow or because Beijing thinks its increasing strength warrants reopening these questions for their own sake?

Second, aside from the Indochinese issue, nothing (not even Afghanistan) precludes Beijing and Moscow from addressing and settling on their own merits all nonideological issues, including the border question, that have hitherto driven the two apart. It is merely a matter of time — i.e., augmentation of relative Chinese power — before Beijing decides it can work a deal with Moscow and thus mitigate two decades of rancor.

Third, the changing balance of American-Soviet military power makes the stakes higher for Washington than for Beijing in the emerging Sino-American military relationship. America must pay China just to stay in place, since it is the United States, not China, that must lead the coalition of anti-Soviet forces. The United States cannot avoid this responsibility. It is impossible for the United States to decide one day to make major changes for the better in its Soviet policy. China is not similarly constrained. Unlike America, whose responsibilities and interests are global, China's interests are regional; she is responsible for no one else's security, aside from North Korea's.

Potential for movement within the strategic triangle thus lies with Beijing, not Washington. America's relative power decline makes it vulnerable to rapid changes in Beijing's Soviet policy; so does Washington's refusal over the past decade to modernize its military forces as necessary to fulfill its alliance obligations and protect its innate interests. Will not China someday demand payment in kind, and in policy changes favorable to herself, just to stay away from Moscow or merely to postpone settlement of differences?

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Bad and Good Reasons for Sino-American Military Ties

Perhaps these worries are extraneous to the present and foreseeable course of Sino-American relations. Two other items seem uppermost in the minds of many analysts: (1) how China might assist the West in the event of war with the Soviet Union, especially if the Soviets should invade Western Europe, and (2) what assistance the United States might be called upon to render China upon Soviet invasion of that country. In other words, U.S. policymakers assume the existence of a Sino-American harmony of interests against the Soviet Union and presume that all differences will be put aside by both countries in the face of the common danger. In a position of relative weakness, long-run considerations are sacrificed to short-term security needs.

These two possibilities must vitally concern defense planners, for their occurrence would involve the United States in a war — probably nuclear — with the Soviet Union or would cause such a shift in the balance of power as to mortgage American policy far into the future. A war in Europe or a Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East with a possible European "follow-on," would put extreme pressure on the United States to involve the Chinese as directly as possible, or at least to prevent Beijing from standing neutral during a Soviet-American death struggle. A Sino-Soviet war of the type usually envisaged (massive Soviet attack to defeat and destroy large numbers of Chinese units and/or to occupy significant territory) would fatally disorganize China, eventually put Europe and the Middle East at jeopardy, and ruin any further chance of improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Policymakers cannot be blamed for wishing to take out insurance against these possibilities by moving toward closer security ties with China, but neither possibility is a likely enough occurrence to warrant by itself the kinds of investments and costs likely to be associated with such ties. On balance, costs appear to outdistance benefits so long as the prospects for either scenario are judged, as seems likely, to be relatively low. It is therefore necessary to adduce other reasons why direct, overtly anti-Soviet military ties with Beijing could be worth the risks.

Other reasons do exist. One such is the deliberate creation of a coalition so strong that Moscow, finding itself hemmed in, would give up plans to expand its influence in areas contiguous to its borders and farther away. If a coalition comprising America,

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China, Japan, and Western Europe were sufficiently strong, stable, and long-lived, the Soviet Union presumably would be forced to turn its energies inward, where they belong. This would set the stage for genuine Soviet-American détente, including mutually beneficial arms control agreements. The United States already heads a coalition with NATO and Japan, and relations between the latter two components will probably develop under American encouragement as the Soviet military threat increases. It would remain only to bring in the Chinese on an agreed, even if informal, basis. That process seems already to be under way, thanks to the Soviet threat — evident both before and after Afghanistan. Some think a bit more substance and a few more symbols will make it a reality. Of course, bringing the Chinese into such an arrangement means paying them enough that they will stay the course when the going with Moscow gets rough. But if this will tame the Soviets, then — so the argument goes — overall security benefits outweigh whatever entrance and continuation fees are necessary to ensure Beijing's allegiance.

Once the coalition is in place, however, will the Soviets behave as we want them to? Moscow might move to smash the coalition before it solidifies or try to transform the situation by one or another breakout strategy. To avoid either of these problems, the coalition must remain loose enough that it does not unduly threaten the Soviet Union, and Moscow must be convinced that the new arrangement is really for the Soviet Union's own good — that everyone, including the Soviets, will live in a safer world as a result or that commensurate material benefits will come Moscow's way once it decides to quit the game of expansion and power projection. It is a tricky business, of course, to know just how close (i.e., effective) such a "loose" coalition can be while still not threatening the Soviet Union. Moreover, is a loose, flaky coalition really a coalition? The putative gains may not be worth the risks. In particular, the Chinese may not be satisfied with an inchoate arrangement whereby the other parties, but not themselves, are joined by formal ties.

The Chinese have never liked second-class citizenship. At the least, moving toward a coalition raises questions of how formal the ties should become, whether the coalition should be based only on a bilateral tie or whether Beijing should be included in some multilateral arrangement. At present, a formal tie seems unnecessary and, to the Chinese, perhaps undesirable. It is not the Chinese habit to enter into formal multilateral coalitions that inhibit their freedom of maneuver. Eventually, though, it may be to America's advantage

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to seek to commit China to some more definite bilateral arrangement, and perhaps to one with Tokyo and the West European capitals. Failing that, both for safety's and planning's sake it may be desirable to spell out with precision the nature and limits of any political-military arrangement with Beijing.

The argument in favor of a loose coalition thus evolves in the direction of an ever-firmer tie. But such a tie might beget just the result that joint Sino-American action seeks to avoid — increasingly strong Soviet reaction, even to the point of taking military action against one or more of the new coalition's members or of seeking compensation elsewhere. The coalition could not be sure that, a cordon sanitaire having been drawn around Soviet borders and its East European sphere of influence, Moscow would see the error of its ways and become a satisfied, status quo power.

Soviet Strategies in Response to Sino-American Cooperation

What strategies might Moscow adopt to forestall, smash, or outflank a Beijing-Washington–centered coalition? The most likely and efficient Soviet response would involve "internal" measures designed to counter the awesome potential power of the new coalition. By internal measures, I mean those that Moscow can now carry out or could in the future carry out, if it so wished, with its own resources. For example, the Soviet Union could partially re-Stalinize the economy, thereby transferring a greater proportion of the social product to military and other foreign-policy purposes. It could do the same in domestic society, extirpating what little opportunity for expression has grown within the system and enforcing near-wartime discipline on the populace. The Kremlin could enforce similar social and economic measures on Eastern Europe, as well, thus making even more resources available for countering the strength of the perceived coalition. Finally, Moscow could attempt to solidify ties with its allies and protectorates in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, fashioning as nearly as possible a cohesive, Soviet-directed alliance system.

In combination, these measures would go some distance in countering the actual or potential power of the new anti-Soviet East-West coalition. Moreover, the Soviet Union can carry them out, however harmful they might be. One consequence would be a new and vicious cold war, largely wiping out all progress in Soviet-Western relations since 1959 and rendering the intervening two decades a mere interlude. Such developments may be inevitable, given

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international trends after Afghanistan, and also "necessary" in the sense that a new cold war may be the price the coalition must pay to stop Soviet expansionism and preserve the balance of power. Let us assume that this is the Soviet response to the coalition. The United States would then have to decide rather quickly whether accelerating arms budgets, failure of strategic arms control, and accompanying changes in U.S. society are worth the gain in long-term security.

The Soviets have a second response, short of war, to an actual or perceived coalition-in-the-making. They could seek to shield domestic Soviet developments from the deleterious effects of competition with the coalition. Moscow could do this by compromising with one or another member of the alliance-under-construction, most probably with China and/or Japan, thus forestalling the coalition's solidification. For more than two decades, Moscow has been attempting to do just that with Beijing, although with little success (thanks to Chinese intransigence toward the Kremlin's own policies of overgarrisoning its borders with China and building its own alliance system surrounding China). The Soviet Union has also tried unsuccessfully to improve its relations with Japan, always stumbling over its own diplomatic crudities and unwillingness to compromise on the Northern Islands issue.

Required would be a renewed, more genuine effort to entice from the American embrace either or both of the Asian members of the coalition. In the Chinese case, enticement could only mean coupling offers to compromise on the border issue with two other concessions: first, a workable scheme of arms control and force reductions along the Sino-Soviet border; second, a major diminution of Soviet force deployments in Vietnam. The latter would have to include a diplomatic and economic distancing from Hanoi such that it would be made clear that Moscow expects to abandon Southeast Asia to Beijing as an area of exclusive Chinese influence.

Just to mention these minimal conditions — which China would probably insist upon as the price for improved relations with Moscow — is to note their futility. The Kremlin may already have gone too far in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan to turn back. Under only two conditions would Moscow be prepared to "sell out" a smaller communist ally in order to improve relations with its major communist adversary: (1) long-term Chinese-Soviet friendship and cooperation against the West and (2) a direct, immediate, and overwhelming threat from the West (in which case the question of "sell-

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out" to China would not even arise). Neither seems likely in the foreseeable future.

Moscow could, finally, attempt to reinstate détente with NATO, especially with its European component. The Soviet Union could then face the challenge from the east more directly. But again, that is highly unlikely, given the still-increasing Soviet military build-up against NATO; the various strategic and conventional "windows" of the early 1980s, all favoring Moscow; the realization in the West that if Soviet forces should invade China or destroy her chief military installations, Europe could be next; and the ever-greater Soviet willingness to use force in pursuit of Soviet interests. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan probably has caused this option for Moscow to be stillborn.

The Soviets are thus driven back to their first (hard-line) policy choice, and this seems to be the option Moscow has decided to adopt. The domestic screws are already being tightened. Pressure to follow suit in Eastern Europe should be expected. A Soviet diplomatic offensive, with the aim of uniting as many states as possible into a common, Moscow-directed alignment, can also be anticipated. This would, in fact, constitute a formal expression of the Soviet "collective security" proposal of several years ago. Such a move is also likely as a response to the extension of the American security blanket to the Persian Gulf, Washington's anti-Soviet military cooperation with China, and the various other measures taken to punish Moscow for its Afghan transgression.

The View from Beijing

How does the situation appear to Beijing? Several elements are germane, of which the most important is the domestic situation. Having finally gotten beyond Mao, his party survivors and the Chinese populace are determined to make up for the enormous losses suffered under the Great Helmsman and intend to put society back on the track of all-around modernization. Two implications follow. First, the foreign policy of the Four Modernizations is one of peace (e.g., of arranging the security environment so that prospects for conflict are minimal). China therefore wishes not merely to avoid war but to compromise where possible with her opponents. Beijing's habitual means toward this end has been to decide which one of its enemies is most threatening, to cooperate temporarily with all others, and to lead a united front against the chosen opponent. Peace is thereby preserved; or war, if it comes, is fought on the most favorable terms possible. This is exactly the policy China pursues at

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the moment: compromising with her long-term and less-threatening enemy, the United States, in order to face her short-term and more-threatening opponent, the Soviet Union. Peace, or at least the delay of conflict, is the product. In either case, China can devote greater attention to, and enjoy a longer period of, economic modernization.

A second implication is that China will do what she can to obtain economic assistance and technology from a diversity of suppliers. Although in the short run this means Western suppliers, there is no intrinsic reason why it could not eventually include the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed, when Western capital and technology are as fully invested in China as capitalist economic principles and Western governmental policies will allow, China is likely to approach Moscow as the sole remaining supplier![1]

Another domestic force is the character of leadership politics in Beijing. Since Mao's demise and the removal of the Gang of Four, Chinese leadership seems to be more solidly united than at any time since 1956. There has been, however, an undercurrent of opposition and resentment felt by many middle- and higher-level party administrators and military leaders against the rather high-handed and ultrapragmatic policies of Deng Xiaoping. This has caused Deng to be somewhat more circumspect than he would otherwise have been in his policies, including his foreign policies.

In 1980, Deng succeeded in removing four additional high-level neo-Maoists reputed to have been opposed to him and promoted his associates to important posts. He also made the army swear allegiance to the party's policies, including defense-budget cutting. As a result, the top leadership of the party and army seems more nearly in Deng's personal control than before. Having freed himself of this opposition, Deng and his followers can pursue their own foreign policy direction with less worry; and if Deng is really the ultrapragmatist of his reputation, the way is also clear for a more open approach to Moscow for negotiating Sino-Soviet differences on their merits and for establishing a policy of balance between Washington and Moscow.

Domestic determinants of Chinese foreign policy, then,

[1] Moscow has constantly made known its willingness to resume close economic relations with China. That is the principal carrot the Kremlin has held out to Beijing during the past two decades of estrangement. In addition, a still-large portion of China's industrial stock is Soviet-derived. It would thus be rather easy to reintroduce Soviet equipment into the Chinese economy, which in any case is also socialist and becoming ever more Soviet-like as modernization proceeds. Finally, China possesses many scientists, technicians, and managers who were trained in the Soviet Union or by Soviet personnel in China. These people probably would not feel particularly remiss were Beijing and Moscow to make up economically, and they still form an important "pressure group" in China.

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point toward an eventual lessening of tensions with Moscow. The Kremlin's support of Vietnam against Cambodia and China, it is true, together with the invasion of Afghanistan, does pull Chinese policy the other way; but the second major element informing that policy — China's international environment — tends in the long run to turn Beijing back to the necessity — and the desirability — of settling disputes with the Kremlin. For twenty years, China has made anti-Sovietism the principal feature of her foreign policy. From 1959 to 1969, this was coupled with anti-Americanism, for Beijing then believed that superpower discord made the environment safe enough to pursue an independent course or to concentrate on internal problems. Since 1969, though, the greater security threat from Moscow has caused Beijing to lean toward Washington within the strategic triangle and to fashion an international united front against the Soviets. In so doing, China has mortgaged almost every other aspect of her foreign policy.

The Beijing leadership must remain uncertain that the strength of the new coalition-in-formation will be great enough to deter Soviet attack. The reasons are three. First, China's military strength — however great absolutely — clearly lags behind Soviet power along the Sino-Soviet border. Second, China has discovered just how far behind she really is in military modernization and has taken fright. Finally, the United States — China's only alternative protector — has lost considerable ground to the Soviets in the strategic realm (to say nothing of the conventional, where the Soviets have always held the lead). The consequent shift of power has kept China from doing what she would prefer, which is to regain her freedom of maneuver between Washington and Moscow. The recent events in Southeast and Southwest Asia have only enhanced the need to seek security through alliance and have accentuated Beijing's inability to pursue an independent policy. Nonetheless, for all the seriousness of the current situation, Beijing will merely be deferred, and not necessarily forever, from that goal. Indeed, achieving a reasonable degree of security is the essential precondition for recapturing the freedom of maneuver lost at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, all measures that enhance Chinese defensibility increase the probability of, and thus shorten the time until, a Beijing approach to Moscow from a position of strength in order to resolve some of their differences.

The dilemma for the United States thus becomes apparent. Given its own felt military weakness relative to Moscow,

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Washington has little choice but to move closer to China. One principal means has been to assist China in building up her military strength. Chiefly on that basis, Beijing seems interested in a security tie with the United States. But these very measures make it easier for China eventually to distance herself from America and settle, at least in part, her dispute with Moscow. In this behavior we see the most recent manifestation of the "dual strategy" long familiar to students of Chinese policy. That is the real meaning to China of playing the "American card" — use the United States to help ward off the Russian polar bear while preparing for an eventual turning of the tables on the United States that will emancipate China from the onerous necessity of taking advice and assistance from the main capitalist enemy.

The Basis of Chinese Political Strategy

Particular notice should be taken of how the Chinese attempt to use the united front and what the relation is between that strategy and the similar — but not identical — U.S. strategy of balance of power. The two resemble each other in a number of particulars, especially in their short-term operational characteristics, but differ in assumptions and long-term outcomes. Both combine true and false assumptions that make for a superficial congruence in needful circumstances, such as at present, but that contain the seeds of mutual misunderstanding and eventual conflict. The united front strategy can be summarized as follows.

1. The object is to render China's principal enemy, the Soviet Union, incapable in two senses: (1) by making impossible a successful Soviet attack on China, or on states and regions that Beijing defines as vital to Chinese security, and (2) by freeing China from Soviet-imposed restrictions on her policy freedom, principally around the Asian periphery.

2. The means to this end is to isolate Moscow by combining with China's "secondary" enemy (the United States), with Washington's allies (Japan, Western Europe, and a scattering of other selected states), and with as many Third World countries as can be enlisted — thus confronting Moscow with an unbeatable combination.

3. China regards herself as leader of the united front. She defines the principal enemy, divides the secondary enemy from that enemy, settles on the strategy for first resisting and later settling with the Soviets, and takes decisions that the others are expected to

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accept and carry out. There is little possibility of genuine coalition-decisionmaking in Beijing's scheme of things.

4. All states play a role in the united front as enemy, friend, or neutral. The secondary enemy — the United States — is treated cautiously, for at any time it may betray China by compromising with the Soviets or even by pointing its weapons against Beijing. Genuine "friends" are few in number, given China's historical experience (before and after 1949), but every effort is made both to keep them satisfied (which means catering to some of their benign desires) and to increase their number. Friends are somewhat more reliable than neutrals, if only because some of them have interests that innately bind them to China. At the stroke of a pen, however, China can cast a "friend" into the ranks of the enemy, his accomplices, or the wavering neutrals. "Neutrals" eventually split into supporters or detractors of the Chinese united front leadership, becoming either "friends" or "accomplices of the enemy." Thus, neutrals are not valued for their own sake, as in a balance-of-power policy, but for the benefits or harm they can bring to or inflict on China.

5. Although in the short term China does seek to balance power, she does so only to destroy or render harmless the principal enemy. Ideology, interest, and power — the three basic elements in the balance of power — are treated differently in a united front policy, ideology occupying a somewhat more important place. Moreover, China does not admit that national interest is a determinant of foreign policy, although her actions suggest some awareness of the connection. Neither does she recognize that power operationalizes and expresses interest and that, because power changes, so does interest. Rather, China claims that her interests, ideological and state-centered, are independent of her power and thus will be the same two decades hence, just as they were two decades ago.

6. What does change rapidly are the tactics necessary to survive in a perfidious and unfriendly world. United front tactics are the most important aspect of policy, for they link power and interest. Because China thinks her interests are constant, while she knows her relative power is determined by the power, policies, and interests of the United States and the Soviet Union (as well as her own), Beijing feels constrained to fall back on tactics — manipulation — as the only way remaining to ensure security.

7. The most important decision in the united front strategy is to determine who the main enemy is. Everything else follows:

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the categorization of all other states and the tactics China will apply toward them. The cases of the United States and the Soviet Union are instructive. In the 1950s, the United States was the "principal enemy"; in the 1960s, it shared that distinction with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s and early 1980s, America has been a secondary enemy. As a near "mirror image" case, the Soviet Union has gone from China's closest "friend" in the early 1950s to Beijing's chief enemy in the 1970s. China's policies toward all other states and issues flowed from the assigned character of its relations with the two superpowers. Thus, for instance, China treated Japan and Thailand at a distance and with disdain in the 1950s and 1960s, when they were allies of China's main enemy. The same two states came into greater favor in the 1970s, when the United States was declared the secondary enemy; then they were seen as temporary allies against the new main enemy.

Beijing in the 1980s: Between Washington and Moscow

Since China has changed her evaluation of the Soviet Union from one extreme to the other in less than two decades, Beijing might well redefine its attitude toward Moscow in the 1980s were there to be an improvement in China's security posture vis-à-vis the Soviets. If that were to occur, there seems little doubt that the United States would again take its historic place as China's principal enemy, for three reasons. First, Beijing has only temporarily put aside its differences with the United States on the most important issue — Taiwan — and that issue will have to be confronted within the next several years. Second, for the foreseeable future the United States is the only country, aside from the Soviet Union, that can counter Chinese power in Asia. Remove or mitigate the Soviet threat to China and America once again becomes of paramount concern to Beijing. Third, Chinese power over the next two decades is likely to grow so rapidly that China undoubtedly will be more and more able both to exert her weight against her regional neighbors and to insist that her interests (which will expand with her power) be taken into account by the United States.

If the United States and the Soviet Union are today Asia's principal external powers, China will seek to supplant them tomorrow, first by balancing one against the other and then, gradually, by squeezing both powers out of the region. This process can only draw Beijing and Washington into a relationship first of mixed friendship and adversity, depending on the issue, and then of more or less con-

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stant opposition, where particular issues will be masking a broader struggle for primacy of power in Asia. Given America's dual preoccupation with the expansion of Soviet power everywhere and the maintenance of its own role as the principal global power, it appears likely that the United States will at first have to defer to China in Asia and later oppose her there.

Since Mao's death and the removal of his associates, Beijing has twice looked into the possibility of improving relations with Moscow. The first time was during the summer and fall of 1977. That probe ceased in 1978 with the onset of the events which culminated in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia late that year and the Chinese "counterattack" into northern Vietnam in early 1979. Almost immediately after the Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam, in March 1979, and Beijing's denunciation of the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, China again seemed to evince an interest in improving relations with Moscow by proposing a new set of state-level talks. These began in late summer 1979 and continued in a reasonably positive manner until they were cut short by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December.

In each instance, it was Soviet action that spelled an end, *pro tempore,* to Sino-Soviet negotiations. How long will it be before the next round of aggressive Soviet policy initiatives fails to eventuate "in time" and thus fails to forestall improvement of Moscow-Beijing relations at the expense of Washington?

Ideology points in the same direction. Its influence is usually swamped by the requirements of national security and the domestic political situation. It then becomes a mere talisman of policy. But when ideology points in the same direction as foreign policy and domestic politics, it exerts an important contributing influence. That is the case now for China in the American and Soviet cases: ideology is not only a vocabulary for discussing policy but is a policy-orienting criterion, as well.

In the American case, China regards capitalism and the foreign policy it supposedly produces as the major long-term enemy and a perfidious short-term ally. That is one reason why Beijing reacted negatively to U.S. suggestions of coordinated action against Moscow after Afghanistan. Because of these views (and for other reasons), the United States can never expect China to be more than a sometime friend. Indeed, once the Soviet threat to China is mitigated or eliminated, Washington should expect Beijing to do what it can to exclude American influence from Asia. Nor should America

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be surprised when the Chinese assessment of the United States as a society reverts to a Marxist-based rejection of American values and actions. In fact, after a period of relatively open reportage about American domestic developments and foreign-policy moves, Chinese news media and decisionmakers are already evidencing a return to a severely critical norm.

Ideology is even more useful as an indicator of Beijing's orientation toward the Soviet Union, the "enemy within" the socialist community. The Sino-Soviet dispute began as — or at least was initially expressed primarily in terms of — an argument over doctrine. Chinese ideological evaluations have gone through three phases over the past two decades. In the period after 1957, the Soviet Union was termed "revisionist." With the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the phrase "social-imperialist" was added. Since Mao's death in 1976, the Chinese favor the term "hegemonists" to describe Soviet leaders.

In each instance, the Chinese appraisal summed up what most bothered them about the Soviets. In the case of "revisionism," Beijing was most worried about the character of Soviet domestic policies and the Soviets' tendency, in Chinese eyes, to compromise with the United States. Revisionism must not spread to China nor should it infect Chinese foreign policy. "Social imperialism" symbolized Chinese worries about the Soviet use of armed force abroad and China's evaluation of Moscow's military rule over Eastern Europe. China could be next. "Hegemonism" pointed up Chinese concern about the possibility that Moscow might prove so strong — despite resistance by the United States, NATO, and China — that it could impose its will on any state or region, thus creating a world empire. "Hegemonism" must be resisted at all costs and by whatever means lest China find herself alone, facing an overwhelming combination of the Soviets and their regional lackeys.

Recently, however, China has revised her ideological view of the Soviet Union. In 1979, she dropped the revisionist label, thus indicating that ideological differences were no longer basic to the quarrel with Moscow. By stressing the hegemonism theme, Beijing clearly indicated that its concern centered on national security. Early in 1980, moreover, the first indications appeared that China once again considered the Soviet Union to be a socialist state. The most important implication of this change was for the internal Chinese order; China had to eliminate the contradiction between her own adoption of economic revisionism and her criticism of the Soviets

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for the same policy. But there was an important foreign-policy implication, as well. If the USSR was now a socialist country after all, it could no longer conduct a social-imperialist foreign policy. China then needed not be quite so fearful of the possibility of Soviet military action against Chinese territory, for China is another socialist country and thus less likely to suffer from Soviet political-military ambition.

China's problem is thus reduced to competing with the Soviets for influence in Asia and in other regions and to amassing sufficient power to approach Moscow through negotiations from strength. The U.S. role correspondingly shrinks to that of (a) "security insurance agent," in case the Soviets should, in some unlikely instance, surprise the Chinese militarily, and (b) supplier of equipment and technology to help China modernize and eventually obtain a better deal from Moscow. Beijing has not yet spelled out these implications of its changed ideological attitude toward the Soviet Union, but its policy toward the United States seems clearly to envisage such a role for Washington.

America's China Policy in the Context of U.S.-Soviet Relations

What about U.S. policy toward China in the context of America's global rivalry with the Soviet Union and in relation to the overall character of America's Asian policy? Several U.S. policy purposes can be identified.

1. American foreign-policy purposes are similar in many respects to those of China. The United States must first see to its own security, which of course means defense against Soviet nuclear attack. Because of America's geographic location, the United States seeks to defend its land boundaries as far away as possible, and supports the independence of as many states — particularly industrial states — as possible around the Soviet periphery. In an era of severe global competition with the Soviet Union, this interest motivates the United States to work out a security relationship with Beijing. The other, more positive, side of security is access. The United States does not want to be frozen out of Asia or out of any substantial part of it. Hence, Washington opposes any power that attempts to dominate Asia or its regions or one that tries to exclude an American presence, be it economic, cultural, or military.

2. A second purpose is economic. America has become interdependent, especially with its most important regional trading

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partners in noncommunist Asia. For more than a quarter-century, the United States has fostered the economic development of its Asian friends and allies. Asian economic development has been so successful and rapid that some states are already highly industrialized, more are clearly on the way, and the rest have a good chance. That success enhances America's prosperity and security.

American economic policy in Asia also serves more basic purposes. One is to foster Asian prosperity as an essential condition for "democratization." Another is to strengthen economic interdependence with Asian states, thus ensuring U.S. economic access to Asian markets and resources, including human capital and technology. Finally, economic development on the "foreign trade, foreign capital investment, economic interdependence" model provides non-Western examples of the virtues of capitalism and interdependence.

China fits the pursuit of these purposes. Through good economic relations with the United States, China looks with favor on America's Asian friends and allies and develops economic ties with them. That lessens military tensions. The United States gains access to Chinese markets, resources, and goods. China also becomes partially integrated into the world economic system — which, because it is largely separated from the Soviet-led socialist economic system, makes it less tempting for Beijing to reintegrate itself with Moscow. Finally, a close economic relationship with China enables the United States to influence the pace and character of Chinese economic development. Thus, when China becomes the economic giant of Asia, as she surely will, she will be less likely to turn against the United States and more likely to continue cooperating with America and its Asian friends in a wider, mutually beneficial transpacific cooperation.

3. The third American purpose in Asia (as elsewhere) is ideological. The United States wants a world of states similar to itself, politically and philosophically. This does not necessarily mean capitalist states; democratic socialism seems perfectly acceptable to latter-day America. It does mean, however, states whose people value the "open" society and basic political rights, and which take a charitable and humanitarian — if still prudent and realistic — approach to others. Certainly China does not meet this test. Leninist communism, of which the Chinese Communist Party is a prime example, is inimical to political and social values closely held by

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Americans. This fact cannot be obscured by a realpolitik-based political rapprochement nor by Beijing's efforts, welcome as they are, to carry through needed sociopolitical reforms.

This poles-apart and ultimately irreconcilable ideological situation severely limits the ultimate character of Sino-American relations. How close, for anti-Soviet purposes, should America move toward China if continued cooperation means that Washington must ignore Chinese domestic policies that are at variance with basic American values? Ultimately, it would mean a double standard for the United States: submitting America's Asian allies to a high test of moral and political "goodness" and China to a more relaxed standard.[2]

Although Beijing has muted its ideological criticism of America and of America's Asian allies for foreign-policy purposes, it remains faithful to long-held Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles. And while the Maoist component is under stern scrutiny, even the casting off of its more extreme tenets would not lead to a genuine and permanent change in underlying attitudes toward Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and other relevant capitals. Moreover, the anti-Soviet "glue" that currently binds Washington and Beijing someday will crack with age. When differences over other issues re-emerge of their own accord, Chinese ideological attitudes toward the United States will again be important to Beijing's policy toward Washington and its Asian friends.

4. America's principal foreign-policy means has been the balance of power, whether it be called cold war, containment, or détente. Transnationalism, isolationism, and other attempts to go beyond the balance of power have so far proved unworkable. America's China policy also centers on the balance of power by contributing to the balance against Soviet expansionism and by promoting America's Asian goals.

America's Asian balance-of-power policy has two components. The first is to ensure that no external state or combination of states dominates the region. That would place Asian resources and territory at the disposal of possibly unfriendly powers, subvert Asian economic development and democratization, and freeze out the United States. The second is to make certain that no indigenous Asian state or group of states, alone or in league with some external

[2] There is, in fact, a dual ideological tension between Washington and Beijing: differences in attitudes between the two regimes (and societies) and differences in attitudes that each in turn adopts when approaching the other's Asian allies.

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power, dominates the area. These two components indicate a policy of opposing the expansion both of Soviet power in Asia as well as that of any Soviet ally (e.g., Vietnam), since the Soviet Union is the only external power that has the capability to rule large parts of Asia. Asia also contributes to this policy by protecting itself from undue Soviet influence and by contributing some of its resources to oppose Soviet expansion elsewhere.

America's Asian policy must center not only on Japan but also on China, as the strongest militarily and most centrally located, if not yet economically the most highly developed, Asian state. U.S. policy has consistently done so since World War II: China's position between America and the USSR has been a key element in setting America's policy toward the Soviet Union, Asia, and China itself.[3]

China has been the "swing" member of the strategic triangle. Her policy variations have forced or made possible commensurate changes in U.S. China policy: opposing China in the 1950s, ignoring her in the 1960s, and allying with her in the 1970s. Each change was a natural, if not entirely automatic, reaction to the requirements of regional and global balance of power. Washington has always maintained the balance, but usually in response to "made in Beijing" policy changes undertaken strictly for reasons of Chinese national interest.

Most instruments of policy have been employed principally for balance-of-power purposes. Thus, American economic and military assistance, trade patterns, immigration laws, clandestine and intelligence operations, military interventions, alliances, cultural and academic exchanges, basing agreements, troop stationing, naval and air deployments, shows of force, interpretations of international law, membership in and fostering of international and transnational organizations, attitudes toward the Asian component of global issues, and encouragement or discouragement of an activist role for other Western powers in Asia have all varied along with Washington's relationship with Moscow globally and with Beijing regionally. So it is today and so it will be in the future. Because it is unlikely that Soviet-American relations will improve in the next decade or two, movement in U.S. Asian and China policy will be determined by

[3] During the 1950s Beijing allied with Moscow, and Washington responded by forming its own united front through a series of alliances. In the 1960s China split with the Soviet Union, and Washington approached Moscow with proposals for détente. The United States would have done the same with China had the Vietnam War and Chinese domestic politics not interfered. In the 1970s China felt threatened by Soviet arms, and the United States needed support against Soviet expansionism. Washington thus moved with reasonable speed to make peace with Beijing, to maintain the global balance, and to restore balance in Asia.

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Beijing's stance between the two superpowers. This will be all the more evident to the extent that Washington allows, as it does now, portions of its Asian and China policy to be made in Beijing.

Comparing United Front and Balance-of-Power Policies

China's Washington-Moscow policy is based on the united front as a conservative and temporary device to preserve Chinese security in a time of relative weakness. Washington's Beijing-Moscow policy is based on the balance of power as a conservative but more permanent device to preserve U.S. security vis-à-vis the USSR and to secure America's regional Asian interests. Are united front and balance of power compatible in the sense of forming a solid basis for long-term Sino-American cooperation and friendship? Or are they mutually consistent only over the short term, destined eventually to drive the two states and peoples apart once again? If there are immediate and obvious benefits — in national security, economic development, and cultural (if not ideological) harmony — to the present arrangement, are they not being purchased at the expense of higher long-term costs?

Balance of power and united front are congruent only so long as Washington and Beijing regard Moscow as a common and overriding threat and so long as China considers economic development as her chief domestic priority. They are not identical, however, even though they utilize many of the same policy instruments and even though they require some compromise of interests on both sides. In the long run, moreover, the changing situation and innate differences in the two policies may well drive America and China apart. For a while, China need not worry about this ultimate incompatibility. A united front policy is quite capable, for a finite and presumably short period, of compromising some interests and postponing some goals (e.g., absorption of Taiwan and ideological competition with capitalism). China's short-term security goal, deterrence of Soviet expansionism in Asia and beyond, is identical to that of the United States; and the means toward that goal — cooperation in all spheres, including military — are similar in most cases.

It pays, though, to note the differences. One such is that China must always feel she is leading the united front and not merely cooperating or even serving as a junior partner in a budding alliance. Beijing wishes to set the pace of mutual cooperation, stipulate its direction and distance, and decide which policy instruments to use. Fortunately, Washington seems aware of these psychological needs

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on the part of the Chinese leadership. A workable balance-of-power policy, however, needs more. It needs, first, stability in policy direction and, secondly, cooperation in the (joint and separate) use of policy instruments over a rather lengthy period. For overall global balance (which is what concerns Washington) changes only slowly — over decades.

Washington thus seeks assurances that China will not suddenly change her policy, drop the anti-Soviet united front, and revert to one of her traditional postures — independence from both Moscow and Washington, isolationism/autarky, or reversal of united front opponents. To this should be added possible future policies of "Asianism" (a mixture of anti-Westernism and racism under Chinese leadership), a Third World–against–the–superpowers emphasis (presumably also under Chinese leadership), and regional expansionism as China's power grows. China is not willing to give such assurances, of course, because she does not want to mortgage again her policy freedom to the dictates of a foreign power. A mutually binding relationship with the United States will not enhance Chinese maneuverability.

Thus, a basic contradiction exists between the policies that China and America use to serve their similar — but not identical — goals. Washington wishes to enter into an ever-increasing series of treaties, agreements, arrangements, and working relationships at all levels, so that Beijing will find interdependence advantageous and so that there might be stability in the relationship. Then the United States would be reasonably free to address the problem of Soviet power without having to worry about a "Chinese double-cross" (or, more positively, with the assurance of Chinese support for its anti-Soviet policies elsewhere) and without having to be sidetracked by Chinese assertiveness in Asia in ways, subregions, and at times inconvenient and inimical to American priorities and interests. Washington wants to put the China problem (in the large sense) on ice for a couple of decades until it has successfully stymied Soviet expansionism. Moreover, it wants China to carry much of the anti-Soviet burden in Asia and does not want to pay much in terms either of fatally compromised interests or of investment in policy instruments.

The other difference is in eventual outcomes, in Asia and as concerns the Soviet Union. Chinese policy is double-edged. The eventual purpose of a pure united-front strategy is to reverse the power relationship with the opponent, to overthrow him and, ulti-

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mately, to destroy him. Toward Moscow, Beijing probably does not have such drastic intentions in mind, to say nothing of its lack of the means, in any reasonable future, for doing so. Nonetheless, the logic of the united front drives Beijing in that direction; and it is that propensity, coupled with China's growth in power, that so troubles the Soviets. On the other hand, China desires more security against the Soviet military threat. The united front is only one way to achieve that goal. The others are compromise with Moscow on their differences (the border question and the division of Soviet and Chinese power in Asia and elsewhere) and a vast growth in power such that China must no longer truck with her American opponent or with such wavering middle elements as Japan and Western Europe. On balance, it is quite doubtful that Beijing will stick with a united front policy forever. Indeed, the "lessons" of the Chinese Communist past, before and since 1949, point toward Beijing dropping the united front policy in favor either of going it alone (as in the 1960s) or maneuvering between Washington and Moscow (as in the late 1940s). In either case, China would distance herself from the United States and seek a new, more positive relationship with the Soviet Union.

The United States has a somewhat different set of outcomes in mind. In Asia, Washington wants a reasonably strong China, but one that, as she modernizes, joins with other Asian states and the United States in a transpacific comity of interdependent nations. Then, Chinese power will be submerged in, and will contribute to, a greater whole. Then, also, the probability of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation injurious to the United States will be minimized. With China "captured," both America's access (in all senses) to Asia and America's security from Asian military threats will be served.

It is idealistic to think that such a felicitous outcome is probable. More likely is the gradual emergence of an increasingly powerful China demanding that her interests be served first and that external powers — the United States as well as the Soviet Union — quit the area. This would, of course, put other Asian states at China's mercy unless they were to band together against Beijing or to find (or retain) an external protector. The first is unlikely (who would be the leader: Japan? India?); the second would bring China back into conflict with the United States and its Asian allies. China need not, of course, turn Asia — or such significant subregions as Southeast Asia — into her own sphere of influence by standing up to the Soviets and the Americans simultaneously, or even by exclud-

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ing their influence in turn. She can maneuver and balance between the two, each policy swing selling China's favors in distant regions for another increment of exclusivity in Asia. But, in this case also, the United States must expect to find its Asian interests increasingly compromised as it purchases Chinese support for its greater policy needs elsewhere.

Sino-American détente, normalization, and now anti-Soviet entente are thus, in all probability, not steps toward permanent friendship and cooperation but a series of expedients. They are undertaken on both sides for a mixture of similar and different reasons, and they presume quite different outcomes. So long as the United States is constrained to subordinate its Asia policy to its interests elsewhere, so long as America perceives itself weak vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and so long as it depends heavily on China to do much of its work for it, Beijing is likely to raise the price of its services again and again. China's desire for Western technology and capital and her inordinate fear of Soviet military power are now preventing that price, for a while, from rising rapidly. But the price will rise, regularly and increasingly, when China's fear of the Soviets progressively diminishes and when she lays in an industrial base sufficient to wean herself from economic dependence on the West.

At the moment, the United States has no choice but to continue its policy of all-around cooperation with China, including military. It does so, however, at some cost, and the bills may be presented at inconvenient times and in higher-than-expected amounts. Perhaps the best — indeed, the only — policy alternative open to the United States is what the Chinese call a "self-strengthening movement." Washington, in short, needs to put its domestic house in order, thus providing a base from which it can, with confidence and ease, do what is necessary in the international sphere in order to compete on equal terms with the Soviet Union. These two tasks, at home and abroad, surely will occupy America's energies for the next two decades. After that, one hopes, the Soviet Union will have been tamed and made a responsible member of the international community. Then it will be time to face the real China question: how to adjust to the expansion of Chinese power in a way that will prevent war and, at the same time, secure American interests in Asia. The trick is to use China for anti-Soviet purposes in the near term but not mortgage our Asian policy, our interests, or our allies over the long term. That is a tough job, but one that must be done.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: INTERESTS, GOALS, AND CONSTRAINTS*

by Sheldon W. Simon

Traditionally, the Soviet Union has viewed Southeast Asia as a region of secondary concern. It has not involved immediate security interests as have central Europe and Northeast Asia, which abut vulnerable homeland borders. Nor does the region hold out the tempting potential of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, whose energy resources promise to help satisfy Soviet domestic needs while providing an instrument for destabilizing the West. Rather, Southeast Asia has been on the periphery of Soviet foreign policy, much as Latin America and sub-Sahara Africa — regions where Moscow has pursued targets of opportunity and ideological commitments with scant fear of the consequences for Soviet survival.

Since the end of the Indochina War, the USSR has been developing a more active interest in Southeast Asia. For the first time it has acquired not only an exclusive regional ally, Vietnam, but also one that will remain dominant for years to come. Moreover, the Soviets have upgraded their naval presence in the region, symbolized by the posting of the *Minsk* to the Pacific Fleet, and are pressing Hanoi for air and naval facilities at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. A Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, having formed at a time when American military interests in Southeast Asia are at a low ebb, could lead to a major change in regional orientation and a new opportunity for Soviet hegemony. The People's Republic of China (PRC) particularly sounds this Cassandra-like tocsin, urging the ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) to coalesce with the United States, the PRC, and even Japan to resist the growing Soviet-Vietnamese menace.

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Is such a scenario realistic? The answer depends on several factors, including the nature of Soviet interests and goals in Southeast Asia and the stability of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, particularly in light of Hanoi's history of fierce independence from outside control. Moreover, the USSR confronts its own competing priorities between support for Vietnamese control of Indochina and the desire to establish friendly relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This in turn raises the question of whether there are divisions within ASEAN which Moscow can exploit to enhance Vietnam's acceptability as a counter to China. One may also ask whether Moscow's growing military power has any practical effect on its influence in the region. Finally, policymakers must address the implications of this analysis for American interests in Southeast Asia.

Soviet Views of the Third World and Southeast Asia

Moscow's policy toward Southeast Asia begins with a general view of the Third World and the USSR's ability to shape developments in those countries. Not until the mid 1950s did the Kremlin even attempt to develop a *separate* policy toward underdeveloped countries. Prior to that time, Stalin's "two camps" perspective subsumed colonial and excolonial states under the capitalist camp. Up to the mid 1950s, then, the Soviet Union excluded itself from opportunities to influence the direction Third World countries would take in world affairs. By the 1960s, however, Moscow was in full competition with the United States for Third World support and had also developed a competing developmental model based on state control of major industries. While Beijing trumpeted its own Third World program in the sixties, stressing the importance of indigenous revolution with minimal outside assistance (reflecting the PRC's limited economic and military capabilities), the Soviet Union saw the developing states as an arena for multifaceted competition with both the West and China at a relatively low risk of direct confrontation.

The doctrine under which the Soviet Union currently operates militarily in the Third World was formulated in the mid 1960s. This doctrine implied that the superpowers could engage in Third World military conflicts without their inevitable escalation to the nuclear level, since they did not affect vital superpower interests. In short, local wars could be fought by conventional means in the Third

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World; therefore, the USSR must have the capability to do so.[1] Not that the Soviets anticipated direct military confrontations in the Third World against the United States. Rather, the doctrine formed the basis for Soviet military aid and commitments to the security of Third World clients whose policies coincided with Moscow's own regional goals.[2]

By the 1970s, the Soviets had experienced both successes and failures in their activist Third World policies. Ominously for Washington, they saw the United States in retreat, with the Nixon Doctrine seemingly reflective of indifference over Soviet actions. Annual congressional cuts in foreign military and economic assistance reinforced the view that Washington would not respond to Soviet military aid to Third World regimes and might not even react to the establishment of a Soviet military presence in these countries.[3]

Nevertheless, Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia expanded cautiously. During the Indochina War in the 1950s, the USSR viewed its obligations to the Vietminh as clearly secondary to the creation of friendly ties to more important Third World members such as India. During this period, China consistently backed North Vietnam's military action more vigorously than the Soviet Union.[4] Subsequently, the Soviet Union backed away from conflicts in the region where the risk of direct confrontation with the United States appeared high. After the United States introduced large numbers of its own forces in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the Soviets counseled restraint to North Vietnam — advice which remained consistent until the American withdrawal in 1973.[5] Thus, when Washington mined Haiphong harbor in 1972, locking in Soviet ships, Moscow did not respond.

The Southeast Asian Setting

The Indochina War's termination constituted a political watershed for Southeast Asia. During the struggle from 1945 to 1975,

[1] See the discussion in James M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1979, p. 21.

[2] For an interesting discussion of the pitfalls of Soviet aid to Sukarno's Indonesia, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Soviet and Chinese Influence in Indonesia," in Alvin Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 56-80.

[3] Lilita Dzirklas, *Soviet Perceptions of Security in East Asia: A Study of Soviet Media Content*, P-6038 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, November 1977).

[4] Within the International Control Commission monitoring the Geneva Accord, the Poles were told by the USSR to support India's views even if they conflicted with the DRV's. See Ramesh Thakur, "The International Relations of the China-Vietnam Conflict," paper presented at the ANU Canberra, July 1979, pp. 4-5.

[5] Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence?* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 101, Autumn 1973), pp. 5, 12, 13.

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the Vietnamese communists had struck an alliance with local nationalist movements, China, and the USSR against the West. With the end of the war, fissiparous tendencies among the communist allies appeared almost immediately. Vietnam, China, and the USSR suddenly found themselves in a mutually antagonistic relationship. Vietnam was faced with a hostile China to the north and a suspicious ASEAN to the south; China had the Soviets on its northern border and the Vietnamese, whose wartime alliance had only been pragmatic at best, to the south; and the USSR continued to face NATO in Europe and a hostile China bent on modernizing as well as establishing close relations with both Japan and the United States.

China and the Soviet Union evinced mirror image hostility, each seeing the other as committed to regional hegemony. The Soviet desire for an "Asian Collective Security System" was to be the device for building a series of bilateral arrangements around China from Afghanistan on the west through Vietnam in the east, while China's active diplomacy toward ASEAN, Japan, and the United States was intended to insure against the success of such a Soviet strategy. Moscow's interest in Southeast Asia, then, has been essentially secondary — to block any Chinese dominance and to establish a new presence in a region which the United States decreed to be of lower priority. In short, the Soviet-Indochina alliance serves to block China's Southeast Asian ambitions with minimal risk (though perhaps high economic cost).

The Soviet alliance with Vietnam thus not only becomes a means of applying pressure on China's southern flank but also deflects the PRC from civilian modernization. China's emphasis on military modernization also had the effect of fueling suspicions of Beijing's intentions in the rest of Southeast Asia, reinforcing differences within ASEAN over each member state's China policy. In one sense, however, the Soviets may have believed that they had little choice in their current alliance with Vietnam. Had the USSR not moved to cement relations with Hanoi in the aftermath of its victory, the latter could have turned toward Beijing instead. A Sino-Vietnamese alliance could have been strong enough to thwart Soviet political ambitions in Southeast Asia, particularly in the ASEAN states, whose revolutionary movements have always been more closely aligned with Beijing and Hanoi rather than Moscow.

Somewhat paradoxically, exacerbated relations among the Asian communists — including the USSR — have dissipated much of the communists' regional strategic advantage which appeared to

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grow out of Hanoi's 1975 victory. Public expressions of apprehension at that time over the vulnerability of neighboring states have been muted as Indochina, the PRC, and the Soviet Union concentrated their hostility against one another.

Moreover, the reemergence of historic and ethnic conflicts among the Indochinese states and between Vietnam and China perplex the Soviets because of their inability to influence them. With the exception of a barrage of racist propaganda directed to the ASEAN states excoriating their ethnic Chinese communities, the Soviets are loath to become involved in Southeast Asian ethnic disputes. In general, they constitute a "no win" set of issues; to line up with one group automatically earns the animosity of its adversaries. On the other hand, it is conceivable that ethnic disputes could be seized by Moscow in the future as an entering wedge in a more activist regional policy.

The Polarization of Southeast Asia

Within this fluid matrix, events in 1978 and 1979 polarized Southeast Asia and solidified antagonisms. The new political alignments culminated in two limited wars (Vietnam-Cambodia and China-Vietnam), neither of which resolved the issues that precipitated hostilities and both of which could recur.

These conflicts can be traced directly to exacerbated relations between China and Vietnam during the last years of the Second Indochina War. Although significant differences between Beijing and Hanoi existed as early as the First Indochina conflict (1945-1954), these were contained by the common struggle against France and then the United States. As Hanoi approached victory in 1973, however, China introduced a territorial dimension into its conflict with Vietnam. Chinese marines occupied the Paracel Islands in January 1974. That action may have prompted Hanoi to abandon its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and to turn to Moscow for long-term assistance against what Vietnam perceived to be an expansionist China bent on blocking Hanoi's ambition to dominate Indochina.

Over the next few years, the Vietnamese and Soviets negotiated over the nature of their new relationship. The first major breakthrough was Vietnam's decision to join COMECON in late 1977. For the Soviets, Hanoi's adherence signified a commitment to a Soviet-backed community of states. For Vietnam, COMECON membership provided preferential access to desperately needed capital and consumer goods in order to begin reconstruction. Never-

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theless, both Vietnam and the USSR stopped short of an alliance against China. It took an additional series of events involving Cambodia to move the relationship in that direction.

By late 1977, Vietnamese leaders may well have concluded that Pol Pot's aggressiveness toward Vietnam, backed by China, confronted Hanoi with the possibility of a two-front war and threatened to stymie its reconstruction plans. Pol Pot's regime would have to be eliminated. In order to effect this, however, China would have to be deterred. Only a military alliance with the USSR could serve that end.

Almost simultaneously a separate series of events was occurring in East Asia, which provided the catalyst for the Soviet decision to form the alliance Vietnam was seeking. With U.S. encouragement, Japan finally agreed to the conclusion of a long-pending Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (August 1978). This in turn was interpreted by Moscow as a major Chinese breakthrough in its effort to form an anti-Soviet east Asian alliance composed of China, Japan, and the United States. While Tokyo denied any security significance in the treaty, Beijing fueled Moscow's fears by explicitly describing it as an anti-Soviet accord.[6] Soviet leaders raged against the document, branding it a "military alliance" that paved the way for Japanese capital to modernize China's military forces and served to link China to the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty.[7] Moscow's own riposte was not long in coming: a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Vietnam (November 1978), which countered China and Japan on the northeast with Moscow and Hanoi in the south. Chinese leaders undoubtedly foresaw the prospect of a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia at this point, with the USSR serving both as Vietnam's source of logistics and its guarantor in case of either a Chinese or American reaction. Hoping initially to forestall the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Beijing normalized diplomatic relations with the United States by compromising on the issue of Washington's military aid to Taiwan. Although failing to deter Hanoi, Chinese leaders believed that their new U.S. connection would prove sufficient to block any major Soviet reaction to the PRC's own subsequent border incursion in February-March 1979. A system of quasi alliances was struck which thrust the PRC-SRV dispute into both the Sino-Soviet conflict and global power politics.

[6] See Foreign Minister Huang Hau's remarks in the *Xinhua* report for August 12, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), August 14, 1978, p. A11.

[7] Premier Kosygin was so quoted in Tokyo's *Kyodo*, September 8, 1978, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), September 8, 1978, p. C1. Also see *Red Star* (Moscow), September 17, 1978, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (USSR), September 21, 1978, p. M1.

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Some observers argue that these developments have led to a harder Soviet line reminiscent of the 1950s "two camps" view in which nonalignment is once again discredited. Certainly, both Cuba's and Vietnam's behavior at the September 1979 nonaligned conference in Havana lends credence to this interpretation. Vietnam tried to obtain conference endorsement for the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of the nonaligned and denigrated the notion of a nonaligned group of states independent of the United States and USSR.[8]

If the Soviets are returning to a conceptualization of Third World politics in polar terms, then its goals in Southeast Asia could lead to military challenges, through Vietnam, initially to the remainder of Indochina and subsequently to the ASEAN states. There are alternatives to this explanation of Soviet policy, however. Regional polarization may be interpreted as a set of serial responses to the actions of adversaries. For China, the Soviet-Vietnam link has fostered the creation of a Vietnamese-led Indochina bloc, thus justifying Beijing's hostility. For the Soviet Union, China's hostility justifies Moscow's backing of Hanoi, particularly since Vietnam is the USSR's only secure ally east of Afghanistan. Thus, a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina, dependent on Soviet strategic support, becomes a counterweight to a China viewed as increasingly allied with Japan and the United States. China's hostility propels Vietnam toward closer relations with the Soviet Union. Hanoi's membership in COMECON and its treaty with the USSR demonstrate that Moscow is the only power willing and able to underwrite Vietnam's plan to control Indochina and that Hanoi's earlier attempts (1977-1978) to widen its ties with the noncommunist states of Asia and the United States had been unsuccessful. Growing polarization in East Asian politics is reinforced in Soviet eyes by the United States and Western Europe appearing increasingly eager to assist China in its drive for military modernization.[9]

Vietnam itself has probably been the primary cause of Southeast Asian tensions. Between 1976 and 1978, Vietnamese leaders made a series of inherently contradictory policy decisions. Although initially hoping to improve relations with ASEAN and the United States, Hanoi found them suspicious and unresponsive. At the same time, Pol Pot's Kampuchea had not only resisted Vietnam-

[8] Alexander Dallin, *The United States in the Soviet Perspective* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 151, Summer 1979), p. 19, and the letter from Professor Irving L. Horowitz to the *New York Times* — "Nonalignment Was Put to Death in Havana" — September 25, 1979.

[9] The Soviets term Western military aid to China as a violation of détente. See Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William Hyland, *Soviet Perspectives on Security* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 150, Spring 1979), p. 18.

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ese diplomatic overtures for the creation of a special Indochina relationship but had also initiated military action across Vietnam's border, underlining its insistence on being left alone.[10] Hanoi viewed this resistance as unacceptable and began to plot the forceful overthrow of the Pol Pot regime. Simultaneously, however, for reasons that remain unclear, Vietnam also chose to move toward the complete economic integration of its southern half, including the abolition of all remaining private enterprises, owned almost entirely by ethnic Chinese. It is hard to believe that the Vietnamese did not anticipate a strong negative reaction from Beijing when both its Cambodian client was threatened with invasion and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents in Vietnam were suddenly eliminated by government fiat.

The PRC may have hoped that the combined impact of its new relationships with the United States and Japan would forestall a Vietnamese attack on Cambodia. But the green light for that plan had undoubtedly been given to Vietnam by Moscow when the two initialed their Friendship accord in November. Soviet military supplies for Vietnam had been increasing since the summer, and the SRV announced the creation of a Cambodian National Front (KUFNUS) just one month after the treaty had been signed and less than a month before the invasion itself.

Moscow's concurrence in the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was probably based on the belief that negative world reaction to Hanoi's aggression would be neutralized by general relief at the demise of a pariah regime; but virtually from the day of the treaty's conclusion, Vietnam was assailed from all sides for affiliating too closely with the Soviet bloc. Vietnamese diplomats riposted:

> The signing of this treaty opens vast horizons. We do not wish to place ourselves under the Soviet umbrella. We have had our differences with the Soviet Union over national and international problems, and we made these known to Moscow even if they were never made public. In any case, the Soviet Union has already signed similar treaties with India and Iraq without these countries being accused of entering the Soviet orbit.[11]

According to Chinese media, the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty had created a new hegemonism in Asia in which Vietnam — "the small hegemonism" — would take its direction from Moscow — "the big hegemonism." China's emphasis on Soviet-Vietnamese hegemonis-

[10] See Sheldon W. Simon, "New Conflict in Indo-China," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1978, and Joseph Zasloff and Macalister Brown, "The Passion of Kampuchea," ibid., January-February 1979.

[11] Agence France Presse (Paris), November 4, 1978, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), November 6, 1978, p. K11.

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tic actions was designed to prod Japan and the United States, both of which had earlier agreed to oppose hegemony in Asia in their accords with the PRC.

The growing flood of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam has been a mixed political blessing for the Soviets. From one perspective, a potential exodus of perhaps two million from Vietnam over the next several years would greatly aggravate Overseas Chinese tensions in such ASEAN countries of first asylum as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Regional suspicions over Chinese intentions, always lurking just beneath the surface, would reappear to Moscow's advantage. As Pravda admonished,

> Thus, the use of Overseas Chinese occupies a not insignificant place in Peking's plans for southward expansion. The peoples of Southeast Asia see in the example of Vietnam where this policy leads. In order to mount an anti-Vietnam campaign, to try to influence the independent policy of the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] and to hinder the creative labor of the Vietnamese people engaged in building socialism, Peking resorted to false allegations about "persecution" of persons of Chinese origin. After these subversive actions provoked the "departure" of Overseas Chinese from Vietnam to China, with a view to fueling tension, the Peking authorities set about placing these people, whom they had deceived, along the borders with the SRV and Laos. It is clear now that the slanderous ballyhoo raised by Peking over the "problem" which it had invented was needed for them to proceed to armed provocations against Vietnam.
>
> Who can guarantee that Peking will not use similar new campaigns about Overseas Chinese against any other country? For it constantly keeps Southeast Asia in the sights of its great-power interests.[12]

Cambodia's occupation by Vietnamese military units and the installation of a puppet regime were hailed by the Soviets as conducive to the restoration of peace in the region. Appealing particularly to Thailand, which had had protracted border difficulties with the Pol Pot government, Moscow lauded Bangkok's new opportunity to establish "good neighborly relations between Kampuchea and Thailand" and urged the Thais to resist Chinese pressures to the contrary.[13] Over time, the Soviets surmised, Thailand would either make peace with a Vietnam-dominated Indochina or face the horrendous prospect of accepting up to one million Cambodians fleeing across the border to escape the conflagration.

Once ensconced in Cambodia with a Friendship treaty to legitimate the presence of a Vietnamese occupation force, Hanoi became adamant. Despite the tremendous financial burden of main-

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[12] *Pravda*, February 3, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (USSR), February 9, 1979, p. C4.
[13] *Izvestiya*, March 20, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (USSR), March 22, 1979, p. E3.

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taining 200,000 troops in Cambodia (plus another 50,000 in Laos) and supplying food and machinery to at least the urban areas under its control, SRV officials have insisted they will not leave Cambodia until the Chinese and "other reactionaries" cease their support for antigovernment guerrillas operating along the Thai border.[14] Of greatest concern to the SRV is the prospect of a united front among the Khmer Rouge and their previous enemies, the Khmer Serai/Lon Nolists and those who back the restoration of Prince Sihanouk. Such a combination of anti-Vietnam Cambodians supplied by China and given safe haven in Thailand (possibly with clandestine American support) would insure a protracted costly guerrilla war, bleeding Vietnam and potentially devastating what remains of the Cambodian population.

Despite the Soviet hope that the refugees would constitute a regional political liability for China, they have in fact become a political liability for the USSR and Vietnam. While Moscow's alliance with Vietnam may be seen as a Soviet strategic gain in Southeast Asia, that gain has been purchased at the price of its entrapment in the Sino-Vietnam conflict. By aligning with Vietnam, the Soviets may be accused of participating in Hanoi's expansionist design. In effect the USSR has backed Vietnam's regional ambitions with few tangible benefits for itself. (As yet, for example, although Soviet ships and planes have used the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, there is little evidence that the SRV has granted base rights.) Moscow's restraint during the February-March 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war may have been a signal that Soviet forces were not at the disposal of Vietnam's policymakers. That is, Vietnam could not use the threat of Soviet military intervention to back its challenge to China. Despite the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the USSR possessed other overriding policy goals, including the maintenance of a working superpower relationship with the United States. By refraining from direct involvement in military action, the Soviets hoped to separate themselves from the less savory aspects of Vietnam's regional activities.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Vietnam

Insofar as a primary goal of the Soviet-Vietnamese partnership is to reduce China's stature and influence in Asia, then Beijing's position in Southeast Asia and its relations with Vietnam

[14] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 31, 1979, pp. 19-20.

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must be examined to see how deep-seated Sino-Vietnamese tensions may be. While the PRC's early relations with the Vietminh were strong and positive, with China serving as a sanctuary and source of logistics and training after 1950, the honeymoon was ended by the 1954 Geneva Conference. Neither the PRC nor the USSR was willing to risk general war with the United States to see the Vietminh through to an Indochina victory, and both pressured Ho Chi Minh to accept considerably less than "half a loaf" at the time.[15] The lesson was not lost on the Vietnamese communists; even great powers that were ostensibly socialist held independent foreign policy goals which, when they conflicted with a smaller "brother's," took precedence.

With the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam after 1965, China became Vietnam's best deterrent to a potential U.S. invasion of the north. Given the trauma of Korea, Washington wished to avoid any pretext for the PRC joining the hostilities. Fear of China was a major explanation for the gradualism of American escalation and the tacit understanding between the United States and Beijing that the DRV's existence would not be placed in jeopardy. Paradoxically, of course, self-imposed American limitations encouraged increased Soviet and Chinese aid to the Vietminh because they knew they faced no direct American military threat.

At this point, however, the PRC's relations with the Vietnamese communists became entangled in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In response to U.S. bombing of the north in 1965, Moscow proposed that China engage in "united action" to aid the Vietminh by permitting the Soviets to station troops in southwestern China and assume operational control of military airfields in that area. Soviet leaders probably anticipated that these requests would be unacceptable to the Chinese, but the latter's refusal diminished China's political stature in Vietminh eyes. Beijing appeared to be obstructing the DRV's war effort for parochial reasons.

The PRC proposed to the North an alternative to increased reliance on Soviet technology for prosecution of a conventional war. Beijing urged the Vietminh to emulate instead the Maoist model of protracted, essentially guerrilla warfare in which self-reliance would be the watchword. Under this strategy, China would once again provide the safe rear sanctuary and supply base, permitting the DRV to defeat the United States and Saigon over time without China making concessions to the USSR. Following such a strategy, of course, would

[15] Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 5-12.

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also confirm the validity of "peoples war."[16] As an earnest of its good faith, the PRC sent some 30,000 to 50,000 logistics, antiaircraft, and engineering troops to the northern provinces of North Vietnam in the autumn of 1965 to repair the damage incurred from American bombs and to keep supply lines open. This force was large enough to demonstrate Beijing's commitment to the DRV's war effort but not so large as to bring United States forces north of the seventeenth parallel.

Nevertheless, Hanoi refused to buy China's preferred plan for the war. After 1965, and particularly following Tet in 1968, the DRV relied upon regular Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) forces. North Vietnam's goal with Soviet backing was to force the United States to negotiate a settlement even if Hanoi had to absorb casualties at a 10:1 ratio to do it.[17] China opposed negotiations, however, for rather complex reasons. The outcome of the Vietnam War per se was subordinate to the Sino-Soviet-U.S. relationship. A negotiated settlement of the war *before* the United States had included China in détente would only serve to benefit Moscow and perhaps even encourage a preemptive strike against the PRC. As the war in Vietnam appeared to be drawing to a close with a Vietminh victory in the early 1970s, Mao moved toward Washington for two reasons. First of all, the United States no longer militarily threatened communist regimes on the Asian mainland and secondly, if America was to leave the region precipitously, the USSR would gain an overwhelming politico-military advantage by default. Moreover, the Soviet-American détente was evidence that Vietnam no longer constituted a barrier to better relations between the superpowers.

Beijing's opening to Washington, however, only exacerbated North Vietnam's suspicions. Not only had China opposed a negotiated settlement to the war in Vietnam and obstructed Soviet aid, but worse still, it had now struck a bargain with the main enemy, America. Hanoi suspected that China really did not want the war to end at all. Much as the Thais did, Beijing may have hoped that the fighting in Indochina would continue indefinitely, thus insuring a

[16] It is important to note, however, that a leadership debate occurred in China during 1965-1966 over whether a rapprochement should be effected with the Soviet Union because of the Vietnam War. One group led by Luo Ruijing believed that there was an imminent American threat to China which required improved relations with the USSR and the professionalization of the PLA. Mao and his supporters, however, overrode this group — essentially for domestic reasons — to retain a populist army as the dominant political model prior to Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution. See particularly the chapters by Hinton, Ra'anan, and Zagoria in Tang Tsou, ed., *China in Crisis*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

[17] Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia*, p. 61.

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weak and divided border region which would be no threat to its neighbors.[18]

Hanoi's suspicions were capped in January 1974 when Chinese forces occupied the Paracel Islands despite the fact that Hanoi had proposed border negotiations for the Gulf of Tonkin less than one month earlier.[19] Hanoi responded by extending its South Vietnam offensive in April 1975 to capture the contested Spratly Islands. Both island groupings in the South China Sea were important for their petroleum potential and as strategic locations on the route between the Indian Ocean and East China Sea. China was particularly concerned that the Soviet Union might have an opportunity to acquire base rights in the Paracels if Hanoi were to replace Saigon.

China was in a weak position to influence Vietnam at the end of the Second Indochina War. Although it had given North Vietnam some $10 billion in aid over a twenty-year period, Beijing's own modernization requirements under the Hua-Deng government inhibited any comparable reconstruction assistance. China's domestic financial needs took priority over long-term external aid commitments. Thus, even if cordial Sino-Vietnamese relations had prevailed in 1975, Hanoi still would have moved closer to the Soviet Union as its only credible long-term aid donor. In reality, of course, relations between the PRC and Vietnam were anything but cordial. Beijing moved to effect a loose arrangement between 1975 and 1978 among itself, Pol Pot's Cambodia, and Thailand in the hope of balancing a Soviet-backed Vietnamese consolidation of Laos. From that point, the overthrow of the autogenocidal Kampuchean regime became a matter of time. Despite the presence of several thousand Chinese advisors, it could not be saved.

The Sino-Vietnam Border War, February-March 1979

The Russians and Vietnamese calculated that Article Six of their treaty, calling for mutual assistance against aggression, would deter China from any military action against Vietnam. After what must have been a lengthy three-month debate in the CCP Politburo, however, the Chinese chose to risk the treaty's invocation. Among the considerations entering into this decision were —

(1) defeat of a centuries-old Chinese effort to prevent the development of a strong hostile power on its southwest mainland border;

[18] Harold Hinton, *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), p. 9.

[19] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 4, 1978, pp. 8-9.

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(2) consolidation of a Soviet-Vietnam encirclement which would include Cambodia and Laos;

(3) depradations against thousands of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam whose position throughout Southeast Asia could become precarious if China did nothing to protect them;

(4) belief that China had to demonstrate its "firmness" against Soviet-Vietnamese bullying in order to maintain credibility in its argument to the Western powers of the necessity of resisting Soviet pressure in Europe and the Middle East; and

(5) Beijing's fear that the successful creation of an "Indochina federation" under Hanoi's leadership would undermine ASEAN's independence and lead to the creation of a broader Southeast Asian organization akin to the Soviet concept of an Asian collective security arrangement. A successful Chinese endeavor against Vietnam would show countries such as Thailand that the PRC could be relied upon to assist them — even if the United States would not.

To a visiting American delegation, China's Deputy Foreign Minister Geng Biao argued that Vietnam had become a fascist state, putting military concerns above the welfare of its own people. Unable to develop on its own, Hanoi mortgaged its autonomy to Moscow, which, in turn, has locked Vietnam into a dependent status in exchange for military equipment and economic support. Domestically, according to Mr. Geng, Vietnamese leaders have undermined popular support by refusing to meet the population's reconstruction needs, confiscating private property through the creation of a Soviet-style secret police, and inciting racist assaults on the Chinese minority to deflect popular discontent.[20]

Strategically, Beijing sees the grim prospect of Indochina's domination by a Soviet ally, which would leave only a weak Pakistan as China's friend in the long arc from the South China Sea to the western extension of the Himalayas, where Moscow also acquired a partner in the Taraki-Amin government of Afghanistan. In mid February 1979, Chinese ground forces crossed the border into North Vietnam after months of preparation. Deng Xiaoping openly telegraphed the move during his visits to the United States and Japan. Insisting that the SRV had to be shown that it was not invincible, that China would defend its border against hostile encroachments, and that the USSR was an unreliable ally (a paper tiger?), Beijing launched a carefully limited military incursion. Deng's public announcement embarrassed both Tokyo and Washington for it implied their acquiescence to the Chinese action. Chinese leaders probably hoped that linking their invasion decision to Deng's American and

[20] Edward Friedman, "The Risk China Faces," *New York Times*, February 4, 1979.

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Japanese visits would increase the probability that the USSR would not directly enter the fray.

Moreover, if the Soviets did not become militarily involved, Beijing could underscore its argument to the West that firmness with the USSR was a sound policy and would not lead inexorably to major hostilities. This, it was hoped would bolster America's resolve in its dealings with the USSR. In a display of bravado, Chinese officials even extended the prospect of aid to Thailand in the event of Vietnamese attack.[21]

China's incursion proved considerably less than a stunning success. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) had to make its attack before the rainy season in northern Vietnam and yet close enough to the spring thaw along the Amur and Ussuri rivers in the north that Soviet forces would find a thrust on that border unattractive. Mid February seemed to give the Chinese the best weather conditions, but the attack would have to be fast and decisive, followed by a quick pullback. In actuality, Chinese forces moved slowly and fought for every kilometer they advanced, employing primitive tactics and equipment. Over 200,000 soldiers on the border backed some 80,000 who moved into Vietnam. They were met by about 100,000 Vietnamese border forces and militia who were better equipped than their PLA adversaries. Chinese armor confined its advance to the main roads where the PLA was vulnerable to Vietnamese artillery. All in all, as one analyst put it, "There is no reason to believe the PRC can project conventional military power any farther beyond its borders today than it could in 1950."[22] The Soviets, of course, contrasted their "soberness and restraint" to the "irresponsibility and recklessness of Beijing's playing with fire."[23]

Paradoxically, China's lackluster military performance in Vietnam may have lowered its credibility as a potential ally against an aggressive SRV for noncommunist Southeast Asia. The PLA's own negative self-assessment has led to plans for the accelerated import of new technologies for quick fixes in tactical aircraft, artillery, and military communications for air-to-ground coordination. People's war no longer seems to be mentioned in Chinese media. And the arms China seeks to acquire appear to be designed more for the Vietnam front than as a strategic deterrent to the USSR.

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[21] Remarks of China's ambassador to Thailand in the *Bangkok Post*, April 1, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), April 3, 1979, p. J2.

[22] For an excellent military analysis of the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, see Harlan W. Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," *Asian Survey*, August 1979. The quotation is from p. 814.

[23] *Izvestiya*, March 21, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (USSR), March 22, 1979, p. B7.

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China's politico-military reorientation toward Indochina includes backing anti-Laotian guerrillas, as well. Support for minority groups in northern Laos, cultivated over the past decade while the PRC was engaged in roadbuilding, is a way of demonstrating to Vietnam that Beijing possesses more than one option for striking back. The maintenance of anti-Vietnam guerrilla movements in Laos and Cambodia is a low risk activity for China, which drains Vietnam both economically and militarily and underscores the latter's occupation of its Indochina neighbors to world opinion. Moreover, Vietnam must consider the possibility that the PRC could walk into northern Laos should Hanoi launch a major mop-up operation against the Khmer Rouge resistance in western Cambodia. At the Geneva Conference on Indochina refugees in July 1979, the PRC offered to take 10,000 Laotian refugees for resettlement. Those who have applied, according to a Thai Interior Ministry spokesman, are healthy and strong young men of military age.[24]

The SRV has publicly expressed its concern over Chinese potential for mischief in Laos, citing reports that Beijing has "set up counterrevolutionary organizations such as the 'new-type People's Revolutionary Party in Laos' . . . for disruptive and subversive activities."[25]

In sum, the Sino-Vietnam conflict has hardened as a result of Hanoi's security relationship with the Soviet Union, which in turn exacerbates Sino-Soviet tension. This combination is particularly difficult for China since it affects the alliance of two hostile states on opposite Chinese borders. Unlike the French and American situation during the earlier Vietnam wars, none of the actors in this triangle can pack up and leave. The security involvement for each is much greater than it was for either Paris or Washington because of geography. Moreover, none of the actors in the current conflict seems to care about what happens to the people of Indochina. The flow of refugees since 1975 far exceeds that of the preceding thirty years.

The Characteristics and Limitations of Soviet Influence

Instrumentalities of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia may be compared with their use in other Third World regions. The modes of influence include political relationships, both government-to-

[24] Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), September 12, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), September 17, 1979, p. J4.

[25] Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi), SRV delegate's presentation to the second round of PRC-Vietnam talks in Beijing, September 20, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), September 21, 1979, p. K3.

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government and communist party-to-party; economic assistance, trade, and investment through joint ventures; and military assistance through arms aid and training. Measuring the density and amount of these relations is one way of determining the *salience* of a region or country to the Soviet Union. But it is not necessarily a good index of *influence,* for it omits countervailing activities of other powers and the increasing capacity of Third World states to control the input of outsiders and manage their own affairs.

The Soviets have been particularly constrained in Southeast Asia in that the communist parties of the region have, for the most part, been peripheral to national political developments in noncommunist states or aligned with the PRC in the Sino-Soviet dispute. On the other hand, this relative absence of access to the radical left in Southeast Asia has permitted the USSR to avoid the political pitfalls they have encountered in other regions where they have manipulated local communist politics. Unlike the Middle East, where Soviet support for a communist coup in Sudan in 1971 and the creation of communist cells in the Iraqi Army in 1971 and 1978 led to a precipitous deterioration in relations between the USSR and these governments, Moscow's general political stature in noncommunist Southeast Asia has remained fairly consistent over the last several years. Relations are correct and cool.

Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union does not see noncommunist Southeast Asian governments as imminent recruits to the socialist bloc. Hence, there is less interest in the kind of political subversion that had been practiced under Khrushchev. Rather, Soviet analysts demonstrate sensitivity to the complexities of trying to move developing states with noncommunist elites and unstable leaderships along the road to socialism. Political goals are both more modest and of greater direct security interest to the USSR — to enhance Soviet influence through increased trade, aid, and investment (joint ventures) while concomitantly expanding the Soviet naval presence by longer cruises in Southeast Asia and more port calls, which demonstrate the capability of the USSR to create and protect its growing merchant marine activity. In a sense, Soviet economic and naval growth emulate earlier policies of the capitalist states.[26]

While the USSR may justify its regional naval presence as related to its overall international economic relations, in fact the latter have been quite modest. Between 1954 and 1976, the USSR extended a total of $11.8 billion in economic assistance to non-

[26] Richard Lowenthal, "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,'" *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1976, pp. 52-63.

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communist countries. Only $7 billion was actually drawn by recipients. By contrast, international lending to Third World states in 1977 alone included $7.3 billion from the World Bank, $2.83 billion from other regional banks, and $5.6 billion in U.S. bilateral assistance. In short, the Soviet portion of this total is almost unnoticeable.[27]

Turning specifically to Southeast Asia, Moscow's minimal assistance is even more pronounced in that, of the top twenty recipients of Soviet economic aid between 1954 and 1976, only one — Indonesia — was located in the region. And, of course, aid to Indonesia came to a halt in 1966.[28] Noteworthy, too, is the conclusion that with over $500 million in military aid to Indonesia prior to the October 1965 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) coup attempt, the army used this Soviet equipment to crush the communists and then reoriented Indonesian foreign policy toward the West. A better example of the lack of symbiosis between aid and influence would be hard to find.

Overall, Soviet economic assistance to Southeast Asia ranked the lowest in its aid to Third World regions. Between 1954 and 1977, regional noncommunist countries received only $157 million out of a global aid total of $15 billion.[29] Tables I and II show the low level of Soviet trade with Southeast Asia and hence its limited utility as a political instrument. As in the case of aid, Soviet trade is generally treated as either irrelevant or unattractive by regional officials for Southeast Asian development. There are several reasons for this perspective. The quality of Soviet manufactured goods is generally lower than international standards, service arrangements are virtually nonexistent, and Moscow has not developed sensitivity to changes in consumer tastes. Because the Soviets do not permit rubles to be converted into hard currency, barter characterizes trade and aid arrangements with noncommunist states, and import and export prices for the goods being traded are negotiated with each agreement — a tedious process frequently leading to ill will on the part of the Third World partner. Added to these obstacles are Moscow's continued refusal to provide preferential access to socialist bloc markets for Third World products and its insistence that the Soviet Union bears no special responsibility for

[27] William H. Leurs, "The USSR and the Third World," paper prepared for the Kennan Institute, n.d., pp. 17, 24, 25.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World,* Research Paper ER78-10478U, November 1978, pp. 5-6.

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TABLE I

VALUE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRADE WITH USSR–EASTERN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES
(% total trade)

Country	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1978*
Burma					
with U.S.A.	3.9	2.9	7.3	...	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.5	0.2	0.4	...	...
Indonesia					
with U.S.A.	19.0	15.9	14.0	17.4	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.5	1.9	2.9	0.8	1.1
Laos					
with U.S.A.	5.4	4.7	...	...	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.1	0	...	...	...
Malaysia					
with U.S.A.	8.6	9.9	10.7	12.6	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.4
Philippines					
with U.S.A.	28.3	24.1	22.4	22.2	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2
Singapore					
with U.S.A.	15.1	14.0	15.7	13.2	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5
Thailand					
with U.S.A.	14.0	13.5	14.4	13.4	...
with USSR–Eastern Europe	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.0

SOURCES: United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1977* (New York: 1978) and *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1978* (New York: 1979).

Third World poverty and hence need not concern itself with concessional terms of trade. Moscow's angry denial that it is part of the "industrial north" which has exploited the "agrarian south" has not endeared it to the growing membership of the "Group of 77" and reinforces their suspicions and reluctance to expand commercial relations.

Overall, Third World states have utilized only about 50 per cent of all credits extended by the USSR, in contrast to West-

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TABLE II

SOVIET TRADE WITH SELECTED SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1978

($U.S. millions)

Country	*Exports*	*Imports*
Singapore	121.0	24.8
Malaysia *	137.0	12.0
Thailand	7.3	10.9

* 1977.

SOURCE: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 7, 1979, p. 50.

ern aid of which most is drawn. Reasons for the reluctance to use more Soviet assistance include dissatisfaction over the quality of technology, products, and service as well as a desire not to become dependent on the Soviets. One analyst has commented that developing countries, as a matter of policy, accept credits from as many sources as possible in order to insure that no single donor can exercise inordinate influence.[30]

There is only one endeavor in Southeast Asia in which the USSR has engaged in successful investment: shipping. The Soviets have joint shipping companies on a fifty-fifty arrangement with Thailand and Singapore. Both are successful, greatly increasing tonnage moved over the last decade. The lines do not belong to the Far East Freight Conference and hence substantially undercut Conference freight rates. The lines' operations also provide an institutional framework for the expansion of Soviet shipping in Southeast Asia. In Thailand, Soviet ship dockings increased from 56 in 1972 to 240 in 1978, while for Singapore the number rose from 200 in 1969 to 885 Soviet ships in 1977.[31] The most recent addition to Moscow's Southeast Asian bilateral shipping companies is the Philippines.

One other source of Soviet influence deserves mention: the Narodny Bank in Singapore — Moscow's only financial institution in the region. The bank has become involved in a number of regional industrial investments which, although modest in monetary terms compared with other banks, are closely monitored by the Singapore government.

While Soviet aid and trade with noncommunist Southeast Asia remain circumscribed, its economic relations with Vietnam (and in the last two years with Laos and Cambodia) are crucial. Western

[30] Rubinstein, ed., *Influence*, pp. 14-15.

[31] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 24, 1979, p. 33, and September 7, 1979, p. 52.

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observers estimate the presence of between 5,000 and 8,000 Soviet military and civilian personnel in Vietnam in 1979, up from 2,700 two years earlier. Moreover, in the first six months of 1979, the USSR sent 90,000 tons of goods to Vietnam (more than for all of 1978). Going further, the USSR has written off all SRV debts stemming from the Indochina War and has promised some $2.5 billion in assistance for Vietnam's Second Five-Year Plan (1976-1980).

The Soviet Union's financial burden has been intensified by the fact that Moscow has had to allocate hard currency to purchase both grain and petroleum for Vietnam. Hanoi's exports have become almost completely mortgaged to the USSR. The Soviets appear to be investing in light industry in Vietnam, the products of which will be exported to the USSR as loan repayments. By contrast, the Soviets do not seem to be investing in the creation of heavy industry, keeping Vietnam dependent on the Soviet Union.[32]

As in the realm of economic assistance, Soviet arms supplies to Southeast Asia are only a fraction of the West's. Between 1970 and 1976, the USSR sent 7 per cent of its total world arms exports to Vietnam (well below the amounts provided to Libya and Syria, which accounted for 23 per cent and 13 per cent respectively).[33] These figures indicate the relatively low military priority Southeast Asia occupied in Soviet plans during this period.

North Vietnam imported a total of $881 million in arms during this period, almost all from the USSR. Most of the monetary value, however, is accounted for in the prices of the SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles. Soviet imports comprised only 19 per cent of Vietnam's aircraft, 4 per cent of its armored vehicles and 2 per cent of its navy through 1977. In fact, most of the country's weapons were manufactured domestically. Beginning in the autumn of 1978, however, the USSR began a massive arms transfer to Vietnam, undoubtedly in preparation for its December invasion of Cambodia. Simultaneously, the SRV increased the size of its army by 50 per cent, from 615,000 in September 1978 to 920,000 by February 1979.[34]

Although Moscow has been willing to provide large-scale military assistance to Vietnam because of its desire for a strategically located ally in "containing" China, the USSR's own military involve-

[32] Nayan Chanda, "An Alliance Based on Mutual Need," ibid., August 24, 1979, pp. 22-23.

[33] The data in this section on military aid are drawn from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1978* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1978), pp. 225, 233, 234-241.

[34] These figures are cited in Ramesh Thakur, "The International Relations of the China-Vietnam Conflict," paper from the University of the South Pacific, July 1979, p. 14. See, also, *Data Asia* (Manila), February 12-18, 1979, p. 6041.

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ment has remained circumscribed. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union did not become directly engaged in the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, nor were its naval maneuvers provocative to either China or the United States. Its current personnel involvement in Vietnam is not unlike the presence maintained there during the Vietnam War, when military advisors and perhaps some SAM crews were dispatched, but no combatants. On the other hand, one could argue that the Soviets have gone beyond their earlier Vietnam War involvement. Since Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, Soviet planes have ferried Vietnamese troops from Vietnam to Cambodian battlegrounds; and the amount of Soviet naval and air activity around Vietnamese bases has been on the rise, perhaps portending a Soviet plan to acquire base rights gradually as its Pacific Fleet grows.

The USSR has expanded its Pacific Fleet in recent years, in line with Admiral Gorshkov's view of the Soviet Union as a global naval power. The addition of the V/STOL aircraft carrier *Minsk* in the summer of 1979 enhanced the fleet's antisubmarine capability and the possibility of its engaging in oceanic aerial combat for the first time. Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that the Soviets see political opportunities in Southeast Asia primarily in military terms. Despite its expansion, the Pacific Fleet possesses virtually no capability to project power ashore. Moscow's relatively sophisticated view of the complexities of Asian politics underlines its manifest reticence in directly applying military force. Hence the Soviets described their diffident military posture during the Sino-Vietnam border war as measured and statesmanlike, dispatching a fifteenship contingent to monitor Chinese radio traffic and transmit field intelligence to the Vietnamese.

An additional explanation for Moscow's careful avoidance of involvement in the Sino-Vietnam hostilities may have centered on its lack of naval base facilities in the region, which would have exacerbated logistical problems in the event of military action. In the border war's aftermath, it is certainly conceivable that Moscow has argued that it needs a base at Cam Ranh Bay if Vietnam expects the USSR to help defend it from attack in the future. Nevertheless, Moscow's desire for bases in Southeast Asia may well be constrained by the concern that, should one be acquired, it could serve as a catalyst for stimulating countervailing action on the part of the United States and ASEAN, reactivating their military relationships which atrophied in the mid 1970s.

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Soviet Relations with ASEAN: The Problem of Trade-offs over Vietnam

Moscow's alliance with Vietnam has effected a new polarization of regional politics — an unfortunate development from the Soviet viewpoint. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets had hoped to square the circle by both supporting Vietnam, first against the United States and then against China, and also courting the ASEAN states through the USSR's Asian collective security proposal. Had the ASEAN states been receptive, Moscow would have realized a series of diplomatic arrangements around China's southern borders not unlike John Foster Dulles's SEATO of the mid 1950s.

The ASEAN states had their own preference for regional security, however, and it did not include an alliance with the USSR. Concerned over the unreliability of American guarantees in the waning years of the Vietnam War, ASEAN came up with a proposal designed to minimize great power military activities in Southeast Asia by declaring the region a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality."

Initially skeptical of Malaysia's 1971 proposal for a great power-guaranteed neutralization of Southeast Asia, the Soviets, since 1975, have only gradually changed their orientation as they became resigned to the general lack of enthusiasm for their particular version of "Asian collective security." Soviet media seemed to consider ASEAN's hopes for regional neutralization potentially as a component of Moscow's collective security concept. The Soviets were attracted by the ASEAN proposal's opposition to the military role of outside powers in Southeast Asia, seeing this as a possible lever against American bases in the Philippines and as a device for excluding future Chinese forays.[35]

The ASEAN states, too, were interested in more amenable relations with the USSR in the wake of the Vietnam War. It was felt that they would serve to broaden international contacts, balance major power relations, and diversify international trade and investment.

Moscow's hopeful attitude toward ASEAN was not matched by Hanoi, however. Despite the neutralization proposal's transformation by 1976 into endorsement for the region becoming "a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" (ZOPFAN), Hanoi was not convinced. Both the SRV and Laos vigorously opposed a resolution endorsing the concept at the 1976 Colombo conference of nonaligned states. Nor did a subsequent personal effort by the Malaysian

[35] Dzirklas, *Soviet Perceptions*, pp. 70-73.

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Foreign Minister in Hanoi yield any softening of the SRV's position. In 1978, however, Hanoi executed a *volte-face,* seemingly accepting a modified version of ZOPFAN in the course of a new competitive diplomatic courtship against China among the ASEAN states.[36]

Douglas Pike explains Vietnam's generally jaundiced view of ZOPFAN by comparing it to Hanoi's 1976 Colombo conference counterproposal: a zone of "independence, peace, and neutrality." According to Pike, the SRV insists there can be no neutrals in the struggle between socialism and capitalism. So long as the ASEAN states retain their ties to the West, they are not fully independent. Therefore, nonaligned states should not endorse neutrality but rather independence — the latter being defined as a severing of bonds with capitalism. Going further, Vietnam argued at the United Nations in June 1978 that the nonaligned states should exacerbate capitalism's global economic problems through a series of raw material embargos.[37]

Despite Hanoi's obvious distaste for ASEAN, based in large part on its members' support for the United States during the Indochina War, Vietnam began to solicit their favor in 1978 as its relations with China hit rock bottom. The ASEAN member most responsive to Hanoi's inducement was Thailand. As the "front line" against Indochina, Bangkok pressed its ASEAN partners to take advantage of what seemed to be a Vietnamese endorsement of ZOPFAN by inviting the Indochinese states to participate in its creation.[38] Other ASEAN leaders were much less enthusiastic, pointing out the discrepancy between ASEAN's concept and Hanoi's.

During a July visit to Tokyo, SRV deputy foreign minister Phan Hien stated his country's readiness to accept ASEAN as an economic organization and indicated Vietnam would be prepared to adopt a flexible attitude toward ZOPFAN. This appeared to mean that Hanoi was dropping its objections to the maintenance of U.S. bases in the Philippines; in return, the ASEAN states should understand the SRV's decision to join COMECON.

At approximately the same time, the Soviets grudgingly endorsed ASEAN's peace zone through the unusual device of an embassy bulletin statement originating in Thailand. As in the SRV's

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[36] For a discussion of Vietnam's shifting attitudes toward the ASEAN ZOPFAN proposal, see Dick Wilson, "ASEAN and Indochina: Future Relations," *Asia-Pacific Community,* Summer 1978.

[37] Douglas Pike's remarks may be read in U.S. Senate, *Indochina, Hearing* Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, August 21, 1978, pp. 174-179.

[38] *Nation Review* (Bangkok), May 23, 1978.

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proposal, the Soviets also urged that the zone be extended to include Indochina.

In a flurry of visits to ASEAN capitals in August and September, Phan Hien broached a series of draft agreements, including friendship treaties containing a nonaggression clause as well as a proposal for the creation of a broader regional economic grouping. The ASEAN leaders backed away from these proposals, insisting that any new regional concepts would have to be discussed and agreed upon with their partners. Most ASEAN observers interpreted the Vietnamese gambit as an attempt to loosen ASEAN solidarity and even to align the association with Hanoi against China.[39] Flat rejection of Hanoi's friendship treaty proposals was based not only on the belief that they would alarm Beijing but also that they could become a part of the Soviet collective security concept. The single unalloyed gift from Hanoi during its summer 1978 ASEAN swing was a promise not to support insurgent movements in the area. This called favorable attention to Vietnam's self-abnegation as opposed to China's unwillingness to articulate a similar pledge.

As autumn passed and Vietnam increased its military buildup and activities on the Cambodian border, ASEAN commentators wondered about the compatibility of such a concentration of firepower with Hanoi's professions of noninterference in the internal affairs of others.[40] Of particular concern was the November Treaty of Friendship signed by Dong in Moscow, which included a provision for military support.

Vietnam's march into Cambodia destroyed the careful diplomatic ground for a rapprochement with the ASEAN states laid by Phan Hien. A Bangkok editorial writer summarized the association's view:

> Given the now undeniable indications of Vietnamese ambitions in respect of Indochina it is necessary that we all should ponder the questions of whether these ambitions stop there. Perhaps in reaching our conclusions we will have to pay more heed to what we have seen rather than what we have heard, for what we have heard is the promises of Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to the effect that Vietnam would not support insurgent movements in Southeast Asian countries. We have heard, too, of Hanoi's desire to set up a zone of peace, genuine independence, and neutrality throughout the region. How can these words be regarded in the light of what has happened in Cambodia?[41]

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[39] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 15, 1978, pp. 20, 23.

[40] See, for example, the editorial in the *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), October 7, 1978.

[41] Editorial in the *Bangkok Post*, January 9, 1979.

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Both the United States and the USSR attempted to reassure Thailand that the latter's sovereignty would be respected by Vietnam; Pham Van Dong himself conveyed a similar message as fighting continued near the Thai border.[42] Less reassuring, however, were Soviet statements lauding successful "liberation struggles" which included Kampuchea, and implied Soviet opposition to "the opponents of progress."[43]

Moreover, Vietnam displayed its pique at ASEAN for advocating a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, as Hanoi reminded the association of its earlier "mistakes" in backing American aggression:

> What would be the fate of the countries in the region if the Indochina bastion should ever unfortunately collapse? They fail to understand this: Peking's tools would immediately begin their work and the publicly known fifth columnists [read: Overseas Chinese] would not hesitate to brandish their swords and behead all those who might oppose them.[44]

In other words, ASEAN should be grateful to Vietnam for creating a strong buffer on mainland Southeast Asia to protect them from an expansionist PRC.

Similarly, Soviet media emphasized the advantages to Thailand of having a Vietnamese-controlled Indochina, insuring tranquillity on the Thai border:

> When the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime that had turned the country into a source of armed provocations in Indochina was brought down, Kampuchea's borders became peaceful. . . . The contacts between Southeast Asian countries, including the recent visit by the head of the Laotian Government, Kaysone Phomvihan, to Thailand show that peaceful coexistence is becoming the basis of international relations in the region.[45]

Moscow and Hanoi are cognizant of the different perceptions among the ASEAN states concerning sources of regional threat and hence the possibility of splitting the association on security matters. The differences center on whether China or Vietnam is perceived as the dominant adversary. Regardless of which falls into that category, the other becomes a potential ally or supporter; thus, if ASEAN members differ strongly over which of the two is to be feared, the association's politico-security cohesion is jeopardized. In

[42] Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter Says U.S. Warned Vietnam and Soviets Not to Threaten Thais," *New York Times*, January 18, 1979.

[43] "International Review," column in *Pravda*, March 25, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (USSR), March 28, 1979, p. CC1.

[44] *Nhan Dan* editorial, March 27, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), March 27, 1979, p. K1.

[45] Radio Moscow in English to Southeast Asia, April 5, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (USSR), April 6, 1979, p. E2.

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fact, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, view China as the greater potential source of domestic instability. The large ethnic Chinese communities resident in each country are seen as possible fifth columns, all the more dangerous because of their significant hold on the commercial sectors of the economy and much of the region's international trade. This basic concern with China is probably even behind Kuala Lumpur's strong position on the Vietnamese boat people since the latter have been predominantly ethnic Chinese. Apprehension over the impact of tens of thousands of Chinese immigrants on Malaysia's racial balance has been publicly expressed. Privately, officials point to the refugee issue as a potential embarrassment to the ruling Alliance Party since opposition Malay Muslim groups can incite communal passions by stressing the government's unwillingness or inability to turn the refugees away from Malaysian shores.[46]

Thailand, by contrast, clearly leans toward Beijing, which it sees as a tacit ally against any future Vietnamese moves to expand hostilities beyond Indochina. Numerous media reports have portrayed Thai military units resupplying Khmer Rouge who have crossed the border and sending them back into Cambodia as well as permitting the movement of Chinese military supplies across Thai territory. Officially, of course, Thailand has denied these reports.

For Malaysia and Indonesia, then, a strong Indochina may still be seen as a buffer against the PRC. This orientation is in direct conflict with the view in Bangkok that it is only Vietnam which poses an imminent threat to the remainder of mainland Southeast Asia. A serious split among ASEAN members over this issue has been avoided thus far, however, by careful consultations prior to any bilateral negotiations with Soviet, Chinese, or Vietnamese officials. Beginning in January 1979, the ASEAN foreign ministers effected an impermeable united front, condemning Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia and calling for its withdrawal in the United Nations in both January and October and at the Nonaligned Conference in September. As Lee Kwan Yew bitterly observed, "Maybe there is a nice distinction: when one subverts a noncommunist neighbor it's called liberation. When one subverts a communist neighbor, it's called salvation."[47] On balance, then, Soviet-Vietnamese political stature has

[46] Author's interview with a Malaysian counterinsurgency official, Kuala Lumpur, July 1979.

[47] Lee Kwan Yew, quoted in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 22, 1978, p. 18.

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been weakened among the ASEAN states because they have engaged in overt aggression, directly threatening Thailand.

Although the probability of an outright conventional invasion of Thailand is very low, Bangkok authorities are concerned about the porous nature of their northern and northeastern border regions and the fact that both the Vietnamese and Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge have access to the heretofore pro-Beijing Thai Communist Party (CPT). The latter has operated along the border regions in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Some reports have circulated suggesting that a new "Northeast Thai Liberation Party" has been created from a disgruntled faction of the CPT, backed by Vietnam.[48] One of its primary purposes presumably would be to demonstrate to Thailand that too adamant an anti-Vietnam or pro-PRC posture could elicit stepped-up insurgency in the border regions. Specifically, the Vietnamese want the Thais to stop providing sanctuary and supplies for Pol Pot's guerrillas. Although a pro-Vietnamese Communist party in Thailand could create problems along the border, it presents little threat to the remainder of Thailand since the party would so obviously be a Vietnamese creation.

Thailand will remain a focal point within ASEAN for competitive influence efforts by China and the Soviet-Vietnam duo. Thailand has had a long, traditional rivalry with Vietnam for the control of Laos and Cambodia and has historically been aligned at times with China for precisely that reason. Thus, Thailand was pleased that China's limited attack on the northern Vietnam border forced Hanoi's leaders to think about the consequences of a second front should they contemplate moving beyond Indochina. The fact that the USSR did not intervene was also gratefully acknowledged for it showed that there are limits to Soviet backing for Vietnamese regional ambitions. General Kriangsak visited Moscow in March 1979 to explore the extent of these limits and to see if there might be a solution to the Cambodian situation other than Vietnamese occupation. There were some reports that the Thai prime minister would propose a conference that could lead to the creation of a neutral Cambodia — neither pro-Beijing nor pro-Hanoi. It is likely that a similar question was raised when Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn visited Moscow in September.

There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets are interested in accommodating ASEAN. Some 200,000 Vietnamese troops occupy Cambodia. Hanoi's control of both its Indochinese neigh-

[48] *Nation Review*, September 21, 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Asia/Pacific), September 21, 1979, p. J1.

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bors renders it even more dependent on Soviet assistance. The USSR's foothold on the Southeast Asian mainland and possible future base facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang coincide with the growing capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. To improve relations with ASEAN on the latter's terms, the Kremlin would have to convince Hanoi to withdraw its forces from Cambodia and agree to the installation of a neutral government, perhaps under the ever ready Prince Sihanouk, who has been carefully placing both political and geographical distance between himself and the Beijing-supported Pol Pot guerrillas. Even if Cambodia were to become a regional neutral, Vietnam would retain its dominant position within Indochina. Hanoi's dependence on the USSR, however, would undoubtedly decrease. That is, by effecting a Cambodian settlement satisfactory to ASEAN, Hanoi would be able to break out of its current diplomatic isolation and establish political and economic links with Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. In short, the Soviets may well have been willing to sacrifice cordial relations with ASEAN in order to solidify a politico-military alliance on the Asian mainland which encircles China and may provide additional bases for expanding Soviet naval forces.

Of course, the USSR has tried to appease ASEAN by insisting that China is the regional aggressor and that if Vietnam had not deposed Pol Pot, the Sino-Cambodian relationship would have led to insurrections throughout the ASEAN region.[49] Moscow also endorsed ASEAN's ZOPFAN concept in 1974, but Vietnam followed suit only in the summer of 1978, hoping to obtain ASEAN diplomatic support in its conflict with China. Moreover, both the Soviets and Vietnamese have hedged their endorsements, Moscow attempting to link the ASEAN proposal to its Asian collective security notion and Hanoi proffering a revised version. Neither of these halfhearted endorsements has been accepted by ASEAN. If anything, they have only fueled the association's suspicions about Soviet and Vietnamese long-term intentions in the area.[50]

The longevity of the Soviet-Vietnam alliance remains open to question. Through 1980, the Soviet Union has been willing to support Vietnam's goals. The long-term wisdom of this policy is problematic, however. The question for the Soviets is whether virtually open-ended support for a Vietnamese regime — historically

[49] Aloksandrov, "Beijing's Aggression Must Be Rebuffed," *Pravda*, February 28, 1979.

[50] For some background discussion, see Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts* (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 270-272, 302-304.

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opposed to dependence on outsiders — to help that regime occupy a traditional ethnic adversary is the kind of long-term political commitment they wish to make. This is slippery turf; it has already led to entrapment in the problems of client states at the expense of broader relations with ASEAN. Moreover, heavy Soviet involvement with a Vietnamese-controlled Indochina could have the nightmare effect — from the Soviet perspective — of serving as the impetus for the creation of a Sino-U.S.-Japan-ASEAN entente. Such an occurrence would undermine the Soviets' basic objective for Southeast Asia: the reduction of both Chinese and American influence. It could lead to such opposite trends as an American military buildup in conjunction with growing security cooperation among the ASEAN states.

Implications for U.S. Policy

American policy in Southeast Asia is based on a combination of regional and global considerations, some of which may not be consonant. Insofar as Washington wishes to assist China in its modernization, develop genuine détente with the USSR, and reassure the ASEAN states of its support for their independence and development, it may find some incompatibilities among these goals. Détente, for example, was a policy formulated by the USSR to reduce tension with Europe and the United States in order to focus Soviet military efforts in Asia, particularly along the Chinese border. It is, therefore, a concept seen by the PRC to be specifically directed against it. The Helsinki Accords between the Western powers and the USSR reinforce this belief in that they exclude any requirement that Moscow give notification to NATO of military maneuvers on its China border while requiring an announcement for any such European actions.[51]

Just as China is suspicious of the Washington-Moscow version of détente, so the USSR remains wary of the Beijing-U.S. variant. As the United States bowed out of Indochina in the mid 1970s, it was transformed in China's eyes from a threatening power to an incipient ally against the USSR's encirclement strategy, as articulated in Moscow's 1969 Asian Collective Security proposal. The PRC's move toward the United States, however, served to antagonize Hanoi, which feared a repetition of the mid 1950s effort to stymie its victory — this time at the eleventh hour.

This perception of a PRC-U.S. entente turned Vietnam in-

[51] Hinton, *Sino-Soviet Confrontation*, pp. 29-30.

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creasingly in the direction of the USSR, accelerating a new Asian polarization process. The SRV's harsh treatment of ethnic Chinese, the flight of several hundred thousand refugees to neighboring states, and Hanoi's military occupations of Cambodia and Laos all served to move the ASEAN states closer to the United States, Japan, and to a certain extent, even China. This latter informal grouping maintains parallel interests in containing Vietnam's regional ambitions and those of its Soviet mentor.

Nevertheless, there are limits to this convergence of Chinese and American security interests. While both oppose the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia based on military power, the United States must nevertheless deal with the USSR as a global strategic equal and hence maintains a strong interest in détente and a stable military balance. In short, America's parallel interests with China in Asia, in the event of a conflict, must be subordinate to stability in superpower relations. The Soviets seemed to be unsure, however, of the purpose of America's China policy as practiced in the Carter administration. With Nixon, when the American opening to China was inaugurated, it was understood that Washington's interest in a better relationship with China would transpire within the framework of détente. That understanding was less clear under Carter, specifically because officials such as Dr. Brzezinski referred to China as a possible participant in the *strategic* balance. That is, if as Brzezinski has intimated, Beijing and Washington share a strategic opposition to the USSR, then it would appear that the Soviet Union has to face a strategic challenge on both its European and Chinese borders. This situation would probably serve to exacerbate other great power tensions, including Soviet support for Vietnam's regional ambitions vis-à-vis ASEAN as well as an accelerated buildup of Russia's global military capability to force the United States to disperse its armed forces.

Insofar as Southeast Asia appears to be moving into another period of high tension, the ASEAN states have responded by deemphasizing their earlier hopes for ZOPFAN (though still giving the concept lip service as a long-term goal once regional tensions have been ameliorated). Instead, ASEAN leaders are encouraging a stepped-up American military presence. There are two dangers, however, in a policy of reliance on U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia. The first relates to the fact that the Nixon Doctrine still seems to dominate American policy toward the Third World. That is, the United States will not intervene in local wars without first determining whether it has the political, economic, and military capabili-

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ties to intervene at acceptable risks and costs. This kind of policy hedging — though admirable in terms of decisionmaking theory — is hardly reassuring to friendly small states which are seeking a commitment. The second danger is, in a sense, the obverse of the first: as a result of commitments to friendly regional states, the United States will build up its own forces in the area and contribute to the expansion of ASEAN's. This could be the formula for a competitive arms race, heightening tensions and deflecting resources away from economic development.

The optimal Indochina solution from the American perspective would be a separation of the region from the Sino-Soviet conflict and the installation of a neutral buffer between ASEAN (Thailand) and Vietnam. Initially an agreement would have to be reached on the future of Cambodia. ASEAN has already exerted pressure in the United Nations through a draft resolution urging that Vietnam withdraw its military forces. They could be replaced by a UN supervisory force, which would continue to hold the Pol Pot, Heng Samrin, and Khmer Serei contenders apart until an election or some kind of negotiated succession procedure could take place. The successor regime would pledge itself to neutrality between the PRC and Vietnam. Most important, it would agree to the exclusion of both foreign forces and bases from Cambodia. Thus, Cambodia's status as a buffer between Vietnam and Thailand would be restored.

The Soviets would benefit from this scenario by reestablishing rapport with the ASEAN states. Vietnam would lose a puppet but would still remain dominant in Indochina, given its military might and control of Laos. Moreover, its more benign posture could reopen access to Western economic largesse, currently being withheld because of its occupation of Kampuchea. China would benefit from reduced threat potential on its southern border and the severance of a dangerous link between Hanoi and Moscow. Finally, this scenario could also lead to the conditions under which the United States might establish diplomatic ties with Vietnam, for the latter's security challenge to ASEAN would be withdrawn.

American policy toward Southeast Asia should be centered on maintaining the viability and continued development of the ASEAN states. ASEAN's autonomy insures diversity in the region, continued economic access for Japan, a counterweight to Vietnamese dominance of the Southeast Asian mainland, and an important contribution to peaceful intercourse among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

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Nevertheless, the American commitment to ASEAN may too easily slip into a narrow military framework. While ASEAN serves as a counter to a Soviet-backed expansionist Vietnam, the challenge should not be defined exclusively in military terms. To do so is to misconstrue the dominant security situation in Southeast Asia, which is centered on the legitimacy of incumbent governments, equitable distribution of economic growth benefits, and the treatment of minority ethnic and regional groups within each country. These are the issues which will determine the viability of the ASEAN regimes; and they are only marginally related to Vietnam's actions in Indochina, the growing Soviet naval presence, or the provision of American conventional weapons to ASEAN military forces.

Moreover, while there is little doubt that the USSR has acquired unprecedented influence on mainland Southeast Asia, the question remains: Does this influence translate into a military threat to the ASEAN states? An affirmative answer is unlikely over the next several years. Soviet military capability in the region, though on the rise, remains limited and concentrated in the Persian Gulf and northwest Pacific rather than off Southeast Asian coasts. Moreover, the Soviets themselves may be distressed as regional tensions lead to an increased American military presence in the area which, over time, could result in a net loss in the USSR's political position. That is, the maintenance of a Soviet-Vietnam alliance serves to strengthen Sino-U.S. ties. The Sino-Vietnam-Cambodian hostilities, then, have been a two-edged sword for the USSR. Additionally, Vietnam's militant posture toward its southern neighbors has led to an apparent stiffening of Japan's military resolve as Prime Minister Ohira called for a bigger Japanese defense effort in cooperation with the United States against the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.[52]

To recapitulate, U.S. strategic objectives for Southeast Asia — including the maintenance of ASEAN autonomy and open access for international trade, investment, and freedom of movement — should include the following:

(1) A cooperative economic and political program for ASEAN such that aggregate growth will be transformed into an increased stake in the maintenance of each political system for the people of each country. This would have the effect of reducing the political base of insurgencies and hence Vietnamese (and/or Chinese and Soviet) opportunities for intervention in the internal politics of noncommunist Southeast Asia.

(2) Establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Vietnam,

[52] Henry Scott-Stokes, "Japan's Premier, Wary of Soviet, Favors a Stronger Defense Effort," *New York Times*, April 20, 1979.

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providing Hanoi demonstrates its independence from the USSR by continued refusal to provide naval bases along the South China Sea coast.

(3) Assurance to China that U.S.-Vietnamese relations will not negatively affect Washington-Beijing ties but will rather provide an opportunity for Hanoi to reduce its reliance on the USSR.

(4) Exploration of a possible negotiated alteration of the political situation in Cambodia which would lead to the installation of a regime pledged to neutrality between China and Vietnam. If realized, a new government in Phnom Penh could remove a basic source of conflict between Hanoi and Beijing, further providing Vietnam with opportunities to loosen its ties to the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, these developments do not seem to be on the horizon. Instead, Soviet-American relations remain strained by the former's support for a seemingly intransigent Hanoi regime and by Washington's tilt toward China and tacit acceptance of its totally reprehensible Pol Pot client. Vietnam's policy of suppressing the resistance movements within Cambodia and its reluctance to permit significant amounts of food to reach the country appear designed to increase the incidence of starvation within Kampuchea, thus providing Hanoi with an opportunity to repopulate the land with Vietnamese settlers. China has supported Pol Pot with similarly little regard for what happens to the Cambodian people so long as the struggle continues, causing Vietnam to hemorrhage through a protracted guerrilla war.

Finally, the Soviets display little interest in altering their dominant role in Vietnam. Since Hanoi believes it can wipe out effective opposition and has become totally dependent on the USSR in doing so, there is little reason for Moscow to consider any options that would weaken Vietnam's hold over Indochina and consequently Hanoi's dependence on the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance has become a linchpin for Moscow's China encirclement strategy, forcing Beijing into a two-front confrontation and delaying its modernization program at minimal risk and acceptable cost to the USSR.

Conclusions

The prospect for breaking this tragic circle of conflict is dim. A viable Cambodian resistance beyond 1981 is problematic at best. Pol Pot has no popular support. His band of followers is maintained through Chinese financial support, Thai acquiescence, and Khmer Rouge coercion over Cambodians in occupied areas of the south and southwest. Other resistance groups, though weak, in com-

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bination with the Khmer Rouge, could force a protracted Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia.

Should these developments transpire, the question arises whether Vietnam and the USSR might be willing to seek a negotiated settlement because of the manpower drain on Vietnam and the economic costs to both. Would the Soviets be willing to pressure Vietnam and its Heng Samrin front to work out a compromise for Cambodia that would be acceptable to Beijing? It is difficult to envision such a development short of a Sino-Soviet effort to ameliorate their overall relationship. In effect, then, a precondition to any Soviet willingness to undercut Vietnam's control over Cambodia would represent a major shift in the USSR's Asian policy away from Vietnam and toward China.

American leverage in this situation would be minimal. Washington could only influence Vietnamese policy indirectly through the Soviet Union. The United States might threaten to withhold the sale of grain to the USSR unless Moscow convinced Hanoi to alter the policies responsible for the massive exodus of both ethnic Chinese and Cambodians to neighboring ASEAN countries. There would be no guarantee, however, even if Moscow were willing to comply, that Vietnam would follow suit. After all, Vietnam does not rely on American grain, and even the USSR could turn to other suppliers or engage in counterthreats to the United States.

The more probable outcome in Indochina, assuming neither Moscow, Beijing, nor Washington can effect significant changes in Hanoi's behavior, is that Thailand (and subsequently ASEAN) will decide to accommodate Vietnam by recognizing its control over Indochina. The Thais would reluctantly reach this decision in hopes of avoiding a large-scale spillover of border hostilities onto Thai soil. There is considerable concern in Bangkok that the tens of thousands of Cambodians who have fled into Thailand will form into exile units, using the border region as a sanctuary for forays into Cambodia. Thai authorities wish to avoid such a development at almost any cost for it could lead to Vietnamese attacks on Thailand. In exchange for an understanding that Vietnam will terminate its border operations, Thailand might well decide to stop serving as a conduit for Chinese aid to the Cambodian resistance and for its own supply through the Thai military. Any decision to cut off these supplies would isolate the resistance and result in its atrophy.

By the mid 1980s, then, the situation in Southeast Asia could exhibit an uneasy balance among a Soviet-backed, Vietnamese-

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controlled Indochina; a China whose regional influence would be excluded from Indochina and somewhat weakened in both Thailand and Burma; and an ASEAN grouping with American, Japanese, and Chinese economic support. ASEAN's primary efforts would be devoted to insuring that neither the Vietnamese nor Chinese developed a pretext for political or military intervention in ASEAN affairs. The Soviets would play an enhanced role in Southeast Asia (compared with the 1970s), but their overall influence would remain limited because of their association with Vietnam and their continued conflict with China and the United States. ASEAN's autonomy would be sustained, although Thailand's freedom of action would be somewhat constrained by the fact that for the first time in this century it would have a strong Vietnam directly on its border.

America's continued military presence through naval and air forces would be essential in this setting, primarily as a form of political assurance to ASEAN, China, and Japan that Vietnamese and Soviet military activities would not be permitted to dominate the region.

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JAPAN'S SECURITY, DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES, AND CAPABILITIES*

by Taketsugu Tsurutani

Japan's military security involves two major considerations that are largely independent of her preferences: (1) trends in the immediate external environment and (2) the political will and military capability of the United States as her security partner. These are crucial to Japan's security, for it is primarily they that define the character and content of Japanese defense requirements. The responsibility of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) has changed in magnitude precisely because those two major considerations underwent a significant shift during the past decade.

One of the crucial aspects of Japan's immediate external environment is the passing of Pax Americana in East Asia, caused by the decline of the U.S. military presence and by Soviet military expansion. During the past decade, the United States reduced its military presence in the region rather drastically, withdrawing all its ground and air forces from Indochina, Thailand, and Taiwan. Simultaneously, America's naval presence — the most visible component of its strategic security commitment in the region — was reduced from more than 200 ships at the height of the Vietnam War to some 50 ships by 1978.[1] In response to crises in the Persian Gulf region and Southwest Asia, Washington has since raised the number of Seventh Fleet naval craft to 55 ships (approximately 600,000 tons),[2] but this hardly compares with the strength it once maintained in the region. In the meantime, the Soviet Union vastly expanded its Pacific Fleet — which used to be dwarfed by the U.S. Seventh Fleet — to nearly 1.4 million tons and a total of more than 700 ships, including some 60 major surface combatants and 130 submarines (nearly half nuclear-powered and 24 armed with SLBMs), outnumbering the

* The author is indebted to the Rockefeller Foundation for its support of the research for this article.

[1] See Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Berman, eds., *Guide to Far Eastern Navies* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 16-17, and *Showa 54 nen ban boei hakusho* [1979 Defense White Paper] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1979), p. 223.

[2] *Asahi shimbun*, February 6, 1980, p. 4.

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Seventh Fleet in every category of combat vessel except for the aircraft carrier.[3] In air power, the Soviet Union at the same time increased its combat complement in the region to more than 2,000 craft, including highly regarded Backfire bombers, while the United States cut its air strength down to about 400.[4] It also began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the region.[5] More visibly ominous to Japan was a sudden Soviet military-base build-up on three of the disputed islands but a few miles north of Hokkaido. In the region immediately surrounding Japan, the crucial air and naval balance between the two superpowers underwent a palpable reversal. Concomitantly, especially in light of declining Soviet restraint throughout the world, the level and range of the security threat to Japan's territory has vastly risen since the 1950s and the 1960s.

It is not only Japan's territorial integrity that is more threatened. Japan's survival depends on the security of the Western Pacific sea lanes over which her precarious life lines stretch. In the event of any serious and prolonged disruption of those life lines, Japan's advanced industrial economy would collapse, for that economy is fundamentally far more fragile than its counterpart in any of the other major industrial states. The American-Soviet role reversal in the military balance in East Asia has vastly increased the danger to those life lines. The danger, moreover, is qualitatively much greater than might otherwise be the case, because Japan's dependence upon Western Pacific sea lanes during the past two decades rose almost exponentially along with her rapid economic growth and spectacular trade expansion (nearly 550 million tons of goods now move to and from Japan through these sea lanes each year), and because her national economic resilience in the face of disruption and dislocation has declined accordingly.

In itself, the lower U.S. military profile in East Asia might not be a disturbing phenomenon so long as the United States were both inalterably committed to the security of the region as well as that of Japan and unambiguously capable of countering or repelling any destabilizing action by the Soviet Union. It is disturbing, however, precisely because America's commitment and capability have come to be perceived as less than fully reliable. On the global level, the United States has ceased to enjoy a clear military superiority over

[3] Ibid., August 22, 1980, p. 3.

[4] Tomoshita Sakanaka, "Military Threats and Japan's Defense Capability," *Asian Survey*, July 1980, p. 766, and Hideo Matsuoka, "Kokozokokka eno kiken na michi" [Dangerous Path to a Hardened State], *Sekai*, November 1980, p. 24.

[5] *Asahi shimbun*, February 6, 1980, p. 4, and August 6, 1980, pp. 1 and 4.

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the Soviet Union. In fact, growing doubt has emerged that the United States could demonstrate even a sufficient combat *equality* with the Soviet Union in an actual military contingency, especially a conventional one. From the beginning, détente was viewed as applying only to Europe in geopolitical terms and only to strategic-nuclear weapons in terms of arms control. Moreover, America's military withdrawal from East Asia (and the since-rescinded plan to withdraw its ground combat troops from the Korean Peninsula), accompanied by a noticeable attempt to strengthen NATO forces in Western Europe, gave rise to an inevitable suspicion that the United States was reverting to a "Europe first"[6] policy, East Asian security playing only an ancillary role in America's consideration for and preoccupation with the security of Western Europe and the Atlantic Community. America's various domestic social, cultural, and political developments during the past decade, not to mention her internal and external economic trials and tribulations, came to be regarded as having weakened her capability and will to meet the Soviet challenge, and this perception was reinforced more recently by Washington's handling of crises in the Persian Gulf region and Southwest Asia.

More specific to the subject of the present essay, the existing security treaty with the United States is no longer viewed in Japan as guaranteeing U.S. security assistance in an emergency, while only a decade ago such assistance was taken for granted by government and public alike.[7] Under the current security arrangements with the United States, Japan is to cope on her own with limited, small-scale aggression. Should an attack on Japan exceed her ability to repel it, the United States will come to her assistance. To facilitate the security partnership in the defense of Japan, Tokyo and Washington in 1978 adopted "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," which both nations view as adding, in the words of one senior American official, "operational credibility and efficiency" to the security pact.[8] Given the inevitable logistical difficulties, American assistance in an emergency would have to be provided by the United States Force in Japan (USFJ). With its fewer than 200 aircraft, however, it might well be that the USFJ, even if it re-

[6] Masamichi Irie, "Shin joseika de Nihon gaiko o kangaeru" [Thought on Japanese Diplomacy Under New Circumstances], *Jiyu*, May 1978, p. 31.

[7] *Showa 53 nen ban yoron chosa nenkan* [1978 Public Opinion Survey Yearbook] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1979), p. 494.

[8] Richard Holbrooke, "U.S. Position in the Pacific in 1980," *Current Policy* (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State), March 27, 1980, p. 2. Cf. Yoshitaka Sasaki, "Saikin boeicho jijo" [Recent Conditions at the Defense Agency] *Asahi janaru*, September 6, 1980, pp. 30-31.

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sponded to the event with dispatch, could play only a supplementary role for the JSDF. The USFJ's 43,000 ground troops (23,000 Army and 21,000 Marine) would remain largely superfluous, at least in the initial stages, since the enemy would rely on air (and perhaps naval tactical-missile) attack. The U.S. Seventh Fleet today is spread very thin, not only because of its size reduction during the past decade, but also because it now has to patrol the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; it cannot be expected to provide much assistance to Japan unless some of its major ships, notably aircraft carriers, happen to be in close proximity. Chances are, then, that the enemy would attempt to inflict a crippling blow on Japan before the United States could use the full weight of its conventional air and naval power to rescue Japan. It would seem, therefore, that the only effective role the United States can play as Japan's security partner is as a strategic-nuclear power: first, to discourage any attack on Japan; if that should fail, to repel and "punish" the enemy promptly.

The security treaty notwithstanding, it is devoutly to be wished but not seriously to be expected that the United States would, in all circumstances and unfailingly, invoke its strategic capability in the defense of Japan. The United States would very likely be powerfully constrained by a range of military, political, diplomatic, logistical, and strategic considerations that would inevitably arise out of its many global security commitments and interests, of which its security relationship with Japan is but one, albeit an important one. These constraints would be all the more potent since the relative expansion of Soviet power, on one hand, and the growing policy independence of key nations among America's Western allies, on the other, would greatly inhibit the United States from acting solely within the context of a security pact with Japan. The United States might well find itself having to choose between Japan and Western Europe.

Given these considerations, it is apparent that Japan should critically reassess her security needs and her security capabilities. The primary threat to Japan would be aerial and naval. While many Japanese fear an aggression by way of enemy troops landing on their territory, especially on Hokkaido, and while much of the JSDF's efforts focus on that northern island, such an eventuality seems unlikely, though it should not be ruled out as a possibility at some stages of an assault. Any land invasion of Japan would be detected well before the fact, for it would require deployment of a great number of naval transport and landing craft. Invasion by

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airborne troops would be extremely hazardous owing to Japan's topography. Moreover, a land invasion of Japan as such would seem superfluous. Japan has an extremely high demographic density and infrastructural concentration, thanks largely to the economic successes over the past three decades that catapulted her into international economic superstardom. She is highly congested, a dense little megalopolitan industrial island sustained by an increasingly complex (hence fragile) network of physical, technological, service, and other life-support infrastructure — all progressively vulnerable to disruption and dislocation. An enemy would need only to execute a brief series of selective air or naval tactical-missile strikes against several of Japan's major nerve centers in order to cripple her on short order. This, combined with the ensuing shock waves of reaction and disorder within a panicked population (a panic likely to be severely compounded by the decline of community, mutual aid, self-help, and other traditional resilience-guarding virtues as the result of progress and prosperity) could lead to total national paralysis. Troop landings would be essential only later, mainly for political and administrative purposes. In addition, Japan's life lines beyond her territorial waters in the Western Pacific are most vulnerable to naval, especially submarine, attack. Her collapse as an industrial state could be brought about by their sustained disruption. Thus, Japan's primary security efforts should focus on her air and naval capabilities, although her ground forces should build and maintain a high level of combat ability since land invasion cannot be ruled out entirely.

The security contingencies Japan might face can be grave, indeed. They cannot be wished away, however fervently the Japanese might wish. How well are Japan's defense forces prepared to cope with those contingencies? Is JSDF capability consistent with the security responsibility that must be shouldered?

II

In a strictly quantitative comparison with military forces of other nations, the JSDF may look rather impressive. In 1980, Japan's military expenditure ranked eighth; only the Soviet Union, the United States, the People's Republic of China, West Germany, France, Britain, and Saudi Arabia spent more. Among the East Asian states, she was second only to the giant PRC. While the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) was smaller than its counterparts in the five highly militarized and conflict-anticipating nations of the region

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(the PRC, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam), in the more crucial area of naval and air power, Japan was numerically stronger than perhaps any nation in the region except for the PRC,[9] and qualitatively her Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) may well have been superior to their Chinese counterparts.

The GSDF in 1980 consisted of approximately 160,000 personnel divided into infantry and mechanized divisions, tank, airborne and artillery brigades, and antiaircraft groups .The MSDF comprised more than 90 surface ships, 14 submarines, and 200 aircraft. The ASDF was composed of some 450 planes and 5 ground-to-air missile groups.[10] Major equipment for the JSDF included domestically developed tanks, howitzers, antitank guided missiles, submarines, destroyers, antisubmarine aircraft, and supersonic trainers; these were augmented by such U.S.-developed weapons as F-4s (now being replaced by F-15s as the ASDF mainstay) and Nike ground-to-air missiles, domestically manufactured under U.S. license. Especially because of the high level of her technological capability, Japan, on paper at least, is indeed a considerable military power, armed with modern ground, air, and naval forces. Japan's real military capability, however, cannot be deduced merely from JSDF statistics. Statistical and other hard data available just do not tell us enough about actual JSDF capability with respect to the kind of contingency for which it should be prepared.

One of the more relevant aspects of any military force is its personnel structure. There are approximately 240,000 JSDF personnel today. This may or may not be adequate in itself, but one characteristic is top-heaviness. The officer/NCO ratio is 1:3, and for every non-NCO enlistee, there are one and a half NCOs.[11] One JSDF general has noted that, relative to the total numbers of military personnel, there are more generals and admirals in Japan than in any other modern state.[12] The JSDF's non-NCO enlisted personnel strength is more than one-fourth below the required or authorized numerical strength.[13] This problem is particularly acute for the GSDF. Platoon- and company-level exercise maneuvers seldom use full personnel complements.[14] While some observers contend that this top-

[9] Sakanaka, "Military Threats," p. 772.
[10] *Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, n.d.), pp. 9-10.
[11] Ibid., p. 12.
[12] Masatake Okumiya, *Nihon boei ron* [A View of Japanese Defense] (Tokyo: PHP, 1979), pp. 68-76.
[13] *Defense of Japan*, p. 12.
[14] Okumiya, *Nihon boei ron*, pp. 64-65.

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heaviness would enable a rapid force expansion, a combination of recruitment difficulties (evidenced by the very understrength personnel), an extremely small number of reservists, and a low level of public interest in enlisting for the JSDF would seem to render such a rapid force expansion quite problematic.[15] Such "neutral" nations as Sweden and Switzerland, which many Japanese consider models of pacifism and noninvolvement in international conflict, maintain relatively small forces on active duty (65,000 in Sweden; 18,500 in Switzerland) but are prepared to mobilize large forces on short notice — 750,000 within 72 hours for Sweden and 625,000 during the first 48 hours in Switzerland.[16] Japan's armed forces, in contrast, have fewer than 40,000 reservists on which to draw in an emergency. Recognizing this problem, the Japanese government began studying the possibility of increasing the size of the reserve force to 180,000,[17] but when the actual strength of total JSDF personnel on active duty is barely 240,000, it would take years to generate more than 140,000 additional reservists. (Reservists are former JSDF personnel who volunteered to remain in the reserves.) Particularly worrisome is the fact that, among those fewer than 40,000 reservists, only about 600 are in the MSDF and but a handful are in the ASDF.[18] Given the critical importance of air and naval defenses to the nation, the personnel situation is disturbing, indeed.

The JSDF's seemingly impressive array of modern defense equipment could be very misleading in assessments of their capability. There is little depth to the JSDF arsenal. Their ammunition inventory, for instance, is reported to be extremely low. Two decades ago, the three branches of the JSDF maintained a total of 140,000 tons of ammunition. By 1978, that total was halved to 70,000 tons — and this in the face of manpower increases in the GSDF from 140,000 to 160,000 persons, in the MSDF from 78,000 tons to 180,000 tons, and in the ASDF from 260 aircraft to well over 400.[19] Although the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) would not disclose the exact numbers of cartridges and shells available to the JSDF, one study has estimated 700 rounds per combat trooper and 300 shells per artillery piece for the GSDF. These figures were viewed as barely adequate

[15] See Thomas M. Brendle, "Recruitment and Training in the SDF," in James H. Buck, ed., *The Modern Japanese Military System* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), pp. 67-96, and *Gekkan yoron chosa* [Public Opinion Survey Monthly], May 1979, pp. 57-58.

[16] *Military Balance, 1978-79* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), pp. 31-32.

[17] *Asahi shimbun*, April 30, 1979, p. 1.

[18] *1979 boei nenkan* [1979 Defense Yearbook] (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko-kai, 1979), p. 421.

[19] *Asahi shimbun*, December 16, 1978, p. 4.

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for two weeks in a small localized battle.[20] In a more serious contingency, the GSDF would, according to one former senior officer, exhaust its ammunition in ten minutes.[21] A recent study reports that much GSDF equipment is more than twenty years old and, again, notes the clear shortage of ammunition.[22] As for the ASDF, it was discovered at the end of 1979 that the inventory of air-to-air missiles was adequate for only one sortie or, at the most, two per combat plane; when those missiles were spent, the most deadly weapons at the disposal of ASDF fighter and intercepter pilots would be 20-mm cannons.[23] Until the summer of 1980, moreover, combat aircraft on patrol duty were not armed with missiles, in deference to the "pacifist spirit" of Japan's constitution. Radar installations, so vital to air defense, remain unprotected. The MSDF is in no better condition. In 1980, the JDA altered its traditional "no torpedoes policy" to permit MSDF ships and antisubmarine aircraft to carry their torpedoes on routine patrol, but admitted that it would take some time before all relevant ships and planes are even partially so armed.[24] Only 5 of the 32 destroyers (the largest surface combatants of the MSDF) and none of the other ships are equipped with antiaircraft missile systems, leaving most of the MSDF complement totally vulnerable to enemy air attack.[25] Thus, should a serious military emergency arise today or in the very near future, Japan's military defense force would be incapacitated within a matter of hours or, at the most, days — even if the enemy failed to destroy it.

The principal reason for this dangerous state of JSDF preparedness, of course, was and continues to be budgetary. In 1978, for example, Japan's defense industry manufactured 25 Sparrow air-to-air missiles (one of the three types of such missiles used by the ASDF) and 1.7 million rifle cartridges per month, to cite but two major items.[26] Twenty-five missiles would be adequate for one sortie each for only six interceptor planes, and 1.7 million cartridges would mean something like ten rounds per GSDF soldier. These, and similar shortages, were a direct result of the consistently small allocation out of the total defense budget for weapons procurement — about 17 per cent in 1979 and 20 per cent in 1980,[27] proportionately about

[20] Ibid.
[21] See Okumiya, *Nihon boei ron*, p. 41.
[22] Sogo Anzen Hoshyo Kenkyu Gurupu, *Sogo anzen hoshyo senryaku* [A Strategy of Comprehensive Security] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1980), p. 55.
[23] *Asahi shimbun*, December 16, 1979, p. 4.
[24] Ibid., August 20, 1980, p. 1, and August 24, 1980, p. 2.
[25] *United States–Japan Security Relations: The Key to East Asian Security and Stability* (Washington: GPO, 1979), p. 12, and *Sogo anzen hoshyo senryaku*, p. 55.
[26] *Asahi shimbun*, December 16, 1978, p. 4.
[27] *Showa 54 nen ban boie hakusho*, pp. 233 and 238, and *Sogo anzen hoshyo senryaku*, p. 10.

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half what other modern military forces spend for such purposes.[28] The problem for the JSDF is even more acute because unit costs of weapons and ammunition production in Japan are said to be significantly higher (some say by as much as three times) than in other modern states.[29] Some JDA sources argue that ammunition production could be increased rather rapidly once additional funds became available. True, but what about an emergency?

In the longer run, an even more serious problem arises out of inadequate defense spending — an inadequacy that the Japanese government has admitted publicly — and that problem has to do with research and development. It is not simply a question of developing "new" weapons. If Japan only needed new weapons, she could buy them. In light of her geography and topography and the most likely contingencies, Japan should concentrate on research and development of particular types of weaponry that are specifically suited for her physical and military predicament. To an extent, she is doing precisely that. Her military technologists are engaged in research and development of, among other items, a short-range surface-to-air guided missile, a medium-range air-to-ship missile, and an electronic detection system.[30] The extent of the effort, however, leaves much to be desired. By the JDA's own estimate, only 0.9 per cent of the defense budget was devoted to research and development from 1975 to 1978 (approximately $66 million in 1978),[31] and in 1980 the amount barely reached 1 per cent.[32] Comparable figures for other nations in 1979 were 10.6 per cent for the United States, 13.6 per cent for Britain, 12.1 per cent for France, and 5 per cent for West Germany.[33] It would seem that relatively little effort was being expended in Japan in the area of military technology, and this is cause for concern because military technology elsewhere has been advancing rapidly. Japan, as a nation committed to nonaggression and peaceful diplomacy, eschews the development or possession of strategic arms, although she is perfectly capable of developing them (including nuclear arms) on short order. Japan has, in effect, renounced the option of strategic defense, and her military capability is consequently much narrower in range than that of other nations. This is all the more reason that Japan should redouble her

[28] Yoshiteru Oka, "Questioning the 1% of Japan's Defense Spending," *Business Japan*, July 1979, p. 57.
[29] Hiroomi Kurisu, *Watakushi no boei ron* [My View of National Defense] (Tokyo: Takagi Shobo, 1978), p. 178.
[30] *Showa 54 nen ban boei hakusho*, pp. 244-245.
[31] Ibid., pp. 233 and 238.
[32] *Sogo anzen hoshyo senryaku*, p. 56.
[33] Ibid., p. 60.

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efforts to develop tactical weapons appropriate to her unique security requirements.

III

The JSDF are a fighting force, organized and maintained to engage in combat with attackers. The proof of combat capability is in the fighting, but, quite unlike the proverbial pudding, a nation cannot afford to wait for the proof to ascertain if its defense forces can in fact adequately do the job expected. We have already glimpsed at some of the crucial factors relating to JSDF capability, but there are more immediate and serious problems.

The effectiveness of any combat force depends critically upon the extent and quality of its training. Aside from the problem of low ammunition inventories, the JSDF are seriously hampered by a number of constraints imposed upon their training and combat preparation. Japan is an extraordinarily dense country, both in human and in structural terms, so much so that there is little space available for large-scale, sustained military training or maneuvers. (Japan is about the size of California, but less than 16 per cent of her land is habitable or otherwise usable. Yet, Japan's population is half that of the United States'. In order to get a rough idea of her physical state, the reader need only visualize one-half the American population, together with one-half their man-made structures, economic activity, and other life support, packed into a narrow coastal strip between, say, San Francisco and San Diego.)

Some of the equipment available is quite sophisticated, but military personnel are handicapped by insufficient opportunities to engage in effective and rigorous combat training with it. Newer GSDF tanks, for example, have many superb operational features, but those features could not be exploited adequately because there are so few areas in the country where their crews can freely and thoroughly train. Artillery firing ranges are both few in number and small in size. The ASDF is particularly limited in its combat training, for the economic growth and prosperity of Japan have created a vast and increasingly congested network of civilian and commercial air corridors over and around the country. This has forced combat pilots to train farther and farther away from their bases, compelling them to expend much of their fuel in getting to and returning from combat-training areas. As a consequence, they can spend only a few minutes in actual combat training on each flight; and, because of rising fuel costs and low ammunition supplies, the number of

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flights must also be severely restricted. The MSDF, while it can use the open seas for training, also suffers from inadequate combat training owing to insufficient ammunition.

JSDF training is further handicapped by administrative and jurisdictional constraints, constraints deriving at least in part from the still lingering antimilitary allergy of the nation at large. The GSDF, for example, must request permission from the relevant regional forestry offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery in order for its troops to pass through national forests and parks to their exercise grounds, permission that GSDF commanders complain is not readily forthcoming. Ministry bureaucrats admit that the influence of leftist labor unions in certain regions causes local Forestry officials to be cautious in handling GSDF requests. Transport of troops, equipment, and supplies over roads and highways and through local administrative entities requires prior approval by a formidable range of civilian authorities outside the JDA. For GSDF troops, all this makes it extremely difficult to acquire a thorough familiarity and knowledge of the geography and topography of areas where combat might actually take place, let alone to engage in the kind of rigorous training required of a first-rate combat force. With respect to the use of air space by ASDF squadrons, authority rests with the Civil Aviation Bureau of the Ministry of Transport, whose operative motto, ASDF commanders complain, is Safety of Civilian Aviation over Defense Requirements[34]; in any event, higher priority is given to satisfying civilian and commercial air-traffic needs and preferences. These constraints upon JSDF training, especially for the GSDF and the ASDF, have made it necessary to seek critical training in the United States for some personnel. The proportion of JSDF combat personnel sent to the United States for training is very small, however, suggesting that the effect of such training on overall combat effectiveness is marginal, at best.

The state of combat readiness in the JSDF is also complicated by the absence of legal provisions that would enable the JSDF to respond promptly to a sudden or surprise attack. According to the existing law governing the JSDF, no elements of the military may be deployed for, or engage in combat for, national defense until the prime minister, as supreme commander, issues an explicit order upon Diet approval. Given Japan's prewar experience with her military and the necessity of maintaining civilian supremacy over the

[34] *Asahi shimbun*, December 21, 1978, p. 4. On the frequency of mid-air collisions and near collisions between ASDF craft and commercial craft, see *Asahi shimbun* for August 21, 1980, p. 1, and September 3, 1980, p. 24.

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JSDF, this seems entirely proper; besides, in an emergency, the prime minister is empowered to issue the order to the JSDF without prior Diet approval. Yet, there is a dilemma under the present circumstances which cannot be brushed away. Even if the prime minister were to issue appropriate combat orders in an emergency without Diet approval, there might not be sufficient lead time for prompt and effective response by the JSDF. With no JSDF officers on the prime minister's staff and no military liaison between him and the Joint Staff Council, communications between the JSDF and the supreme commander go through civilian bureaucratic channels. Any loss of time, owing to communications problems (e.g., the prime minister may be out playing golf, or the JDS director-general who must inform him could be attending a private meeting) or to hesitation on the part of either the prime minister or his cabinet (inasmuch as the current interpretation of law still warrants its concurrence),[35] could spell defeat, not to mention the death and destruction, military and civilian, that could otherwise be avoided or reduced. Thus, even if the JSDF themselves were 100 per cent combat-ready and capable of repelling a surprise attack, the potential lack of dispatch by civilian authorities could reduce, even nullify, whatever level of effectiveness they might possess. It is precisely this predicament that in the summer of 1978 prompted the chairman of the Joint Staff Council to suggest that, in an emergency, front-line commanders might have to act "supralegally" in order to defend the nation — a suggestion that immediately led to his dismissal and forced retirement for having challenged the principle of civilian control over the military.[36]

This problem of prompt response to security contingencies has proved more difficult to deal with than one might imagine. The Japanese are understandably sensitive about the principle of civilian control, and the parliamentary opposition, in particular, fears that legislation enabling the JSDF to respond promptly to such contingencies might start a dangerous trend toward erosion of the principle and toward a revival of militarism. The government, acutely aware of these emotions, has been extremely cautious in dealing with it for fear that a debate might undermine the popular acceptance of the JSDF so carefully cultivated during the postwar period. In the meantime, the problem is unresolved.

Nor does the JSDF's strength as a fighting force provide much comfort to those concerned with the security of the nation.

[35] Ibid., February 7, 1980, p. 4.
[36] Ibid., July 26, 1978, pp. 1-3.

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Even ten years ago, when in more ways than one they were in better condition relative to the potential forces faced by the nation, officials and knowledgeable observers were already pointing out that, in a serious contingency, the ASDF would be annihilated within one hour, the MSDF in a few days at most, and that the GSDF would immediately have to resort to guerrilla warfare if enemy troops were landed.[37] A Soviet diplomat was reported recently to have told a Japanese journalist that an invasion of Japan would "take only several tens of minutes if we did it in real earnest."[38] Clearly, he was not overly exaggerating: many expert assessments of the JSDF's capability are today even gloomier than ten years ago,[39] and the general pessimism is publicly shared by none other than the chairman of the Joint Staff Council who, in a speech last summer, stated that the JSDF would lack the ability to repel a small-scale, limited aggression even if their five-year (1980-1984) weapons upgrading program (known as "midterm service estimate") were fully implemented.[40]

If these views sound excessively pessimistic, it might be useful to recall the MiG-25 incident. When a Soviet Air Force lieutenant defected to Japan in September 1976 aboard his ultramodern MiG-25, the ASDF, using its full complement of electronic surveillance and detection systems and supersonic F-4s, proved incapable of intercepting the intruder as it approached and entered Japanese air space; well before the ASDF finally located the MiG, the Soviet plane had safely landed at a civilian airport only minutes away from a major ASDF base.[41] Clearly, it normally would not be fair to judge overall ASDF or JSDF capability from a single incident. The MiG-25 incident is especially telling, however, because it took place in Hokkaido, which was and is the focus of the JSDF's most concentrated and intense security efforts. The incident, therefore, suggested not just a local or isolated gap in national defense but some fundamental defect in the national security system. Defense experts have in the past suggested that the combat objective of the JSDF, whose purpose is strictly defensive, is to inflict a 30 per cent loss on the

[37] See, for example, "Nihon no senryoku" [Japan's War Potential], *Sande mainichi*, August 27, 1972, p. 20, and Martin Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 114.

[38] Quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 20, 1979, p. 29.

[39] See, for example, Sakanaka, "Military Threats," p. 768.

[40] *Nihon keizai shimbun*, July 18, 1980, p. 1.

[41] For a detailed discussion and evaluation of the incident, see Kaoru Murakami, "MiG-25 jiken kara nani o mananda ka" [What We Have Learned from the MiG-25 Incident], in *1977 Jieitai nenkan* [1977 JSDF Yearbook] (Tokyo: Boei Sangyo Kyokai, 1977), pp. 31-49.

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attacking force.[42] Why a 30 per cent loss would cause the enemy to relent has never been clear, but the more fundamental question now is whether the JSDF could in fact inflict *any* critical loss on the enemy, let alone a 30 per cent loss, and how much greater a loss they themselves would have to suffer. In the end, it may well be that the JSDF, in their basic posture and capability, remain little more than "a parapolice force," as once described by a Japanese analyst.[43]

IV

At one level, some of the measures Japan should undertake to improve her self-defense capability seem obvious, for they have been implied in my discussion thus far. Speaking generally, all these measures entail giving the JSDF the kind of "muscle" that they should have but do not, though many people obviously think they do. This means, among other things, an expanded ammunition inventory, both for training and combat, especially in antiaircraft missiles and antisubmarine weaponry; more rigorous combat training; the "hardening" of radar sites and naval surface ships against enemy air attack; a vast improvement in, and perhaps expansion of, electronic surveillance-and-detection systems; the elimination of unnecessarily cumbersome administrative procedures regarding GSDF and ASDF training and maneuvers; and legislation that ensures prompt response to security emergencies and at the same time safeguards the principle and practice of civilian control over the military. These are the kind of measures that would make the JSDF as effective as they are now expected to be. Otherwise, the JSDF will remain essentially useless and superfluous, an enormously costly papier-mâché.

Beyond these minimal measures, Japan should, in order to keep up with the continuing advance of world military technology, endeavor to develop specific types of tactical weapons closely attuned to her unique defense requirements and geography. These might include a range of small but potent weapons such as precision-guided munitions capable of being launched from land vehicles (e.g., trucks and jeeps) and, eventually, even from the shoulders of ground troops, against enemy planes and ships; mobile radar systems; and torpedoes and ASW mines with accurate homing devices.

[42] See Osamu Kaihara, *Nihon boei taisei no uchimaku* [Inside Japan's Defense System] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1977), pp. 216-221.

[43] Makoto Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 343.

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The defense of Japan's small and congested industrial zones require her military forces — especially since Japan has no strategic weapons of her own — to be extraordinarily versatile and mobile. This, in fact, is *the* crucial element of Japan's security need that should command the most concentrated attention from her military experts, for the only way in which Japan by herself can hope to discourage an attack or aggression will be to raise the anticipated costs to the enemy of such a venture.

At another level of analysis, however, it could be persuasively argued that, whatever is done, Japan will remain indefensible in strictly military terms. The invocation of America's ultimate strategic power in the defense of Japan, as I noted earlier, cannot be reasonably expected except in the case of a total Western military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Short of such a global or semi-global conflagration, the tactical defense of Japan against a determined, well-planned, and well-executed attack, given the physical features of the country, would be extremely difficult, to say the least; indeed, so long as the enemy is prepared to sustain the cost of its attack, Japan's defense is most likely impossible. American tactical or conventional military assistance, apart from what the USFJ could provide, would not materialize in time. If Japan cannot be defended militarily in such an event, how can she be defended?

V

National defense is as much a political problem as it is a military task. The effectiveness of a given quantity of military power might be significantly augmented qualitatively by political innovativeness. The political device I suggest would involve a restructuring of the existing security arrangements between Japan and the United States. My fundamental proposition is still that the United States is the key to Japan's defense and security, but the American role I have in mind is quite different from what it has been; that role would go far beyond JSDF-USFJ "coordination" or "interoperability," which are indeed the central operational concerns of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. My recommendation is that some kind and degree of Japanese-American (i.e., JSDF-USFJ) force integration for the tactical defense of Japan be considered, particularly at the level of first-line combat operations in air and naval defense. To many, perhaps most, Japanese and Americans, this recommendation might sound outlandish. But an extraordinary problem sometimes calls for an extraordinary solution. We live in an

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extraordinarily dangerous age, and the problem of Japan's defense, we have seen, is an extraordinarily difficult one. In any event, the kind and degree of air and naval force integration could be determined by the relevant experts. All costs of such integration — i.e., additional aircraft and naval combatants needed, as well as personnel, equipment, supply, and facilities — should be included in Japan's annual contribution to the costs of maintaining the USFJ or in the JSDF budget. At the level of first-line air and naval tactical defense, there should be a system of joint command, each relevant unit, group, or squadron being commanded by a JSDF officer assisted by an American deputy and a mixed staff of Japanese and American officers. The idea of joint command might also be applied in some form at the highest military levels, the relevant Japanese officer always being senior.

The purpose of force integration suggested here is decidedly *not* to improve Japan's military capability for defense, though some improvement might indeed result. The purpose is first and foremost political. Japanese-American force integration at the level of first-line tactical defense would create a security context in which the United States would automatically be involved in the defense of Japan from the first minute of any enemy attack. In the most fundamental security terms and to the extent that the United States is committed to the defense of Japan, the advantages of such force integration should be quite obvious. To a potential adversary, America's commitment to Japan's defense, which in recent years has become suspect, would be definitive and fail-safe. The enemy could no longer count on hesitation, delay, or welshing in America's military response, which might be strategic or even nuclear. In short, Japanese-American force integration for first-line tactical defense would raise deterrence against even the most "limited" attack on Japan to a far higher level than today's security arrangements could ever hope to achieve. The enemy would from the first moment of its attack on Japan be engaged in a military confrontation with the United States. Such first-line force integration would constitute the most effective and direct tripwire strung along Japan's defense perimeters. Not only would Japan be more secure, but the United States would reduce the risk of having to shed USFJ blood in the defense of Japan.

Japan's role in the defense of the Western Pacific sea lanes cannot but be supplementary to that of the United States. There are several facts to be considered in this regard. U.S. naval forces in the

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region are at considerably lower levels than they once were, both in absolute terms and relative to the contingent environment. At the same time, the United States, with multiple security concerns and commitments throughout the world and serious economic and political constraints at home, will continue to be hard-pressed in any attempt to restore its formal naval dominance in the Western Pacific. The endemic political instability and economic underdevelopment of other East Asian nations will continue to render them not entirely suitable as effective and reliable partners for the United States in maintaining Western Pacific security. Japan is an economic giant to which the safety of the region's sea lanes is vital and which benefits from those sea lanes far more than all her neighbors combined. Thus far, though, despite her economic power, Japan has contributed nothing to the maintenance of sea lane security. All these considerations suggest that Japan should take active and concrete steps toward maintenance of Western Pacific security in support of and in cooperation with the United States. Indeed, nations in the region, especially the ASEAN states, have in recent years come to expect Japan to play such a regional security role, especially within the framework of her security pact with the United States.[44] Particularly because the security pact is explicitly concerned with "international peace and security in the Far East" and because the United States, according to the pact's provisions, continues to shoulder its commitment to Japan's defense through the USFJ, whose personnel are expected to risk life and limb in the event of a serious attack, it behooves Japan, now virtually equal to her ally in economic capability, to reciprocate the United States' assistance and cooperation in Japan's defense by assisting and cooperating with America in the maintenance of Western Pacific security. This is a question not only of fairness but of enlightened self-interest. It is also a matter of critical responsibility for Japan as the pre-eminent developed nation in the region.

How Japan might best assist and cooperate with the United States in defending the Western Pacific sea lanes would have to be decided by discussions and negotiations between the two nations and in consultation with their friends in the region. It should be quite obvious, however, that, given Seventh Fleet capabilities in the region (the ships assigned to the fleet since the crises in Iran and Afghanistan have been deployed in the Indian Ocean and in

[44] See Jusuf Wanandi, "Dimensions of Southeast Asian Security," *Indonesia Quarterly*, January 1980, pp. 50-51, and *Asahi shimbun*, August 14, 1980, p. 3.

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Persian Gulf waters), the participation of even ten major MSDF combat vessels would significantly raise the total security of the region. In light of the critical value of Western Pacific sea lanes to Japan's survival, whatever additional funds she might have to expend in working with the United States to protect those sea lanes would seem a small price to pay.

VI

This essay has not addressed the issue of Japan's defense-expenditure levels, consistently the primary topic of security debate in Japan and the primary source of disagreement between her and the United States. I believe the issue to be an ancillary one. The fundamental issue is, and has always been, the specific security needs that Japan, as a sovereign state and as partner of the United States under the existing security pact, should meet. Whether 1 per cent of GNP is adequate or not is in itself irrelevant. Japan must do what she should: her spending ought to be determined by her security needs, not the other way around. What she should do, moreover, had better be done with the greatest economy and efficiency. One of the underlying purposes of this essay, then, has been to make a small contribution to the necessary task of shifting the general direction of security debate in Japan and of discussion between Japan and the United States toward the really fundamental issue.

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WHAT THE SAUDIS REALLY WANT: A PRIMER FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

by Bruce R. Kuniholm

As the Reagan administration prepares to grapple with the problems of formulating a Persian Gulf policy, it has the opportunity to reflect on and benefit from some of the misunderstandings that have complicated relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. At the heart of these misunderstandings are the U.S. government's imperfect notions about the royal family's room for maneuver and the American tendency to overestimate its own importance in Saudi calculations.

The Carter administration's most unrealistic expectation was that Saudi Arabia could and would support (or at least would not actively oppose) the 1978 Camp David agreement — an expectation that precipitated, in mid March 1979, the visit to Saudi Arabia of a high-powered U.S. team under Zbigniew Brzezinski to pressure the Saudis along those lines. The administration's failure to understand what the Saudis told that delegation (and a previous delegation under Harold Brown in February 1979) was mirrored in an unintentionally ironic editorial in the *Washington Post*.[1] While it is too early to be certain, the Reagan administration's most unrealistic expectation may well be that the Saudis can and will provide bases for the Rapid Deployment Force. According to one Saudi prince, Riyadh is concerned that the United States will come to them with great hopes: "Ronald Reagan will offer us weapons in return for ports and bases in Saudi Arabia. We will say no, and he will be disappointed because he expects too much."[2]

[1] "Baghdad II," April 1, 1979. (See also the editorial for April 2, 1979.)

[2] *Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 1980. On President Reagan's belief that the United States needs a ground presence in the Persian Gulf, see the *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 1981.

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Saudi Priorities

Saudi behavior in the aftermath of Camp David (and in the wake of later events in the Middle East) has created puzzlement about what the Saudis really want. This uncertainty results, in part, from the shifting saliency of one or another threat to the House of Saud, from the complexity of Saudi Arabia's consensual decision-making process, and from the Saudis' inclination to play the role of mediator between their quarreling friends — a role that lends itself to misinterpretation when the Saudis try to be all things to all people. The primary cause of puzzlement, however, is our misunderstanding of Saudi priorities, which lie on several distinct but intersecting planes.

(1) *The Royal Family:* Of primary concern to the Saudi leadership is the preservation of the family and its dominant role in the kingdom. While intrafamily bickering over minor issues or major national concerns may receive considerable attention outside Saudi Arabia, nearly all members of the royal family assign top priority to family unity and continuity. Differences are reconciled through the agonizing process of achieving a consensus.

(2) *The Kingdom:* Next to the family, the kingdom is of primary importance. Indeed, the interests of the kingdom tend to be indistinguishable from those of the royal family, whose numbers are in the thousands and whose leading members occupy key positions throughout the country. At the same time, the Saudis feel obligated to improve living conditions, to respond to human needs, and to articulate the concerns of Saudis at large.

(3) *The Arab Nation:* Beyond the borders of the kingdom, the Saudis feel a strong identity with other Arabs. They have a sense of obligation as the protectors of Arabism. A primary goal of the Saudis on any major international issue is to obtain a consensus that will enable the Arabs to function as one nation. Even those Arabs who are philosophically opposed to the Saudis are not rejected; instead, they are considered errant members of the larger Arab family who must be brought back into the fold. In this light, the breaking of diplomatic relations with Libya in October 1980 was unusual, warranted only by Colonel Qaddafi's vitriolic accusations that the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes sent to Saudi Arabia by the United States had desecrated Muslim holy places and by the Libyan leader's call for *jihad* to liberate Mecca. More typical of Saudi practice is the royal family's care in keeping open its ties with the Baathists in Damascus and in continuing financial aid to

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Syria despite Syria's friendship treaty with the USSR and Syria's differences with Jordan and Iraq.

(4) *The Islamic World:* After the Arabs, other Muslims are of greatest concern to the Saudis. The Saudis view themselves as, and most Muslims consider them to be, guardians of the Islamic holy places and protectors of the faith. As such, they feel a great obligation to ensure that Muslim interests in the international arena are protected. The pattern of Saudi financial assistance reflects this priority: whereas Muslim nations have received generous financial assistance, non-Muslim Asian and African states have obtained relatively little.[3]

(5) *The Anticommunist Bloc:* Another important Saudi interest lies in shoring up the anticommunist bloc. Relations with the United States, the closest powerful ally the Saudis have in this common interest, are quite different from relations with Arab and Muslim states. From the Saudi perspective, though, anticommunism is directly related to Riyadh's interest in protecting the family, the kingdom, the Arab nation, and the Islamic world from the threat posed by radicalism. As a result, these very different concerns are at times indistinguishable.[4]

Saudi Dilemmas

The basic problem the Saudis face is that of most countries in a complex world: their fundamental concerns are often in

[3] While statistics vary, most analysts believe that well over 90 per cent of Saudi Arabia's foreign aid (which in recent years has run close to $3 billion per year) goes to the Arab and Muslim world. See, for example, Ralph Braibanti, *The Recovery of Islamic Identity in Global Perspective* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, Islamic and Arabian Development Studies, Reprint Series, No. 1, 1979), Ralph Braibanti and Fouad Al-Farsy, *Saudi Arabia: A Developmental Perspective* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, Islamic and Arabian Development Studies, Reprint Series, No. 2, 1979), and Adeed Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia in the Eighties: The Mecca Seige and After," a paper presented at the Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, November 6, 1980.

[4] The themes of family, the kingdom, the Arab nation, the Islamic world, and anticommunism are examined in detail in H. St. John Philby, *The Heart of Arabia,* 2 vols. (London: Constable, 1922) and *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (London: F. Cass, 1977, reprint of the 1928 ed.); Gerald De Gaury, *Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972); Joseph Malone, *The Arab Lands of Western Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); David Long, *Saudi Arabia* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976); Richard Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia,* 3rd ed. (Washington: GPO, 1977); Fouad Al-Farsy, *Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development* (London: Stacey International, 1978); Willard Beling, ed., *King Faisal & the Modernization of Saudi Arabia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979); Christine Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and Alvin J. Cottrell et al., *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

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conflict with one another. Faced with a decision, therefore, they must weigh its impact on all their concerns and not just on one. The resulting decision often reflects the immediacy of a particular threat — the Saudi perception of a threat is never static — as well as a temporary compromise between contradictory interests. The decision, therefore, is likely to be one with which the Saudis themselves are uncomfortable; and, given the Saudi decisionmaking process, Riyadh will appear to outsiders to vacillate even on key issues. As the complexion of a particular threat changes, so will the evaluation of the compromise that must be made. The Saudis confront such choices in virtually all of their current policy problems, the three most important of which are outlined below.

(1) *The Peace Process:* The Saudis regard the Arab-Israeli issue in general, and Zionism and "Israeli expansionism" in particular, as a direct threat to their security. The Israeli occupation of a Saudi island at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba and occasional Israeli overflights of Saudi territory remind Saudi leaders of their vulnerability. In addition, the Saudis regard the struggle against Israel as undercutting fundamental Saudi interests because the close relationship between a major Saudi ally (the United States) and Israel provides the Soviets with an immense opportunity to create divisive factions — whether within the family, the kingdom, the Arab nation or the Islamic world. As a result, the Saudis want a just and lasting peace. This, they believe, can be established only by (a) Israel's withdrawal to its pre–June 5, 1967, boundaries, including the return of East Jerusalem to the Arab-Muslim fold, and (b) granting the Palestinians their full legitimate rights, including the right to self-determination and to an independent state in their homeland.[5]

To respond to U.S. initiatives and acquiesce in anything less than this, in the Saudi view, would polarize the Arab world even more than it already is over the Iranian-Iraqi war and would threaten virtually every one of their major interests. The Saudis are convinced that the survival of the monarchy depends on the solidarity of the Arab nation. Should the Arab world become polarized over the Arab-Israeli question, Saudi Arabia would face increased internal and external threats; the royal family's claim that it is responsible for the Muslim holy places and the preservation of the Islamic way of life — a claim that is a crucial component of its legitimacy — would

[5] For one of many statements on this question, see Foreign Minister Prince Saud's statement of August 1, 1979, in Taif. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], *Daily Report*, MEA-79-150.)

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be undermined. If the Saudis need a reminder of their vulnerability on this issue, they need only look at the rhetoric of those who attempted to take over the Grand Mosque of Mecca in November 1979, or at Colonel Qaddafi's attacks on them in October 1980.[6]

The primary threat to Saudi leadership will come from those who can challenge their legitimacy — either within Saudi Arabia or in the Muslim world. Legitimacy depends to a great degree on perception and is influenced considerably by the image that the royal family projects at home and abroad. An awareness of this problem explains the strong Saudi reaction to the BBC film "Death of a Princess" in the spring of 1980. In Saudi society a woman's conduct reflects the honor of her male blood relatives; the film's portrayal of a Saudi princess was thus seen as bringing shame upon the royal family. "A man who does not correct a shame," a Saudi proverb advises, "has no future." The imperatives of Saudi culture required that the royal family seek sanctions against the British to avoid a loss of face within their own society — even at the expense of increased publicity — and that the British show evidence of contrition before the injury could be excused. If moral behavior is a source of legitimacy, it is important to recognize that, to the Saudis, it is not so much what you do (to which the notion of guilt speaks), but how actions are perceived (to which the notion of "face" speaks) that counts.[7] Sensitivity to the need for maintaining "face" within their own society — and hence safeguarding the legitimacy of the Saudi royal family — explains the need for taking a strong stand against the showing of the film. The need for legitimacy also explains why, in August 1980, Crown Prince Fahd raised the possibility of *jihad* against Israel over a Knesset law affirming united Jerusalem's status as the "eternal" capital of Israel, and why, in January 1981, the Saudis endorsed the Islamic summit's Mecca Declaration, which asserted that the primary mission of the present generation would be to prepare for *jihad* in order to liberate East Jerusalem and all Israeli-occupied Arab lands.[8]

The Saudis, with the rest of the Arab world, share a similar

[6] Juhayman bin Muhammad bin Seif al-Oteibi and his followers asserted that the royal family had betrayed Islamic ideals and had therefore forfeited its role as a leader of Islam. (*New York Times*, February 25, 1980.) Colonel Qaddafi asserted that the AWACS planes constituted a desecration of the Muslim holy places in Mecca and called on the 2 million pilgrims to the Muslim shrines to engage in a holy war to liberate Mecca. (*Washington Post*, October 23 and 29, 1980.) The attacks on the royal family as well as the royal family's response evidence a need to seek legitimacy within the context of Islam.

[7] For a brief but valuable discussion of "face," see Peter Iseman, "The Arabian Ethos," *Harper's*, February 1978, pp. 43-44.

[8] *Durham Morning Herald*, August 15, 1980; *Washington Post*, January 29, 1981.

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concern for the plight of the stateless Palestinians who, lacking any means of obtaining a real sense of identity, will continue to remind the Arab world that they cannot be ignored. The Kuwaiti National Assembly was dissolved in 1976 partly because of tensions emanating from popular support within the assembly for the Palestinian cause. To the extent that the Saudis, like the Kuwaitis, experiment with more representative structures for political participation,[9] tensions over the Palestinian question (tensions which, if they call into question the Islamic and Arab credentials of the royal family, would directly affect the legitimacy of the House of Saud) are likely to increase rather than abate. Private criticism of the royal family's "irresponsible" use of the national patrimony (oil) to subsidize indirectly (through the United States) Zionist aspirations in the West Bank and Jerusalem is likely to become public and more acute.

As a result, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty meets few Saudi needs and constrains its choices — particularly since it ostracizes Egypt from the Arab world and separates the Saudis from a historical and natural ally.[10] The Saudis would prefer not to have to reconcile the inherent conflict between their U.S. connection and their Arab and Islamic role, a conflict which, in their eyes, the Camp David process will continue to present so long as the United States fails to confront the Palestinian problem. The Saudis want to maintain close relations with the United States. Nevertheless, if the Reagan administration were (like the Carter administration in 1979) to pressure them to support the Camp David agreement in the absence of what the Saudis consider to be genuine progress on the Palestinian question, then Riyadh will again conclude (as it did at the time of its endorsement of the Baghdad Resolution in 1979) that Saudi Arabia must devote primary attention to the agreement's shortcomings rather than to Saudi security concerns in the Gulf, for the former is seen as a more direct threat to the survival of the family, the maintenance of Arab unity, the protection of Muslim rights, and the containment of radicalism in the Arab world.

To argue that the Saudis can ignore such factors is to make the same mistake as those who argue that Israel can ignore what it views as real threats to its survival.[11] The threat to Saudi Arabia may

[9] The Saudis have recently taken the step of creating a consultative assembly — albeit a conservative one. See the *New York Times*, February 17 and 22, 1980, and the *Wall Street Journal*, August 20, 1980.

[10] Saudi Arabia and Egypt are natural allies in the sense that their resources and needs (e.g., manpower and money) are symbiotic.

[11] See, for example, Phillip J. Baram's "Op-ed" piece, "Don't Forget How the U.S.-Saudi Romance Began," in the *Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 1980: "The case can be made that today the monarchy is increasingly and seriously hurting, not helping,

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be less dramatic, but it is nonetheless just as real. Just as the United States must accommodate within its political system the complex of moral, political, and military factors that influence its policies toward the peace process, so must Saudi Arabia. Such factors must be weighed against the political realities peculiar to each country as well as against their mutual long-term interests.

(2) *Regional Security:* In the wake of events on the Horn of Africa, the revolution in Iran, the Yemen war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, most recently, the war between Iran and Iraq, the Saudis recognize the need for an effective U.S. shield to protect them from regional enemies as well as from the externally sponsored forces of communism and radicalism. This explains their request for the four AWACS planes in the fall of 1980. At the same time, the Saudis recognize that dependence on a close relationship with the United States is dangerous because it (a) makes the Saudis beholden to Washington and vulnerable to American pressure in the peace process, (b) subjects them to the charge that they have forsaken their Arab and Muslim brothers for association with an imperialist power and friend of Israel, and (c) threatens what is left of Arab solidarity. All of these factors militate against the stability of the House of Saud and lead the Saudis to fear that they embrace the United States at their own peril.

The Yemen war in 1979 was a microcosm of the Saudi dilemma. Saudi vulnerability was clear, and Riyadh wanted strong U.S. support. When American aid was forthcoming, however, the Saudi response was mixed, especially since, in their view, the United States played up the conflict as a great-power confrontation. The Saudis thus found themselves accused by their fellow Arabs of aiding and abetting the internationalization of *an essentially Arab problem* by encouraging a superpower confrontation on the Arabian Peninsula. While an Arab League solution relieved the Saudis from Arab wrath, it also illustrated their dilemma.

The brouhaha later in the year over the Strait of Hormuz, resulting from Oman's call for a multilateral approach to the security of the strait, elicited a reaction from the Persian Gulf states that again illustrated the Saudis' dilemma: while they and their Lower Gulf friends might benefit from a U.S. role in gulf security arrange-

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the US — and the US government is doing very little about it." The obvious implication, repeated by many in Washington, is that the United States should be a lot tougher with the Saudis. This line of reasoning assumes that the Saudis can ignore the factors discussed above and that we can pressure the Saudis into doing what we want them to do.

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ments, they also feared what might flow from American involvement. As a result, they wanted a *limited* U.S. presence in the region, a *low profile* in the provision of desired assistance, and *no U.S. rhetoric*. (Publicity necessary to garner domestic support for U.S. policies is seen in Saudi Arabia as a potentially dangerous lack of discretion.)

The Iraqi-Iranian war that began in September 1980 continues to illustrate the same themes. As in the case of Yemen, Saudi requests generated a quick U.S. response: AWACS planes and a guided-missile cruiser were dispatched to Saudi Arabia. In the face of an immediate threat, the Saudis also were more willing to explore the possibility of some form of regional security and were — at least temporarily — willing to accept a greater U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. But there are limits, as the Saudis have reminded us.[12]

The Saudi dilemma in this instance is that an American guarantee of Persian Gulf security would at a minimum require U.S. actions that would make a shambles of other Saudi goals. To increase dramatically the U.S. presence in the region (beyond, say, the prepositioning of project stocks) and to raise the profile of U.S. forces in the gulf, would have serious repercussions once the conflict between Iran and Iraq subsides. Iraq, in particular, distrusts U.S. intentions and fears great-power involvement in gulf affairs. If Iran were eliminated as a threat, Iraqis would undoubtedly see an American presence in Saudi Arabia as directed against them. The external pressures to which the Saudis would be subjected might seriously threaten the kingdom's security and could, perhaps, stimulate internal forces which would exacerbate that threat.

As a result, the Saudis can be expected to vacillate on the key issue of regional security while continuing to fall back on a desire for symbolic reassurances of support in the form of an unrealistically extensive military-supply relationship with the United States — a desire which congressional legislation and present U.S. policies in the Middle East preclude us from fulfilling. In the summer of 1980, a Saudi request for bomb racks, conformal fuel pods, and KC-135 refueling tankers for the F-15 (scheduled for delivery starting in 1981) was turned away and a decision on the request postponed

[12] Consider, for example, the comment of Foreign Minister Prince Saud, repeated in the *Wall Street Journal* for September 30, 1980: "If one speculates and prepares for every eventuality, one tends to increase the threat. . . . The dynamics of such logic is what is dangerous." Or Crown Prince Fahd's opening remarks at the January 1981 Islamic summit in Taif which included the assertion that "the security of the Islamic nation won't be assured . . . by taking refuge under the umbrella of a superpower." (Ibid., January 26, 1981.) See, also, fn. 1, above.

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until 1981. In October 1980, a campaign statement by President Carter ruling out the sale of bomb racks was reported to have led Crown Prince Fahd to consider requesting a withdrawal of the AWACS planes. Additional equipment for the F-15 (which the Saudis feel is essential to their long-range intercept and all-weather missile-launch capabilities, as well as to their protection against low-altitude attack) shapes up — at least until the Israeli election, currently scheduled for late June — as the test of Saudi-U.S. relations in 1981.

Should Washington not be forthcoming on the F-15 issue, particularly on the fuel pods (which, concludes a recent but yet to be released Defense Department study, do not constitute a threat to the Israelis), the Saudis undoubtedly will pursue with greater urgency the Mirage-4000 option offered by France. Recent agreements with France and Germany suggest an increasing Saudi inclination to diversify the sources of military assistance available to them. This course of action has the additional attraction of allowing the Saudis to consider using the weapon systems they acquire to assist other countries — an option not open to them with U.S. systems. In the meantime, regional security issues continue to absorb the Persian Gulf states[13] while an effective, unified approach to gulf security continues to evade them.

(3) *Oil Policy:* Saudi oil presents the kingdom's rulers with a serious dilemma. The Saudis are under pressure from other Arab states to reduce oil production and to raise prices in order to influence the United States and, indirectly, the Israelis in the Middle East peace process. If the Saudis were to heed the call of the other Arab states to reduce surplus funds and cut back oil production, they would increase world oil prices substantially, thereby creating serious economic and political problems not only for the West but ultimately for themselves, as well.[14]

On the other hand, as the Saudis see it, acceding to U.S. desires to keep prices down and increase current production angers the other Arab states and discourages conservation by consumers.

[13] *Christian Science Monitor*, December 26, 1980, and February 5, 1981.

[14] In a statement on August 14, 1979, Minister of Petroleum Sheik Ahmad Zaki Yamani explained the problem: "Saudi Arabia is undertaking a unique role, because when it adopts an oil resolution, it does so in light of seemingly contradictory factors. For example, if we raise prices, both we and other countries get additional income, but if we raise prices to a higher level than we should, we will cause a world recession which could lead to a standstill in our industrialization programs. That is why we must be aware of the balance between the price that should be applied and the price that is harmful. The same process would apply to an increase in production since this would affect the oil life span while the lack of increase would affect the world economy." (FBIS, *Daily Report*, MEA-79-159.)

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Further, the Saudi capacity to influence oil prices has diminished greatly because the Saudis, since the Iranian Revolution and the Iranian-Iraqi war, no longer have sufficient excess capacity to be oligopoly price leaders. Finally, the Saudis — especially "conservationists" such as Minister of Planning Hisham Nazer — correctly attribute much of the oil problem to the inability of the United States to adopt an effective energy policy.[15]

Faced by these unpalatable alternatives, the Saudis have had to make some difficult choices over the past eighteen months. The decision in July 1979 to increase oil production from 8.5 to 9.5 million barrels per day (MBD) reflected essentially a compromise between two sets of fundamental concerns: (1) the economic health of the United States and the West, as well as Saudi investments in the West, and (2) solidarity with OPEC and the Arab world. These concerns, relating to the very security of the kingdom, appeared to be mutually exclusive, and they made the compromise that the Saudis reached an extremely tenuous one. Riyadh reluctantly acquiesced in the OPEC demand for a significant price increase and set the price of Saudi Arabian light crude — the OPEC benchmark — at $18 per barrel. While increased oil production clearly served their own economic interests, it also enabled them to meet international responsibilities.

The July 1979 decision to increase oil output was attributed by the Saudi state radio to the additional needs of the kingdom's 1976-1981 development plan — an obvious attempt to rationalize the decision for public consumption. A more convincing explanation would refer to a combination of factors: (1) an attempt to control the spot market and to stabilize prices, thereby softening the impact of OPEC price increases on Western economies (and Saudi investments) and demonstrating to OPEC that the Saudis are still a force to be reckoned with; (2) a response to President Carter's letter to the heads of OPEC countries, possibly seen by the Saudis as a strong indication that the United States was prepared to reduce energy consumption but needed relief on the production side to proceed in an orderly fashion; (3) an opportunity to earn political credit with consumers, to repay the United States for its support of North Yemen in February-March and, implicitly, to induce Washington to use its leverage on Israel in the peace process.

[15] Imputations by such "liberals" as Sheik Yamani are generally, but not always, more elliptical: "Saudi Arabia cannot be expected to go on forever using its production to save the world from the consequences of unrestrained greed. . . . A global energy program is necessary to move the world away from the edge of an abyss." (*Saudi Report*, March 31, 1980.) Cf., however, the *Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 1980.

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Many of the factors outlined above were influential in the subsequent Saudi decision, in September 1979, to maintain oil production at 9.5 MBD. The same was true a year later at Vienna, where the Saudis agreed to raise the price of a barrel of oil to $30 but maintained production at 9.5 MBD, and at Bali in December 1980 when the Saudis, acting to restrain price increases demanded by the OPEC countries, reluctantly raised the price of oil to $32 a barrel but maintained the production increase, discussed below, that followed the Iranian-Iraqi war. The conflicting pressures to which Saudi Arabia is subject allow the Saudis to go only so far in responding to any one that seems particularly threatening. As the Saudis see it, their only choice is to compromise between competing pressures with the hope of gradually improving the difficult situation in which they find themselves. In this context, cartoon stereotypes of unkempt, gouging, and backstabbing Arabs, which can be seen throughout the press, project a totally misleading image of Saudi Arabia that makes even more difficult any understanding of Saudi Arabia's options and what it is that the Saudis want from us.[16]

Psychological and sociological factors help to explain what the popular press inappropriately refers to as "blackmail," and what should be understood as a more subtle linkage between the Saudis' oil production policies and their perceived military-supply needs. The Saudis have a deeply ingrained aversion to the use of threats. This attitude makes any blunt use of the oil weapon, such as occurred in 1973, an exception. To the Saudis, threats and blackmail directly challenge fundamental Bedouin norms and are regarded as tactically counterproductive. If a Saudi wants to influence a friend, he does so in the context of reciprocity. In the Saudi system, friends have mutual obligations that oblige one to help another in time of need. In the process, influence is exercised and expectations are met without confrontation. For these reasons, perhaps, the Saudis have avoided an explicit linkage between oil and the peace process. Saudi leaders, in fact, both privately and publicly, have denied repeatedly that these two matters are interconnected;[17] commentators, in turn, have asserted that Islamic fatalism, combined with a fixation on divine will, has enabled the Saudis to compartmentalize issues and to view specific events as separate exercises of

[16] See, for example, Herblock's cartoon in the *Washington Post*, July 12, 1979.

[17] For example, see the Minister of Defense Prince Sultan's comments in October 1979 (fn. 22, below), or Foreign Minister Prince Saud's explicit rejection of the use of Saudi oil as a weapon against Israel's Western supporters. (*Washington Post*, February 1, 1981.)

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fate or of God's will — having no association with related events.[18] Such denials and explanations, however, should not blind Washington to the expectations that Saudis do have.

Last year's shortfall in world oil supplies and Washington's failure since then to enact a comprehensive energy program have made clear to Saudi Arabia the heavy dependence of the United States and its Western allies on imported oil. The Iranian-Iraqi war underscored the West's dependence and resulted in the Saudi decision to increase production by approximately 1 MBD (to 10.4 MBD) in order to make up for the Iraqi shortfall — a shortfall which, because of extensive damage to refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, oil-loading terminals, and other facilities, probably will continue into the near future. These developments have increasingly led the Saudis — who are well aware of their own vulnerability and who depend on the United States to resolve the Palestinian question and to be more forthcoming on military assistance — to expect more consideration in return for their oil.

Support for this argument can be found as early as 1979 in a wide variety of public Saudi comments, a few of which are cited below:

(1) Crown Prince Fahd's public suggestion in June 1979 that the United States enter into an immediate dialogue with the PLO. "The Saudi Government," he said, "would be more than prepared to contribute to this taking place."[19]

(2) Sheik Ahmad Zaki Yamani's (minister of petroleum) assertion in a July 1979 interview that if the United States cannot compel Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, it "must be prepared to face the consequences. . . . You can't expect Arabs to cooperate on oil unless there are positive incentives on the political front."[20]

(3) Saudi press editorials in August 1979 that exhorted the Carter administration to play a more influential and effective role in resolving the Palestinian problem.[21]

(4) Prince Abdallah's (second deputy premier and head of the National Guard) assertion, carried by the Riyadh Domestic Service in September 1979, that U.S. recognition of the PLO was natural and logical, and that U.S. interests in the region obliged Washington not only to contact and listen to all parties in the conflict, but also to help the Palestinian people to gain their rights.[22]

(5) Prince Sultan's (minister of defense) observation in October 1979

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[18] See David Long's analysis in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 23-24, which expresses a point of view widely shared by many government analysts.

[19] *New York Times*, June 21, 1979.

[20] *Newsweek*, July 9, 1979.

[21] See, for example, FBIS, *Daily Report*, MEA-79-152 and MEA-79-168.

[22] FBIS, *Daily Report*, MEA-79-182.

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that, although linkage between the Palestine problem and oil production was ruled out, there were "efforts, both political and economic, to serve the cause."[23]

More recently, in September 1980, Crown Prince Fahd noted that U.S. policy toward the Arabs could be altered only by "a strong united Arab stand." Only then would the president, whoever he might be, "be compelled to reckon with Arab power as he reckons with the Jewish vote in the elections."[24] In November 1980, Hisham Nazer, the Saudi minister of planning, noted that "if we have common interests, and we do, then we must both consider these interests when we make decisions. We do. We are producing oil. Now it is your turn."[25] And, in January 1981, Sheik Yamani expressed the hope that "the West will do what is needed to bring about a peaceful settlement in the [Middle East]." If it does, "the oil weapon will be used in a constructive manner," he said. "Definitely, I'm not threatening," Yamani added. "You threaten when you need to. Among friends, I don't think we are threatening."[26]

The gist of these comments, examined in conjunction with other developments that we have touched on, is reasonably clear. If there is a negative response to the Saudi request for additional F-15 equipment, if there is no progress on the Palestinian question (the Saudis find it hard to imagine that there can be until the Israeli elections have taken place), and if there is no new cataclysmic event in the region (such as the Iranian Revolution, the Yemen war, the invasion of Afghanistan, or the Iraqi-Iranian war) that changes the context of the problem, then there will be exceptionally strong pressures both from the OPEC countries and from within the Saudi hierarchy (the technocrats, the religious establishment, or *ulama,* and the next generation of leaders) for a return to production levels of 9.5 or even 8.5 MBD, as well as for greater accommodation to a unified and higher oil price.[27]

In order to avoid these internal and inter-Arab pressures, the Saudis have repeatedly hinted at the linkage between their production of oil and U.S. assistance for Saudi security (whether in the form of military equipment or progress in the peace process). Saudi perceptions that Washington has failed to recognize this linkage,

[23] FBIS, *Daily Report,* MEA-79-208.
[24] *Christian Science Monitor,* September 19, 1980.
[25] *Wall Street Journal,* November 14, 1980.
[26] Ibid., January 30, 1981.
[27] Sheik Yamani has asserted that the Saudis could cut oil production to 6 MBD and still finance their needs. (Ibid., February 2, 1981.) In February 1981, he predicted that Saudi production, then at 10.3 MBD, might drop to as low as 5 MBD by 1982. (*Christian Science Monitor,* February 5, 1981.)

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however, may well result in the reduction of oil production levels (supposedly for technical reasons) as well as in a serious setback for U.S. policies in the Gulf.

Velvet Glove or Mailed Fist?

Analyzing the full range of their interests, many Saudis feel that, despite the interdependence between our two countries, Saudi Arabia is of greater importance to the United States than the United States is to Saudi Arabia. When the Saudis feel particularly threatened, they will seek U.S. assistance if it seems appropriate. But such threat perceptions (e.g., during the early stages of the Yemen civil war, the period immediately following the ouster of the shah of Iran, and the Iraqi-Iranian war) have short lives; the Saudis (who understand the politics of survival) have other means of accommodating them, and Saudi perceptions eventually tend to gravitate back to the generalization that oil for the West weighs more heavily on the scale of U.S.-Saudi relations than American promises to safeguard the security of Saudi Arabia. This is particularly so when the most *immediate* threats to Saudi security come not from Soviet-supported forces operating on the Horn of Africa, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, or in Afghanistan but, rather, from within the Persian Gulf region, if not from within Saudi Arabia itself. As a result, the Saudis look to Washington to balance the scale by (a) using its influence with Israel to help resolve the Jerusalem and the Palestinian issues, and (b) providing Saudi Arabia with the military equipment it needs and with a regional security umbrella that will not upset its Arab neighbors.

The Saudis consider close ties with Washington an essential element of their foreign policy. Nevertheless, they cannot afford to sacrifice their even more essential ties with other Arabs and Muslims, or to risk domestic instability, for their relationship with the United States. In short, what the Saudis really want — a clear choice that protects their interests — they cannot have. Instead, they must pursue policies that balance off extremely difficult choices and sometimes violently conflicting interests, thus unavoidably creating misunderstandings among those who share some of those interests with them.

By the same token, what the United States wants — an ally that can be counted on to support its general policies in the region — it cannot have either. After recovering from its disappointment over Saudi endorsement of the Baghdad Resolution of March

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31, 1979, the Carter administration began to understand that Saudi support for U.S. policies toward the peace process as it then stood, undue Saudi acquiescence in the projection of U.S. military force in the Persian Gulf, and increased production of Saudi oil were potentially as harmful as they were helpful to Saudi interests and risked undermining the very institutions that U.S. policies were said to be protecting.

As the Reagan administration formulates its policies toward the Persian Gulf region, it must be sensitive to these same considerations. Any attempt to push the Saudis beyond what their instinct for survival tells them is acceptable (we must remember that their interpretation of what is threatening them is sometimes markedly different from ours) can only result in failure and in damage to our common interests. At the same time, the constraints under which Saudi Arabia must operate do not preclude constructive U.S. policies. Delivery of some of the military equipment that the Saudis feel they must have or, more important, progress toward resolution of the Palestinian question — while not *necessarily* changing Saudi oil-pricing and production policies, or *necessarily* rendering the Saudis capable of withstanding regional pressures against an enhanced U.S. presence in the gulf — *would* diminish the threats to which the Saudis are most vulnerable. This change, in turn, would alter the nature of the political pressures operating on Saudi leaders. Progress toward a resolution of the Palestinian question, for instance, would reduce a number of threats to the legitimacy of the House of Saud, making it easier for the Saudis to focus the attention of the Islamic states on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (which many Middle Eastern Muslims regard as little different from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank). The Saudis, who for obvious reasons would continue to be responsive to the West's energy needs, would also be in a position (both internally and regionally) to be more receptive to U.S. concerns about Persian Gulf security. In short, there is room for maneuver, but such maneuvers should be conducted with a velvet glove, not a mailed fist. Heavyhandedness in dealing with the Saudis is self-defeating and will only impede the continuation of what has been — up to now — a mutually beneficial special relationship.

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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN 1981: PONDERING AT THE CROSSROADS*

by Paula Scalingi

The 1980s will be a crucial decade for the European Economic Community. This quasi-federal apparatus, nearly a quarter of a century old, today faces a formidable array of interrelated internal problems which stem from two fundamental causes: inherent weaknesses in the EEC's institutional and financial structure and the Community's inability to adjust with changing times. The prospects for maintaining the present level of economic and political cooperation will depend on the member states' willingness to address and rectify the most pressing of these problems.

The most obvious of the structural defects is the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), an ever-growing bureaucratic monster which now swallows nearly three quarters of the annual EEC budget and is threatening the Community with imminent bankruptcy.[1] Other weaknesses that come to mind are the politically frustrated European Parliament and the laborious Community decisionmaking process, which necessitates multitudinous meetings of national ministers and experts, and thrice-yearly summit meetings.

The Community's adjustment problems are less apparent. The EEC has become a fixture on the international scene. Not only is its continued existence taken for granted, but it is also assumed that the Community will always muddle through its periodic crises and internal bickering. Beyond this, it is difficult for longtime enthusiasts of European integration to relinquish their vision of an EEC slowly evolving into a single, cohesive economic and political unit based on viable supranational institutions.

But 1981 is not 1958 or even 1973, and the post–World War II conditions which led to the Community's creation, to a large

* The views expressed are those of the author alone.

[1] For a generally uncomplicated explanation of a complex subject, see Werner Feld, "Implementation of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy: Expectations, Fears and Failures," *International Organization*, Summer 1979, pp. 335-362.

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extent, no longer exist. It must be remembered that the original "Europeans" saw the EEC as a means to counterbalance the influence of the superpowers while restoring to the West European nations some measure of prestige and economic prosperity. The EEC was expected to eradicate residual hostility between Germany and its neighbors while integrating the young Federal Republic into a pro-U.S. bloc to contain Soviet expansion.

Today, however, the larger EEC members are internationally perceived as possessing considerable clout in their own right. In contrast, the United States appears assailed by self-doubts and unable to cope with unexpected international developments and an uncontrollable economy. Moreover, the Community is now the world's largest trading bloc, a position which will only be enhanced by the eventual admission of Spain and Portugal in the mid 1980s. Relations between France and West Germany have been generally excellent for a number of years.

Thus, of the original motivations behind the creation of the Community, only the much-diminished specter of Soviet aggression still remains. Significantly, major West European moves toward further intergovernmental cooperation or toward strengthening federal institutions have followed periods of great international tension. The EEC was established shortly after the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, while the 1968 Czech invasion preceded the revitalization of West European cooperation and expansion of the Community in the early 1970s.[2]

Uneasy Bedfellows

In a certain sense, the Community can be described as the product of an unorthodox marriage of convenience. The original six members — France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux states — shared similar economic interests and political institutions but also possessed diverse and often competitive national goals, not to mention a history of conflict. The first enlargement in 1973 brought into the Community three more unlikely partners, an enthusiastic Ireland, a reluctant Denmark, and an ailing Britain, whose chronic economic woes and declining Commonwealth influence were major motivations behind its decision to join.

Particularly for Britain, this partnership that once seemed

[2] I have dealt in detail with this cyclical aspect of integration in *The European Parliament: The Three-Decade Search for a United Europe* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980).

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so desirable has become, in many respects, an uncomfortable harness. The lengthy and acrimonious dispute over the British net contribution to the EEC budget, more than anything else, has demonstrated Britain's disenchantment with its short but rocky European relationship. The controversy also reflects the twin fundamental causes of the Community's present difficulties as previously noted. While the Community certainly is in no danger of disintegration in the near future, a British decision for less than full partnership or even eventual divorce is not out of the question. The controversy, for all the ill will it produced and left behind, effectively has forced the governments to attempt to alleviate the Community's chronic difficulties.

Money Problems

At the root of the Community's present difficulties is the expensive Common Agricultural Policy. Long held to be a cornerstone of European integration, the Cap has evolved into a complex, haphazardly constructed apparatus.[3] While it has provided higher prices, subsidies, and general prosperity for the Community's farm sector, the CAP is on the verge of exhausting the EEC's cash resources. It may be able only a while longer to stand the strains of conflicting economic interests among the member states, prospective EEC enlargement, and growing inflation. The well-publicized row over the budget issue was a clear manifestation of this dilemma.

The CAP is designed to integrate farm production of the member states with the goal of stabilizing markets and ensuring adequate supplies for consumers while improving the living standards of the farm population. To achieve this end, the Community uses price controls, subsidies, stockpiling, and common import and export policies. The CAP has replaced national farm programs to a large extent, covering a great number of commodities from meat and dairy products to grains, fruit, and olive oil.[4]

While in theory the CAP is a viable means of integrating the various national farm sectors, in practice it has proven so costly and inefficient that many EEC members have quietly resorted to limited national funding to augment Community outlays. For exam-

[3] See Feld, "Implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy," pp. 336-339. Also see "Europe's Budget Headaches," *Europe*, January-February 1980, pp. 15-17; "Shortfall Forecast for EC in 1980," *Journal of Commerce*, December 26, 1979, p. 1; and "Getting Justice from the EC," *The Economist*, September 22, 1979, pp. 16-17.

[4] *Financial Times* devoted a supplement to EEC agriculture that goes far toward explaining farmers' benefits under the CAP and their effect on the surplus buildup. (November 30, 1979, pp. 29-32.)

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ple, France, the CAP's most vocal supporter, has been subsidizing its fruit and vegetable growers. Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy are also under fire from the EEC commission for breaking the rules.[5]

The CAP functions in a deceptively simple manner. Each year, the EEC Council of Ministers adopts "target" or market prices and "intervention," or support prices, on the basis of commission recommendations. Under the provisions of the CAP, the Community intervenes when prices fall below support levels by purchasing surplus products, providing direct subsidies, and paying interest charges on the value of the products stored.[6]

It was expected when the CAP was created in the mid 1960s that a common farm policy would stabilize prices and promote efficient production. Although in Britain's case, it was acknowledged that the cost to finance the CAP would be high, benefits from less restricted industrial trade were expected to offset this. It also was assumed that agriculture ultimately would take less of the EEC budget as farm prices fell and expenses in other areas increased.

However, target prices and support prices have risen inexorably, most rapidly between 1974 and 1978.[7] This trend has been accelerated by increasing oil prices and fluctuations in EEC member currencies. The result has been a tremendous increase in Community farm expenditure and a buildup of massive stockpiles of a wide array of products such as butter, wine, milk powder, sugar, and olive oil. Nearly 40 per cent of all CAP funds are spent on milk alone.[8]

To furnish the amount needed to run the CAP, the Community utilizes a European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which is financed by farm import levies, customs duties, and a portion of the value added tax (VAT) not to exceed 1 per cent, which is supplied by the national governments. At present, nearly 75 per cent of the annual Community budget is required to administer the CAP. The EEC commission has estimated that, at its present rate, agricultural spending will exceed the Community's cash resources by more than $2 billion by 1982.[9] The states presumably would be forced to meet the expected deficit with additional contributions.

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[5] By and large the commission in the past has turned a blind eye to such practices. See "Everyone's Breaking the Rules — Except Britain," *The Economist*, July 19, 1980, p. 49.

[6] Feld, "Implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy," pp. 37-38.

[7] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[8] "Getting Justice from the EC," pp. 16-17. Ironically, British complaints over costs to finance the CAP obscure the very substantial benefits the inefficient British dairy sector receives from the farm fund.

[9] "Britain's EEC Trade Conundrum," *The Economist*, January 5, 1980, pp. 35-36.

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The obvious solution to the dilemma would be reform of the Community's farm policy. While EEC members have recognized the need to bring the CAP under control, until the divisive budget dispute it appeared that national interests and domestic political considerations would make consensus on CAP reform all but impossible. Part of the problem has been that, for all its shortcomings, EEC farm policy has proven very beneficial to the smaller, heavily agricultural states that enjoy favorable net budget contributions. (The net contribution is the difference between a member's gross EEC payment and funds returned to it in the form of farm supports, regional fund outlays, and other expenditures.) Ireland, for example, has received substantial subsidies and grants from the farm fund as well as from the Community's regional fund. Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands also have fared quite well.[10]

Although Italy has gained much from EEC membership, Italian farmers have not done as well as their northern counterparts because Mediterranean products are subject to lower price supports than north European products like beef and milk. Italy has consistently maintained that EEC support for non-Italian farm surpluses and Community concessions on Mediterranean products to nonmember countries have left Italy with the short end of the stick. An additional Italian grievance has been that swelling farm expenditures are diverting funds from other important areas, particularly social programs and industry.[11]

Of the larger Community states, France and West Germany, with their influential agricultural sectors, are a considerable drain on the Community farm fund. In 1978, for example, West Germany received 30 per cent of the EAGGF funds although its farm production totaled only 23 per cent of EEC agricultural output. The smaller EEC states also had favorable balances, while France's balance was just about even.[12]

As for France, although the farm labor force has been slowly shrinking, it still comprises nearly 9 per cent of the total working population.[13] The trend is toward larger farm enterprises and powerful farmers unions that are determined to protect high French prices. A recent example of the farm sector's clout was the noisy "sheep meat war" between France and Britain. In order to protect

[10] "An Exposed Mrs. Thatcher on the Dublin Stage," *Financial Times*, November 28, 1979. Also see "The Great Divide," *The Economist*, October 27, 1979, p. 58; *Agence Europe* (no. 2770, new series), October 17, 1979, pp. 6-7; and "Ireland: Fellow-Feelings," *The Economist*, March 22, 1980, p. 55.

[11] Ibid.; also, "The Italian Problem" (editorial), *Agence Europe* (no. 2794, new series), November 22, 1979.

[12] "Fleecing the Poor," *The Economist*, November 18, 1978, pp. 44-46.

[13] "Farmers Losing Their Privileged Position," *Financial Times*, October 24, 1979.

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higher-priced French lamb, France defied an EEC Court of Justice ruling allowing the British to export cheap lamb to France from non-Community countries such as New Zealand. France's goal was to pressure the Community into adopting a common policy for lamb favorable to French farmers.[14]

West German agriculture, which still employs about 6 per cent of the total working population, has gained much from the CAP, particularly the dairy industry, which has been a major recipient of farm funds.[15] Anticipating inadequate Community farm support in the future, the powerful German Farmers Association in the fall of 1979 requested substantial increases in federal aid — a request the budget-conscious Schmidt government denied — but most reluctantly because of the strong farm sector ties of its coalition partner, the Free Democrats.[16]

An Unequal Relationship

On the surface, certainly the British complaint had its merits. The "European" ideal of equal states, equally sharing notwithstanding, Britain by 1979 was the third poorest EEC member on a per capita basis and yet a major contributor to the Community budget.[17] British demands for a "broad balance" of its EEC contributions and receipts began well before Thatcher took over the British helm in May 1979 as the British net payment to the Community dramatically increased. While Britain was a net beneficiary as late as 1975, the net contribution deficit doubled between 1976 and 1978. By the fall of 1979, the Thatcher government was estimating its unfavorable 1980 net contribution at more than $2 billion, up from $1.6 billion the preceding year.[18] Later EEC commission computations were to increase the predicted deficit to $2.5 billion and finally to $3 billion for 1981.[19]

According to the commission's assessment, the reasons

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[14] The British press has produced many stories on the sheep meat issue. For the uninitiated, the most lucid account is "The Mutton War of '79," *Newsweek*, November 12, 1979, p. 29.

[15] "Benefits from the CAP," *Financial Times*, October 22, 1979 (supp. on West Germany), p. xx. See, also, Yao-Su-Hu, "German Agricultural Power: the Impact on France and Britain," *The World Today*, November 1979, pp. 453-461.

[16] "Benefits from the CAP."

[17] "EEC Unity Threatened by Growing Economic Disparities," *Financial Times*, January 22, 1980, p. 16.

[18] "Mrs. Thatcher Goes Way Out on a Budget Limb," *The Economist*, October 27, 1979, pp. 56-58.

[19] These new assessments prompted France to charge that the commission was pro-British.

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for the adverse British net budget contribution were (1) Britain's small, efficiently run farm sector received a relatively small amount of the Community's very extensive spending on agriculture; (2) Britain still imported a substantial amount from non-Community states, thus paying a larger share of customs duties; and (3) many British products were subject to the value added tax, resulting in a high British VAT payment into EEC coffers.[20]

A Family Quarrel

Armed with the Commission's statistics, the Thatcher government bluntly demanded that "the Nine" first agree to substantially cut the British 1980 net budget contribution and then tackle the basic cause of the problem by reforming the CAP and the budget structure. While professing loyalty to the Community, Thatcher strongly implied that Britain would withhold future payments to the Community budget or, at a minimum, would walk out of the Dublin meeting if British demands were not satisfied.[21] This was no idle threat, since Britain could effectively paralyze the Community machinery by resorting to either tactic.

Subsequent press criticism from within Britain and the other Community states tempered Thatcher's stand somewhat. Some British papers, however, were already making the issue a *cause célèbre*. Thatcher disavowed her threat to suspend payments to the Community, but continued to play up the controversy to bolster her position at the Dublin summit and also probably to divert attention from increasing British economic woes caused in part by the Conservative government's stringent austerity program.

Meanwhile, the other EEC members found themselves in an untenable position — bound by their own national interests, facing a Community budget deficit by 1982, and hampered by the inability of the Community's ponderous machinery to implement short-term reforms that would appease the British by Thatcher's deadline. An additional complicating factor was the European Parliament's attempt to pressure the governments to limit farm expenditure. The Parliament, anxious to exert and perhaps extend its limited powers, was threatening to veto the entire 1980 budget if the gov-

[20] "Brussels Report Says UK Pays Too Much," *Financial Times*, September 5, 1979, pp. 1, 3.

[21] Rumor was that the Thatcher government had already drawn up plans for a unilateral cut in the British budget payment. See "Slow Ascent to the Summit," *The Economist*, November 3, 1979, pp. 45-46, and "Thatcher Threatens to Withhold EEC Rents," *The Guardian*, October 28, 1979.

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ernments refused to accept its amendments, which would cut spending on milk surpluses, tax dairy farmers, and divert more revenue to the EEC regional fund.[22]

Searching for a "Modus Vivendi"

The number of alternatives available was limited at best, and none offered more than a temporary solution to the budget dilemma. The most likely temporary expedient was a revision of the "corrective mechanism" devised in 1974-1975. This financial device originally was intended to reimburse a member state whose contribution to the Community budget exceeded its share of the EEC gross national product. The mechanism was restricted to countries with a large trade deficit. Moreover, the amount of the refund was limited, and the mechanism itself was not automatically applicable to states saddled with unfavorable net contributions. Ostensibly, by eliminating many of these limitations, a possible cut of around $700 million could be made in the British net contribution.

Another proposed solution was to maintain the British budget contribution at the 1979 level. Such a ceiling, however, would have to be balanced by a corresponding increase in financing from other EEC countries. The British not only would receive preferential treatment, but would escape paying any additional funds when EEC revenue fell short in 1982.

A less likely solution was an EEC agreement to link the British payment and receipts to the low British per capita gross domestic product (GDP) rather than to Britain's share of the Community GNP, but shrinking EEC resources and enlargement of the Community made such an approach unrealistic. One problem, for example, would be that the low per capita GDPs of new member Greece and future members Portugal and Spain would divert a large portion of the Community's regional funds to them. At the very least, they also could demand special treatment from the EEC, violating the concept of equal partnership within the Community.

A last possible solution was a temporary revision of EEC rules to pump Community funds back into Britain. This, however, would blatantly discriminate against the other Community members and would set an unwelcome precedent, especially in light of further EEC enlargement.[23]

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[22] "EEC Farm Cash Move Rejected," *Financial Times*, November 15, 1979, p. 1, and "The Parliament Flexes Its Budget Muscles," *Business Week*, November 26, 1979, pp. 48, 52.

[23] "Commission Lists Ways to Cut UK Share of Budget," *Financial Times*, October 19, 1979, pp. 1, 20.

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Significantly, all of these short-term expedients were designed to meet minimum British demands. None of them addressed the underlying weaknesses of the EEC's financial structure — the basic cause of the British problem. Complicating the difficulty in finding common ground were disagreements among the Nine in other areas, especially energy policy and fisheries policy. And there was also, of course, the French-British "sheep war."[24]

Two Sides to the Story

Although Britain's EEC partners generally agreed that the British complaint was legitimate, they nonetheless reacted negatively to the Thatcher government's demands for a large refund of its EEC budget contribution. By the time of the Dublin summit, France had emerged as Britain's chief adversary in the budget dispute. Although officially recognizing the British grievance as genuine, France was opposed to reducing the British contribution for financial considerations as well as reasons of principle.[25] The French position was that Thatcher exaggerated the British plight. France also held that the dilemma was of Britain's own making, since British imports, to a large extent, came from non-Community countries. Moreover, Thatcher's campaign was viewed as further evidence of continued British hostility to the Community — that Britain never would "fit in," just as de Gaulle had argued in the 1960s when he twice blocked British EEC membership.[26]

There also was considerable French resentment over Thatcher's bludgeon-style diplomacy and over what was perceived as Britain's lack of concern for its partners. From the standpoint of national interest, France was adamantly opposed to the British demand for a "broad balance" of its EEC contributions and receipts, maintaining that this would amount to a second renegotiation of Britain's participation in the Community at the expense of the other members.[27] France also rejected changes in the corrective mechanism — the most practical short-term solution — as unfair. Notwith-

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[24] "Big Rift Feared," *Daily Telegraph*, December 3, 1979, p. 8.

[25] "The Lady Protested Too Much," *The Economist*, December 3, 1979, pp. 48-49, and "EEC Summit Deadlocks," *Washington Post*, December 1, 1979, p. A16.

[26] For background on de Gaulle's attitude toward Britain see Miriam Camps, *European Unification in the Sixties* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), and John Newhouse, *Collision in Brussels* (New York: Norton, 1967).

[27] "Britain and the EEC: On an Uphill Road from the Summit," *Financial Times*, December 3, 1979, p. 1. Thatcher and Giscard had met on November 9 for a presummit airing of differences and had made no progress on the budget issue. See "Thatcher-Giscard Talks Yield No Results," *Press Association* (London), November 19, 1979.

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standing the anticipated EEC deficit, France was against cuts in Community farm spending or an increase in the value added tax ceiling above the 1 per cent established limit, although the percentage of the VAT that the states paid stood at just under 1 per cent.[28] The 1981 presidential election was an additional incentive for France to maintain the status quo.

Unlike France, West Germany appeared the least reluctant of the Nine to accommodate the British demand for short-term relief. Like France, Bonn was opposed to raising the VAT ceiling, and, as late as the end of 1979, was against tackling CAP reform.[29] The Schmidt government understandably wanted to avoid antagonizing West German taxpayers and farm interests, especially with national elections less than a year away. For Schmidt, the most practical and convenient solution was alteration of the 1975 corrective mechanism to provide Britain with one to two years' relief.[30]

Although philosophically opposed to giving Britain preferential treatment, West Germany still sought the support of France, Ireland, and Italy for this approach in order to achieve a consensus prior to the Dublin meeting. Schmidt apparently was counting on British willingness to grant concessions in other areas to mollify the other EEC members, specifically EEC fishery policy and perhaps North Sea oil supplies and prices. The Thatcher government, however, gave no indication that it was ready to link a temporary solution of the budget issue to consensus on these other bones of contention.[31]

As for Italy, the Cossiga government had been waging its own campaign to win financial concessions at the Dublin summit. Italy hoped to receive a pledge from the other governments that long-term budget reform would be undertaken to produce a CAP favorable to Italy, and was prepared to support the British view if only to show its support for farm-policy revision. The Cossiga government nonetheless was worried that Thatcher could precipitate a serious EEC crisis.[32]

Likewise the smaller states — with the exception of Den-

[28] "Thatcher-Giscard Talks."

[29] "Schmidt, Thatcher, Discuss EEC Cash Imbalance," *German Tribune*, November 11, 1979, p. 1; also, "Schmidt Sees No Failure at Dublin" (Hamburg television interview), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Western Europe), November 30, 1979, p. J6.

[30] This would have left West Germany on record as favoring CAP reform while offering Schmidt an easy way out of what could become an explosive domestic political issue.

[31] British intransigence on the linkage issue was to test the limits of Schmidt's patience over the next several months.

[32] "The Italian Problem," *Agence Europe*, November 22, 1979.

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mark — recognized the validity of the British complaint but resented Thatcher's ultimatum and the magnitude of the British demand. While Belgium, The Netherlands, Ireland, and Luxembourg probably were ready to accept a partial cut of the British net budget payment on a temporary basis, they rejected Thatcher's insistence on elimination of most or all of the amount in question.[33]

Of all the Community members, Denmark was the most vocal on the budget issue prior to the Dublin summit. During the mid-October meeting of EEC finance ministers, the Danes bluntly refused to recognize the legitimacy of the British position. Denmark, on the basis of its own analysis of the British net contribution, contended that the Thatcher government exaggerated the amount by two-thirds.[34] While a British-Danish dispute over fishing policy probably was a major factor behind Denmark's hostility, still, as a chief beneficiary of the Community farm policy, Denmark was fearful of undermining its own favorable position.[35]

First Confrontation

When the nine heads of state met in Dublin, November 29-30, Thatcher and her colleagues remained poles apart on the budget issue. Nonetheless, most veteran EEC watchers predicted that the governments, true to Community tradition, would wrangle far into the early morning hours and agree to a makeshift compromise. West German Chancellor Schmidt was one of those voicing optimism on the eve of the summit.[36]

Thatcher's inflexibility, however, not to mention her far-from-diplomatic defense of her position, guaranteed that the summit would fail to produce the anticipated compromise. Refusing her colleagues' offer of a reduction of the British deficit by roughly a third of the projected $2 billion, Thatcher only narrowly averted a complete impasse by agreeing at the last moment to postpone further discussion of the issue until the next EEC summit in February or March.

The press on both sides of the channel added to the already tense atmosphere by giving the Dublin story extensive news

[33] "Simonet Views EEC Problems" (text of interview with Belgian foreign minister), *Le Soir*, November 29, 1979, p. 5. Simonet reflected the feeling of the smaller members when he noted that the governments were willing to help Britain solve its "political problem" but that any solution must "remain within tolerable limits."

[34] "UK 'Wrong' on Cost of EEC," *Financial Times*, December 1, 1978.

[35] Ibid.

[36] "Compromise Solution Expected from EC on UK Budget Share," *Journal of Commerce*, November 29, 1979, p. 1.

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play, particularly seizing upon Thatcher's threats to resort to an "empty chair" policy. There seemed to be an almost perverse irony that Britain could employ as a weapon the tactic used by French President Charles de Gaulle in the mid 1960s to paralyze EEC decisionmaking to force farm policy concessions favorable to France.[37] Thatcher and French President Giscard d'Estaing escalated the rhetoric; the former loudly proclaimed that Britain would not accept "one third of a loaf," while the latter attacked the British prime minister's negotiating style and charged Britain with lacking "Community spirit."[38]

While cooler heads among the member governments continued to stress that the budget controversy was merely another family quarrel, the Community's fortunes in mid December took a turn for the worse as the European Parliament made good its earlier threat to veto the entire 1980 Community budget. The immediate effect of the Parliament's action was to freeze EEC spending at the 1979 level and to bring the Community budget process back to square one. This meant that it would be months before the budget was approved, since the EEC commission would have to draw up another draft for the Council of Ministers to scrutinize and the Parliament to amend.[39] The Parliament's unprecedented action added to the tremendous pressure already on the Nine to resolve the budget dispute as quickly as possible. By the end of the deceptively quiet Christmas holidays, however, it appeared highly unlikely that there would soon be a narrowing of the chasm that separated Britain from the rest of the EEC on the budget issue.

Sparring Between Rounds

The first three months of 1980 were accompanied by intense speculation in the West European media over the outcome of the crucial next EEC summit, which finally was scheduled to be held in Brussels at the end of March. Italy, which officially held the EEC council presidency for the first six months of 1980, would play host.

Chancellor Schmidt stoically played go-between to reconcile Thatcher and Giscard, trying to devise a compromise package

[37] France had boycotted EEC activities for seven months after negotiations over the CAP broke down in the early morning hours of July 1, 1965.

[38] "Thatcher's Demands Refused," *Financial Times*, December 1, 1979, pp. 1, 2, 20, 26.

[39] For a description of the Parliament's role in the budget process, see Barnett Cocks, *The European Parliament: Structure Procedure and Practice* (London: HMSO, 1973). The Parliament, its momentum undercut by the governments' eventual commitment to CAP reform, ultimately approved a similar budget several months later.

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that would entail British concessions on fisheries, sheep meat, oil, and farm policies.[40] Press speculation focused on British Foreign Secretary Carrington's contribution to a possible settlement. It was hoped that Carrington, now free to center his attention on non-African issues after his successful resolution of the Rhodesia situation, would temper Thatcher's stridency as well as be more amenable to compromise than the outspoken British prime minister.[41]

The weeks preceding the scheduled Brussels summit, however, witnessed an unadorned return to a hardline stance by both France and Britain. The Thatcher government was buoyed by a new commission estimate that the 1980 British deficit would top $2.5 billion rather than the $2 billion previously predicted.[42] Accordingly, the British returned to the theme of special treatment on a multiyear basis. Thatcher, in effect, was now asking for a modification of the EEC's corrective mechanism to guarantee Britain at least the $712 million discussed at Dublin, annually over the next four to five years. Britain also wanted a special fund to finance regional projects over the same time period. It was prepared to consider concessions on lamb, fisheries, and farm pricing — but not North Sea oil — in return for specific guarantees of future refund amounts.[43]

If a crisis indeed was in the offing, the sudden postponement of the summit by Italy, in its capacity as EEC council president, effectively gave the Community a bit more breathing space to engineer a compromise. It is unclear which government or governments were behind the postponement. The excuse used was that Italy itself was in the midst of a governmental crisis. But certainly chronic Italian political instability had not been enough to scotch a scheduled summit before. The most likely explanation was that Italy, unwilling to have the blot of a Community blowup on its six-month EEC presidency, had decided, with the probable concurrence of Britain and France, to hold the summit at a later date.[44]

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[40] "Wide Agreement After Thatcher-Schmidt Talks," *The Times* (London), March 29, 1980, p. 1.

[41] "Mission Accomplished, Britain Can Turn to Europe," *The Guardian*, March 16, 1980, p. 9; also, "London and Bonn: Now on to Paris," *The Sunday Times*, March 30, 1980, p. 16. During January, Thatcher sent Lord Privy Seal Sir Ian Gilmour to the other EEC capitals on an abortive mission to convince Britain's partners to accept its demands. See "Gilmour Seeks EEC Budget Compromise," *Financial Times*, January 5, 1980, p. 1.

[42] "Stalemate at Quatre Bras, On to Waterloo," *The Economist*, March 22, 1980, pp. 52-53; also, "Half a Rather Larger Loaf from the EEC," *The Guardian*, March 16, 1980, p. 3.

[43] "Britain: The Heretic of Europe," *Financial Times*, March 26, 1980.

[44] "Dangers in 'Family Quarrel'" (interview with Lord Carrington), *The Times*, March 5, 1980, pp. 1, 5.

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Second Faceoff

Far from offering more negotiating time, the month interval between the aborted Brussels meeting and the rescheduled summit (April 27-28) in Luxembourg witnessed only a further, intensified war of words. Although it appeared unlikely that Thatcher could hold out much longer, the Community received yet another jolt when the Luxembourg summit ended in an impasse. The fallout this time was much worse than after the debacle at Dublin, for Giscard and Schmidt had gone far beyond their original position by the end of the stormy session and offered Thatcher a large, one-year rebate of the British net contribution. What the Franco-German proposal did, in effect, was put a fairly low ceiling on the 1980 British net payment. When Thatcher insisted that this rebate cover at least three years, Giscard apparently first balked and then, in frustration, extended his offer to two years. Thatcher, however, counterdemanded that the net contribution ceiling be lowered even further, and Giscard and Schmidt refused.[45]

Neither leader was in a position to accept this final British demand. Schmidt, facing reelection in the fall, could not have justified committing West Germany to shouldering the lion's share of so ambitious a British relief effort even if he were willing to violate his own principle of fair play to settle the controversy in the short run. Giscard apparently was more than just thoroughly put off by Thatcher's negotiating tactics; he had met Thatcher more than halfway and had been rebuffed in what amounted to a stinging humiliation for the French president.

Even more frustrating to Giscard was that the British prime minister had an excellent bargaining weapon: EEC farm prices. The Community's spring rite of setting annual farm prices always is extraordinarily important, especially to the members who benefit most from the CAP. With the 1981 presidential elections very much in mind, Giscard wished to secure as large a price hike as possible on a wide variety of commodities produced by French farmers. Prior to the Luxembourg summit, all the EEC members but Britain had agreed to implement an average 5 per cent farm price increase on June 1, when the 1979 prices and subsidies expired. By maintaining that Britain logically could not agree to such a price hike unless a large

[45] "An Offer She Couldn't Refuse But Did," *The Economist*, May 3, 1980, pp. 73-74; also, "EEC Budget Stalemate," *Daily Telegraph*, April 29, 1980, p. 1, and "France Offers Deal in EEC Budget Row," *Daily Telegraph*, April 28, 1980, p. 1.

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refund of the British net contribution was secured, Thatcher effectively backed Giscard into a corner.[46]

Talk of a Trial Separation

The failure of the Luxembourg summit and continued British blocking of farm price increases led to some of the most remarkable rhetorical exchanges in the long cross-Channel dialogue. Giscard and French Foreign Minister François Poncet assailed the Thatcher government for its violation of Community principles and repeatedly emphasized that Britain might be better off an associate member of the Community rather than a full partner. There were rumors that France might circumvent the British farm price veto by resorting to national funds to supplement CAP expenditures. France also hinted that the other EEC members would go ahead without Britain and implement the new farm prices.[47] This action was in itself extraordinary, since France always has been the most adamant among the governments on maintaining the practice of unanimity in all important EEC decisionmaking. In fact, in 1966, as a concession for ending his seven-month boycott of Community activities, de Gaulle had forced the so-called Luxembourg Agreement on his colleagues, which upheld the right of any Community member to veto any joint decision counter to its national interests.[48] Giscard's threat, if truly there was one, was groundless, since West Germany immediately squelched any speculation with a denial that the British veto would be overriden by the other governments.[49]

Thus, as June drew inevitably closer, pressure on the Nine to reach a stopgap solution to the budget issue increased accordingly. Although the farm price aspect was certainly a major motivation behind the final grueling effort to reach a compromise, other factors were very much involved, especially external events. The governments were finding the budget controversy, explosive though it was, eclipsed by the situation in Iran. EEC members had agreed in April, at U.S. insistence, to implement some form of joint sanctions against Iran, although most publicly expressed the feeling that such

[46] EEC agricultural ministers had met in an all-night negotiating session just prior to the summit, with British farm minister Peter Walker's continued refusal obviously geared to offer Thatcher maximum bargaining leverage in the ensuing budget discussion.

[47] "François Poncet Gives 'Last Warning' to UK," Paris Domestic Service, April 30, 1980.

[48] The Luxembourg Agreement, facetiously termed the "gentlemen's agreement to disagree," has lasted for fifteen years through the continued tacit support of the governments.

[49] "EC Sets May 31 Deadline for Solution to Budget Problem," Dow Jones (Brussels), May 6, 1980.

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an action would not lead to the release of the American hostages taken captive by student militants the preceding November.[50]

The unsuccessful U.S. attempt to rescue the hostages on April 19, however, exacerbated international tension and further complicated the Community sanctions effort. It was not until late May that the Nine were finally able to agree on limited sanctions against Iran.[51] Meanwhile, the budget dispute, which temporarily had been placed on the back burner, was in danger of boiling over as the date for the implementation of farm prices approached. In a last ditch attempt to prevent an open break, EEC foreign ministers met for a special marathon session on May 30 to succeed where the heads of state and earlier ministerials had failed. According to some reports, the meeting came extraordinarily close to a breakdown when a disgruntled Carrington nearly walked out.[52] Finally, in the early morning hours, the ministers agreed to a makeshift compromise that postponed the day of reckoning for at least a year, effectively freeing the French and West German governments from electoral complications and permitting the Nine to turn to more pressing foreign policy concerns, particularly the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and an EEC peace initiative for the Middle East.

A Grudging Reconciliation

The temporary settlement of the budget controversy was a solid endorsement of Thatcher's obstructionist negotiating tactics, for Britain managed to get what amounted to a large rebate of its net EEC contribution for both 1980 and 1981. The foreign ministers also agreed that a 1982 rebate was in order, but left the amount unspecified. Most importantly, they pledged to undertake limited reform of EEC farm policy as soon as possible (i.e., after the West German and French elections).[53]

Despite the fact that Thatcher did not receive the multiyear refund she demanded, the compromise was immediately hailed by both the continental and British press as a Thatcher victory. It can be argued that this indeed was the case, since through the rebate, Britain would move from its position as the Community's largest net contributor to third place on the roster of EEC members with un-

[50] "The Wavering Allies," *Newsweek*, April 21, 1980, p. 36; also, "Cabinet to Discuss U.S. Measures Against Iran," FBIS, *Daily Report* (Western Europe), April 9, 1980, p. J1.

[51] "Europe to Impose Sanctions on Iran Despite Britain," *Washington Post*, May 22, 1980, p. A20.

[52] "Crisis on the Back Burner," *European Report* (no. 689), May 31, 1980, pp. 4-9.

[53] Ibid.

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favorable net payments. West Germany would become the EEC's biggest financial loser, paying roughly 40 per cent of the British rebate. France would become the Community's second largest contributor.[54]

Unexpectedly, but certainly understandably, the budget settlement caused a flurry of adverse criticism from some members of Schmidt's own cabinet and from the German press. For a short time, there was speculation that West Germany might not approve the compromise. The situation was not helped by Schmidt's blunt contention that the West German states would have to share the burden imposed by the British rebate, or that federal gas, diesel oil, and liquor taxes would be raised if the states failed to comply.[55] Dissent notwithstanding, by June 4 West Germany had granted its official approval. Britain promptly lifted its ban on EEC farm price increases, which were immediately put into effect after typically being backdated to June 1.[56] After over ten months of bickering and predictions of a possible British divorce, the Nine projected an image of uneasy harmony — for about twenty-four hours.

Unresolved Problems

It was inevitable that the acrimony of the past months and the various problems associated with the CAP that were threatening the Community could not be dismissed with a limited agreement on the budget issue. Although the governments had agreed to devise a fisheries policy, distributing fishing quotas portended to be a long and difficult process in this highly sensitive area. The sheep meat issue remained to be solved to both French and British satisfaction. More important, although the Nine agreed to tackle CAP reform, there was no consensus on what form a revised farm policy would take.

One of the CAP-related problems that now could no longer be tucked under the rug was the scheduled EEC entry of Portugal and, especially, Spain, two poor and heavily agricultural states. It was obvious, in the wake of the budget dispute, that the CAP could not withstand the burden resulting from Spanish and

[54] "Effects of 30th May Agreements," *Agence Europe* (no. 2924, new series), June 9-10, 1980, p. 14.

[55] "Federal States Reject Government's EEC Contribution Plans," FBIS, *Daily Report* (Western Europe), June 6, 1980, p. J1; also, "West German Aide Opposes Common Market Budget," *New York Times*, June 2, 1980, p. A3.

[56] "Bonn Announces Approval of EC Budget Compromise," Dow Jones (Bonn), June 5, 1980.

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Portuguese membership. At the same time, for the Nine to postpone further enlargement was unthinkable in terms of principle as well as sound diplomacy. Giscard, however, was not deterred.

The specter of CAP reform, electoral considerations, the British "victory" in the budget dispute, and the direction of the EEC in general were probably very much on the French president's mind when he shocked France's present and future Community partners on June 5 by calling for a slowdown in the negotiating timetable for Spanish and Portuguese entry into the Community.[57] Speaking before some thousand French farm representatives, Giscard claimed that the "incomplete" integration of "certain new members" that joined the Community in 1973 (specifically, Britain) made it "advisable" that the Nine undertake necessary reforms before further EEC enlargement took place.

While Giscard did not withdraw French endorsement of Spanish and Portuguese entry, he did say that their membership should be dependent on the EEC governments' ability to reform the CAP. He probably underestimated the impact of his blunt remarks on the very recently achieved EEC reconciliation, not to mention on the peace of mind of his Mediterranean neighbors. Greece, scheduled to enter the Community in January 1981, was initially distraught over Giscard's remarks, but was hastily reassured by the French that Greek entry was a *fait accompli*.[58]

For Spain and Portugal, it was a different matter. Their EEC membership, set tentatively for January 1983, was suddenly held hostage to CAP reform, clearly a tedious and tendentious undertaking. But Giscard's unilateral action, although condemned by his Community colleagues, probably was not unwelcomed by them. Significantly, EEC foreign ministers at their July 22 meeting adopted a common position on Spanish and Portuguese entry not too removed from the French stance, stressing that more preparatory work needed to be done in the areas of agriculture and fisheries policy before further enlargement took place.[59]

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[57] Giscard later denied that he called for a "pause" in the EEC enlargement process, as press reports indicated. See *Agence Europe* (no. 2938, new series), June 28, 1980, p. 3.

[58] The Greek accession agreement, signed on May 28, 1979, already had been ratified by the parliaments of the Nine and Greece. Portugal had applied for membership on March 28, 1977, and Spain on July 28, 1977, with the former beginning negotiations with the EEC in October 1978 and the latter in February 1979.

[59] "The Nine Call on Spain and Portugal to Be Patient," *Le Monde*, July 23, 1980, pp. 1, 22; also, FBIS, *Daily Report* (Western Europe), July 11, 1980, p. F1. For an assessment on the impact of further EEC enlargement, see Christian Deubner, "The Southern Enlargement of the European Community: Opportunities and Dilemmas from a West German Point of View," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, March 1980, pp. 229-245.

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A Future Together?

There is no evidence at this time to suggest that the Community is in danger of a breakup soon. There is equally no proof, however, that the EEC will be able to "muddle through" this latest crisis as it has done in the past when faced with serious internal problems. The difficulties associated with the CAP, as underscored by the British net payment controversy, make it plain that, unless the governments are willing to adjust to the realities of the 1980s, the great hope of the postwar federalists may eventually join the growing roster of past confederal and federal experiments gone awry.

It is obvious that something must be done with the CAP, and the governments have pledged to undertake this thankless task by mid 1981. There are a number of alternatives open to them, most of which are little more than palliatives while a few, which are more radical, nonetheless offer better prospects of fulfilling their purpose.

In the former category, for example, the governments could simply raise the ceiling limit on the states' VAT contribution beyond the present 1 per cent, saving the Community from imminent bankruptcy while keeping farm expenditure relatively untouched. While an attractive short-run alternative, such a "non-solution" would only postpone the inevitable day of reckoning. Certainly, it would be consistent with the Community's past history of devising makeshift compromises. However, swelling farm prices, the resurfacing of the British rebate issue, and the states' reluctance to pay more and more into EEC coffers soon would force them to face reality. Also, until the governments reduced farm expenditure, they and the European Parliament would routinely clash each fall over the amount allocated to agricultural spending in the annual EEC budget.

Another deceptively simple solution would be to freeze farm expenditure levels and supplement the CAP with national contributions. As previously noted, the governments are already quietly resorting to national funding. Such an action, however, would lead to ever-greater national outlays until the governments reached their toleration limits. It also would encourage periodic dissension among the members as to who pays what out of pocket.

On the surface, a more pragmatic alternative would be to peg each member's GNP to its EEC contribution. Such a solution, however, would heavily skew EEC benefits in favor of the poorer members — Britain, Ireland, Greece, and, after they join the Com-

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munity, Spain and Portugal. France and West Germany would be the big losers. Furthermore, this would discredit the longstanding Community concept of equality among EEC members as well as undermine one of the chief reasons for continued West German and French membership in the Community.

A related alternative would be to link the size of a member's contribution to the benefits received. But again, this would mean that both West Germany and France would bear an ever-increasing financial burden while the smaller members witnessed the erosion of their favorable net balances.

The prevalent train of thought among leading "Europeans," however, is that the key to solving the Community's financial dilemma lies in revising the CAP to scale down farm expenditure. This solution, which seems the most viable on the surface, may be little more than a bandage on a festering wound — assuming the governments agree on the best cover for the sore spot. The smaller members, to be sure, would be loath to sacrifice the favorable net contribution position they now enjoy while France and particularly West Germany would rebel against financially supporting the other members. Farm interests in all the states — including Britain — would put enormous pressure on the governments. Moreover, such an approach might not appreciably lower the British net contribution relative to the other members, leaving the now dormant budget controversy to erupt again by the mid 1980s.

A much more extreme approach to the CAP would be to dismantle it. A wholesale return to national price supports would free nearly three-quarters of the annual Community budget to be used for energy and social programs, industrial development, and other regional projects. The obvious benefits of such an action, however, would be outweighed by the liabilities. The CAP, for psychological as much as economic reasons, is literally the cornerstone of West European integration. EEC members would be very unlikely indeed to resort to such a radical solution.

Perhaps the most practical solution — considering the impact of further EEC enlargement and the realities of the 1980s — is "Europe à la carte." This intriguing concept has been in the "European" lexicon for quite some time now. Proponents claim that the governments should be able to select in which Community programs and institutions they wish to participate. For example, Britain could opt not to participate in the CAP but could still take part in EEC foreign policy planning (i.e., political cooperation) and the

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common market. Again, the problem with such a solution is that it negates the whole rationale of integration as developed since the early postwar era. It is a step backward, according to the "European" view, which can only envision increasing cohesion as a measure of success. Thus, the Thatcher government has been continuously pressed to join the European Monetary System, although none of the present participants appears eager to push further toward monetary union at this time.

Such selective participation in Community programs would allow a future EEC composed of twelve states, each with its own aspirations, capabilities, and interests, to carefully consider and experiment with different forms of European cooperation. It certainly would defuse anti-EEC sentiment in Denmark and in Britain, where the Labour Party appears ready to make continued British membership a major campaign issue in the next general elections.

Granted, this approach flies in the face of "European" tradition, but such criterion is no longer relevant in the 1980s. Also, admittedly, this solution would probably accelerate the trend toward domination of the Community by its larger members, since their participation in a particular program or lack thereof would determine its viability. The smaller states, however, would have to accept this fact of life as the price they must pay to continue to reap the considerable political and economic rewards of EEC membership. They, too, could benefit from such selective participation since they would have leverage to pressure the dominant members to adopt EEC policies more favorable to themselves.

Although it is too early to foresee what form the future Community will take, it is obvious that the governments must begin their long and distasteful task by the fall of 1981. By that time, the British budget controversy will be reemerging as EEC members are faced with deciding what figure to put on the 1982 British rebate. Also, Spain and Portugal will be subjecting the members to increasing pressure to approve their EEC entry.

Domestic political considerations will add further pressure. Public opinion is most volatile in Britain, where a Gallup poll conducted in June 1980, just after the temporary resolution of the budget issue, revealed that 53 per cent of the British wanted to "secede" from the EEC while 25 per cent expressed indifference to Community membership. In Denmark, where the Community is nearly as unpopular, nearly one-third of those polled in an April 1980 survey preferred withdrawal to participation while another

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scant third did not care.[60] In France, disenchantment with the Community could grow to large proportions if the public perceives that France would lose many of the economic benefits it reaped from the unreformed CAP. As for West Germany, although European unity has been a popular concept and EEC membership has allowed Bonn to balance both its East and West European interests, the German public nonetheless is not prepared to subsidize the Community's financial excesses for too much longer.

Clearly, the British budget dispute has forced the governments to examine their partnership, recognize its flaws, and face the long-avoided prospect of reform as an alternative to possible separation or divorce. Over the next few years, EEC members will endeavor to iron out the Community's many problems to their mutual satisfaction. They will have to fight a strong temptation to patch over their differences to postpone possible confrontation. If the governments are able to circumvent this pitfall, the Community should emerge after their judicious tinkering strong enough to withstand the internal and external pressures of the 1980s.

[60] "British Public Largely Opposes Continued EEC Membership," USICA, *Foreign Opinion Note*, July 5, 1980, pp. 1-4.

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA: BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATION

by John Chettle

It is not surprising that, in all that has been written on South Africa, and on what policies the United States should adopt toward South Africa, little thought has been given to the structural barriers — historical, constitutional, sociological, or psychological — to communication between the two countries. For many Americans, the situation has seemed too clear-cut and too inequitable to admit this kind of analysis. Unlike, for example, the Islamic revolution, there seemed little in the language, the religious background, or the nature of South African society to obscure the realities of the situation for Americans. The problem for South Africa has appeared to lie less in being misunderstood than in being understood all too clearly.

It may now be worthwhile, though, to undertake a dispassionate analysis of the subtle and often undefined differences that cause misunderstanding between our two societies. For South Africa is changing, although there is considerable disagreement about the nature and the pace of change; if white South Africans are not to become disheartened by a lack of recognition of these changes, they must realize the difficulties the United States faces in understanding their situation.

South Africa: Image and Reality

The normal analytical processes that Americans bring to the study of South Africa often have unsatisfactory results. One feels like a character in *Alice in Wonderland,* where the application of an outsider's logic produces a seemingly illogical result. This is not to say, then, that the South African government is illogical, but its logic must be understood in African, not Western, terms. Outsiders tend to view the conflict between blacks and whites in terms of the way such relations have developed in Western societies, although the appropriate analogy is with Africa, where the white "tribe" behaves in ways that are familiar to dominant tribes elsewhere in Africa. The South African government used to present its policy as "separation"

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of the races; yet it was soon apparent that no separation was intended or possible, but, at most, only a separate political focus involving a part of the black population. The separation is thought of as a "racial" one, but the predominantly Afrikaner government separates white Afrikaners from white English-speaking South Africans just as carefully — in the schools, universities, the army, and elsewhere — as it separates blacks from whites. The key to the separation of whites is often thought of as linguistic; however, the Afrikaans government has been no more ready to establish links with Afrikaans-speaking people of mixed race than with non-Afrikaans-speaking whites.

This helps to explain why the considerable differences between the United States and South Africa tend to be obscured by the numerous, but superficial, similarities between them: in both cases, there was early settlement by the Dutch; both countries were opened up by pioneers in covered wagons in the face of hostile peoples; both secured independence from Britain; both fought a civil war; and both even have a rather similar "look."

The big contrast, between native populations, is an obvious one, and yet we do not often ponder its implications. The Indians of the United States collapsed militarily and socially, and declined in numbers, whereas the blacks of South Africa increased rapidly and now exceed the white population by a ratio of 4:1. This single difference dominates the situation in South Africa to an extent that Americans seldom fully appreciate. As Americans talk, perhaps rightly, about equity or about making a "deal" while there is still time, white South Africans are thinking about survival on an unstable, unpromising, and unfriendly continent, wondering whether their position could possibly be worse after such a deal than before it.

No less obvious, but also not always understood, is that the blacks of South Africa are at vastly different levels of development. South Africa is both a First World and a Third World country, a developed and an undeveloped society. South Africa's population is about the same as Canada's and almost twice that of Australia, but its gross national product is only one-fifth that of Canada and less than one-half that of Australia. Visitors and journalists who confine their attention to the principal cities and to the educated black elite are often unaware of how small and unrepresentative this group is.

One must also consider the great complexity of the ethnic mix. Differences exist not only among the 4.5 million whites, of whom the Afrikaners form about 60 per cent, but also among the

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Coloureds (2.5 million), the Indians (790,000), and the ten major language groups of the blacks, who number about 22 million (if the independent but unrecognized states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda are included). This ethnic mix constitutes the government's main justification for the policy of separation, although the significance of that argument is vehemently denied by its critics. (This is not the place to debate its validity, but, certainly, the confusion it engenders should be noted.) Each of the major protagonists has, of course, partisan interest inherent in its sociological thesis: the South African government underlines (or, according to its critics, accentuates and even promotes) ethnic differences, while those opposed to the government deny that ethnic or tribal divisions have any validity. Perhaps it is appropriate for Americans who see the profound differences between English- and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans to suspect both that there is more to ethnic differences than the opposition claims and that shared powerlessness and animosity to government legislation may have done more to promote black unity than anything else.

The separate-development policy of the South African government has had practical results that must be understood, as these provide the context in which communication takes place. The central government has established nine subgovernments for separate ethnic or tribal areas; each has different powers and responsibilities. Three of these subgovernments have secured independence, although their independence is not recognized by any country other than South Africa. As a result, there is a good deal of misunderstanding about the nature of these governments, the general belief outside South Africa being that they are puppets, or at least not fully autonomous. The fact that they are fragmented and dependent on subventions from the South African treasury lends apparent substance to this belief, which is nonetheless false. On the contrary, the necessity for the South African government to emphasize the independence of these territories and to legitimize the transfer of power gives security and the widest measure of discretion even to those Homeland leaders in areas not independent.

In the past, the inequity of the 13 per cent of the land area set aside for the Homelands, their fragmented character, their lack of a good agricultural and industrial base and, above all, black resistance to the policy have all undermined the credibility of the policy. The central government itself has now recognized its failure. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this recognition; the

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government acknowledges the failure of a policy in which it has invested thirty years of effort, perhaps in the belief that world opinion would be satisfied.

It is beyond the purposes of this article to describe the process by which the permanence of the urban blacks was accepted, but this was a historic decision. Clearly, it involved an effort (not far removed from the Vietnam analogy either in origin or in phraseology) to win the "hearts and minds" of the blacks. Successive prime ministers put the choice in unmistakable language, stating that the alternative to negotiation was "too ghastly to contemplate" and that whites had to "adapt or die." Far-reaching consequences followed the decision: the desegregation of public facilities, land ownership, local government rights, trade union rights and, ultimately, some form of political rights, at least for urban Africans. The implementation of these changes was not (and still is not) necessarily thought out, the process is not complete, and the shape of the contemplated new structure is still vague; however, the direction of government policy clearly involves movement toward greater equity for all races.

Perhaps this movement would have been more obvious but for the government's own behavior and the skill of the opposition abroad. That opposition is certainly formidable, but it is not always apparent how great a vested interest there is in perpetuating the idea of the South African government as uniquely evil and irredeemable. This issue occupies a considerable proportion of the time and resources of the committees and secretariat of the United Nations. Many chairmen, committees, bureaucrats, and advisers would lose their *raison d'être,* and their jobs, if South Africa were to be seen to be doing the right thing, however imperfectly. Further, this is the one issue on which the Organization of African Unity has been able to build some kind of concord in sessions that would otherwise have produced conflict; without it, black nations of southern Africa would perhaps lack their most potent means for attracting aid and attention.

It is in their interest to portray change in South Africa as cosmetic. For, if one's objective is a complete change of power, anything less is "cosmetic"; in fact, the use of that term serves as a useful distraction from the changes that actually occur. Similarly, it is in the interest of those opposed to the government to portray whites and blacks of South Africa as monolithic groups, when the reality is that they are fragmented, to portray the government as static and unyielding, when it is embarked on compromise and a

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search for solutions, and to portray South Africa as a police state in order to cast suspicion on and nullify the effect of its various attempts at change.

For many years, though, it *was* the behavior of the government that constituted the most considerable barrier to communication. After all, it was the successive prime ministers of South Africa who boasted of their stern, granitic qualities, even while they were engaging in compromise. It was they who enacted police-state legislation, even when they did not use most of it, or who introduced it just before an election in order to make the parliamentary opposition seem inadequate protectors of law and order.

The government's own behavior is still one of the most significant barriers to communication. For a long time it seemed to white South Africans, as it did to the aristocracy in Russia before the revolution, that to talk about change could be a substitute for change; indeed, that to talk about change was change itself. Moreover, even where change has occurred there is still understandable incredulity abroad that a government, having embarked for nearly a generation on one policy, could have reversed itself and started to dismantle the very structure that it had itself so deliberately erected. On the ultimate question — whether the present government intends to create a structure that will genuinely provide equal political, social, and economic rights for all of South Africa's peoples, regardless of race — there is still disbelief.

Thus, the continuation in office of the National Party has been one of the greatest barriers to communication. Although today's government is very different from the frankly segregationist one elected in 1948, the party has never been defeated and has never admitted to anything more than an adaptation of policy. In other countries, changes of administration or government enable policy not merely to change but to be seen to change. In South Africa, a government fundamentally different from its early years continued in office, bearing the cumulative burden of more than thirty years of policy decisions. The necessity to propitiate various factions within the party has prevented the frank repudiation of much of that inheritance.

The existence of a powerful reactionary element within the party has been almost as great an obstacle to communication as the continuation of the party in power. As in most political parties, activists tend to be "purer" and more thoroughgoing in their ideology than rank-and-file supporters. Moreover, the activists have been

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influential in deciding who will represent the party in Parliament. For some years, opinion polls have shown that the majority of Afrikaners have been more liberal than the National Party. The prime minister showed himself conscious of this fact by moving sharply to the left once he was elected. But he felt obliged to obfuscate what he was doing: to make changes by stealth rather than in the open, by administrative fiat rather than by legislation, by commissions packed with his supporters rather than through Parliament or the bureaucracy. It could hardly be wondered that, in executing a strategy designed to confuse his opponents and keep them off balance, he should succeed in confusing everyone else.

This struggle within the ruling party, still poorly understood abroad, affects almost every facet of the national life:

(1) It means that change itself has to be cautious and circumspect. It becomes impossible to give freehold ownership of land to urban blacks, for example, for this would violate the principle, long since abrogated in practice, that blacks are only "temporary sojourners" within the "white areas." Instead, blacks are given a "99-year leasehold."

(2) It means that change can never be explained in an honest and straightforward way. As the present assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, has shrewdly observed: "Changes in racial policy, when they occur, are typically clothed in legalistic and ideological formulas designed to make them either deniable or invisible—a tendency which only aggravates 'misunderstanding.' It requires an expert in the bizarre politics of Afrikanerdom to interpret what is really going on."[1] Often, change is accompanied by rhetoric, intended to protect the political flank of the minister concerned, that not only makes it difficult to see that change has taken place, but that even arouses fears of retrogressive steps. Outsiders, though skilled in understanding the function of rhetoric in circumstances nearer to home, often fail to understand its use in South Africa and take such utterances at face value. As a result of the inability to communicate changes that have taken place, blacks are inclined to mistrust the evidence of change, and outsiders to discount it entirely.

(3) It means that it is difficult to grapple effectively with reactionary elements of the National Party who are skillful at presenting their dissent from policy changes in terms of a defense of the spirit and letter of established party policy. This phenomenon strengthens the suspicions of those at home and abroad who argue that no substantive change has taken place.

(4) For the same reason, it is hard to deal with the bureaucracy, which over the long period of Verwoerd's ascendancy both as minister of Bantu administration and prime minister was thoroughly imbued with his vision of territorial separation. This may be the greatest impediment of all to securing meaningful change. Thus, for several years the decision to grant rights of home ownership to blacks was systematically and skillfully frus-

[1] Chester A. Crocker, "The United States and South Africa: Coping with Complexity," in Mark B. Winchester, ed., *The International Essays for Business Decision Makers* (Houston: 1979), vol. 4, p. 195.

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trated by the very bureaucracy entrusted with the task of carrying it out. In this respect, South Africa is not unusual. Henry Kissinger once remarked that policy in bureaucratic societies "is implemented by individuals whose reputation is made [*sic*] by administering the status quo."[2] This obstacle may well be one of the main reasons for the prime minister's drastic reconstruction of the civil service, including the reduction in government departments from thirty-nine to twenty-two.[3]

Similarly, legislation often is not repealed but merely circumvented. Years before "job reservation" was finally abolished, it had almost ceased to function as a result of large-scale exemptions or because of simple noncompliance.

There is, in fact, what might almost be called a tacit conspiracy: corporations and individuals break the law quietly, without drawing attention to what they are doing; factory inspectors wink at the illegalities; government departments carry on as if everything were normal; and the central government continues to defend a policy that is no longer being carried out. So long as no one says anything publicly, the charade continues. If someone should point out the contradiction, there is a brief flurry of action, policy is fervently reaffirmed, and after a while everything reverts to its previous state of legitimated practice. Outsiders may see this as hypocrisy, but rather than being the tribute vice pays to virtue, it seems to be the tribute virtue feels obliged to pay to vice.

This disparity between policy and practice is just part of the misleading rhetoric that invades every crevice of South African political life and that constitutes a formidable barrier to understanding. The government, in its communications with hard-line domestic constituencies, tends to explain changes as mere evolution from past policies. In its communications with people abroad, the government is more truthful, but inclined rather to exaggerate the immediate significance of the changes it has made. The parliamentary opposition, which is not eager to give the government undue credit for anything, tends to depreciate the significance of those changes and is less than candid about the implications of its own proposals for change. The blacks, who want to see greater change, have no interest in showing themselves satisfied with the changes that have already occurred, and so they, too, condemn such changes as merely "cosmetic." Nor are they averse to playing to an overseas gallery. Chester Crocker has pointed out that South Africans tend to speak the language they assume foreigners want to hear. White liberals

[2] Quoted in *Time*, January 1, 1973.
[3] Stephen Orpen, in *Business Times*, May 25, 1980.

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speak the language of race polarization and Afrikaner brutality; government supporters, that of the cold war; militant exile groups, that of Soviet puppets; black moderates, that of desperation; and business leaders, that of moderate progress.[4]

The press is, by and large, a valuable vehicle for communication, but it sometimes puts further obstacles in the way. It is true that the press operates under serious constraints. Kelsey Stuart's authoritative book *The Newspaperman's Guide to the Law,* printed in 1977, lists some ninety laws having application to the press, many of them of scant significance, but some critical to reportage on political matters. Recent legislation on inquests, prisons, and the police, when seen in conjunction with security laws, makes it unlikely that the press will in the future feel free to provide the type of coverage it gave to the death in detention of Steve Biko. There are also restrictions on what may be published about defense and about oil supplies that make it very difficult, if not impossible, to issue investigative reports on these matters.

In practice, however, these restrictions are less significant than they may seem. As Douglas Brown, deputy editor of the British *Sunday Telegraph,* explained: "There can be few countries where public political argument is so intense and well-documented. It is carried on by societies of every kind, by academics, by financial and industrial leaders and above all, by the press. There has been nothing like it since the pamphleteering era that preceded the French Revolution."[5] The tradition of courageous and outspoken journalism in South Africa has not been lost. Indeed, the press may be more outspoken now than it was in the past. In addition to a hard-hitting English-language press, there is now an Afrikaans press that has thrown off many of its constraints (most of the Afrikaans newspapers, for instance, are owned by the ruling party) and that now indulges in some remarkably candid criticism of the government. The great paradox is that it is hard for an outsider, visiting a country widely perceived as an authoritarian police state, to find anything in the press favorable to the government.

In short, it is difficult for an American, using the sources available to him, to understand either the content of the government's policy or the justification for it. If anything, the English-language press, which is all that is usually comprehensible to an overseas visitor, may make such an understanding more difficult. For the press is a partisan press and, to some extent, a tribal press. Repre-

[4] Crocker, "Coping with Complexity," p. 196.
[5] Brown, *Against the World* (New York: 1969), p. 159.

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senting as it does the English-speaking whites, who have been out of power for a generation, it is caustic and rather unaware of the responsibilities and concerns that power brings. It is also much less analytical with respect to the implications of policies proposed by the opposition. The English press has been more sensitive than the Afrikaans press to the effects of government legislation on the dignity and lives of blacks, but less sensitive to the complexities of constructing a peaceful and workable political system from so complex an ethnic mixture. This lends an atmosphere of unreality both to much press comment in South Africa and overseas and to the academic, diplomatic, and other assessments based largely on those reports.

The United States: Barriers Recent and Long-standing

If the barriers to communication in South Africa arise largely from the dominance of one political party, the main barriers in the United States derive from almost the opposite condition. The decline of the party system, the personal character of the political process, the growing influence of single-interest groups, and the rising power and assertiveness of black Americans in foreign policy all impose limitations on the candor with which developments in South Africa are likely to be appraised.

These, of course, are rather recent developments; there are other, more significant and long-standing, barriers. The most obvious is the extent to which the political systems of South Africa and the United States have diverged. As the United States moved away from the discrimination and segregation that prevailed before *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* (1955), the inequities remaining in South Africa began to to seem more glaring. Even today, when South Africa is moving cautiously away from discrimination, the United States is moving a good deal faster, not only away from discrimination but toward "affirmative action."

The change in the relationship between these two countries was in some respects even more abrupt than has just been suggested. Although the United States had practiced segregation, justified by the Supreme Court, segregation nonetheless had always been in conflict with American ideals and ideology, epitomized in the Declaration of Independence. Of course, as Charles Burton Marshall has pointed out, the Declaration was an exercise in psychological warfare, deliberately couched in universal rather than in pragmatic

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terms.[6] Those who were "born equal" at the time did not include Indians, Negroes, women or, in many states, those without property. But, once principles and practice were brought into harmony, an immense torrent of idealism was released and reflected in every facet of the national life; the United States, with characteristic energy, moved to improve race relations. *Brown* also strengthened an element in American public life that Irving Kristol had recognized when he called the United States "the most ideological of all nations." "One does not exaggerate," he wrote, "when one calls it a kind of Messianic commitment to a redemptive mission."[7] This commitment, observed Kristol, found its expression in a glowing vision of man, history, and society; an entire profession had emerged, "the media," that took upon itself the responsibility of leading this chorus.[8]

The origins of the prevailing ideology lay in purposes almost diametrically opposed to those of the South African government: namely, in the need to weld diverse peoples into a single nation. Jacques Ellul has pointed out that "at the beginning the U.S. had to unify a disparate population that came from all the countries of Europe and had diverse traditions and tendencies. A way of rapid assimilation had to be found; that was the great political problem of the U.S. at the end of the 19th Century. The solution was a psychological standardization — that is, simply to use a way of life as the basis of unification and as an instrument of propaganda."[9] Thus was imposed a further conformity of thought on a society that already had such a tendency, as de Tocqueville and others had noted long before. The changes wrought by *Brown v. Board of Education* were not always put into effect with great speed, particularly before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, nor were they always accepted without opposition or trouble; but they were accomplished, and at a time when South Africa was reinforcing its discriminatory legislation.

South Africa in the 1960s was not merely an uncomfortable reminder of what the United States had been, a crass country cousin reflecting in manner and appearance a charmless image of the past. She seemed to disdain lessons from the American experience. The pain felt by her American friends began to merge with the disapproval of those less involved and with the zeal of the newly converted into an attitude of almost universal condemnation.

There was little appreciation of the fact that the United

[6] Marshall, "American Foreign Policy as a Dimension of the American Revolution," in *America's Continuing Revolution* (Washington: 1975), pp. 370-374.
[7] Kristol, *On the Democratic Idea in America* (New York: 1973), p. 131.
[8] Ibid., p. 148.
[9] Ellul, *Propaganda* (New York: 1972), p. 68.

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States' largely homogenous black population — mostly literate, speaking English, members of Christian churches, raised in the culture of the United States and identifying with its aspirations — had little in common with black South Africans, at least with those outside the urban elite. There was little comprehension of the difficulty of securing an equitable solution in South Africa, where the majority of the population was not white but black; indeed, that fact seemed merely to accentuate the inequities of the existing system in South Africa. It was idle for the South African government to talk of separate states or partition for the blacks; Americans thought they knew all about separation, and they had fought the Civil War, the bloodiest war of their history, to prevent partition. There seemed little sympathy with the sheer magnitude of the problem, even when Americans were experiencing the difficulties, the agonies, of integrating a mere 11 per cent of their population. If there was sympathy, it was swiftly overtaken by distaste.

For most Americans, the dominant fact in South Africa is that there has been an uninterrupted sequence, for more than thirty years, of reports of suffering, slights, greed, and oppression. On the news reaching the United States, Professor J. D. B. Miller, in his *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs,* remarked: "Few countries can ever have had so bad a press as South Africa."[10] These reports influenced a whole generation that was — often rightly — appalled by the effects of the South African government's legislation and that had little appreciation of the reasons for that policy, the complexity of the situation, or the workability of the alternatives. Little wonder that many U.S. students after the end of the Vietnam War concluded that "South Africa" was the pre-eminent moral issue of their times. Yet, the more one examines it, the most astonishing that judgment becomes. A series of reports on human-rights coverage in the media by Accuracy in Media (AIM), a Washington-based organization concerned about liberal bias in the media, showed clearly the extent of that bias.

In November 1977, Accuracy in Media published the results of a survey it had conducted on U.S. news-media coverage of human rights in Chile, South Korea, North Korea, Cuba, and Cambodia. In 1976, AIM counted reports, columns, and editorials having to do with human rights in those five countries from five of the most important U.S. news media: the *New York Times,* the *Washington Post,* and the CBS, NBC and ABC television networks. AIM found that during 1976 there were —

[10] Miller, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 1953-1969* (London: 1974), p. 138.

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(a) 137 stories about human rights in Chile;
(b) 90 stories about human rights in South Korea;
(c) 7 stories about human rights in Cuba, despite its geographic proximity to the United States and despite reports from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;
(d) 16 stories about human rights in Cambodia, despite the fact that the Cambodian government is estimated to have killed more than 1 million Cambodians in that year; and
(e) 1 story about human rights in North Korea.[11]

By comparison, in that same year, in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* alone, there were 513 stories, editorials, and columns about human rights in South Africa.

True, 1976 was the year of the Soweto riots; but during 1977, in the same newspapers, South Africa ran second only to the Soviet Union with respect to the number of human-rights stories. AIM observed: "The *Washington Post* ran 30 items on the death of one man in South Africa, black leader Steve Biko. This was three times as many as all the items it ran on human rights in Cambodia, where the deaths were estimated at between one and two million."[12] Network television coverage of human rights — perhaps the most influential in establishing public attitudes — was even more skewed: "Our survey for 1977 turned up only two network news stories on Cambodia, four on Cuba, five on Uganda, six on China and eight on Chile. The big exception was South Africa, where for the three networks combined, we counted 159 rights-related stories."[13] In 1978, the USSR and South Africa again received a disproportionate amount of attention: "*The Times* ran 13 items about a single white South African newsman who had gotten into difficulties because of his criticism of government racial policies and had left the country. That was more than it ran on rights-related stories in Poland, Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary combined, and almost as many as it ran on Idi Amin's Uganda in 1978."[14]

The implications of these facts are serious and go far beyond the narrow question of U.S.-South African relations, raising questions about the direction of U.S. foreign policy as a whole. A whole generation is growing up in the United States — the young intellectuals, for example, that look to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* as the newspapers of record in the United States, or the millions that rely on the networks as their principal source

[11] *AIM Report*, November 1, 1977, vol. 6, no. 21, pt. 1.
[12] Ibid., February 1, 1979, vol. 8, no. 3.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid., March 1, 1980, vol. 9, no. 5.

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of news — who think that the most significant breaches of human rights in the world today occur not in China, Cuba, North Korea or Cambodia, but in countries like South Korea, Chile and South Africa that are friendly to the United States and that generally allow reporters unfettered freedom. In other words, it is precisely those countries where freedom exists that are subject to incessant criticism about human rights. The human-rights situation in the more rigidly totalitarian communist countries receives almost no attention at all.

How is one to explain such slanted reportage? In the first place, there are obviously some nonideological factors involved. It is much easier for American newsmen to get into countries like South Africa, South Korea, and Chile than into North Korea or Cuba. It is also easier and more pleasant to live there. It is much easier for an English-speaking reporter to understand what is going on in South Africa, and there is no tiresome necessity to acquire a new language or to learn about a totally foreign system. In addition, a lively, investigative domestic press helps overseas reporters to locate good stories (and to look good by retelling them). The issue of South African relations between blacks and whites seems familiar to Americans, an issue they believe they can understand immediately from their own experience. It has all the attributes of news-worthiness: conflict, drama, and high emotion. It is a seemingly uncomplicated story that loses nothing in being retold; emotions are so strong and ideology so firm that obviousness tends to be regarded as insight and cliché as high principle. It is a natural.

There are other factors. The language barrier makes it more difficult for U.S. reporters to understand the viewpoint of the governing Afrikaner establishment and makes them all too dependent on opposition, English-language sources. Acting in the same direction is the need to avoid being labeled an apologist for apartheid and thus losing access to black Africa. To these factors, one acute observer has added that there seems to be "an unconscious reluctance to take National Party politics seriously — as if to do so would be an act of disloyalty to [the] disenfranchised majority."[15]

One might conclude that the nonideological reasons for this disproportionate coverage are more significant than the ideological ones. The considerable attention given to human-rights violations in the Soviet Union would suggest that no simple leftist bias is involved. What is more important, rather, is fashion and "radical

[15] Helen Kitchen, "Some Observations on U.S. Media Coverage of South Africa in the 1980's," prepared for the World Peace Foundation, May 1980, p. 5.

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chic." The Soviet Union has lost the appeal it exerted on the student generation of the 1930s, but its formidable power compels caution, respect, and restraint. Thus, there were no demonstrations in the universities against corporations doing business with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, even when those countries were so bloated with Western bank loans that there was doubt that the loans could be repaid and even though those loans increased the power of the only country having the ability to obliterate the United States.

Nonetheless, ideology is still important. Prevailing attitudes in the news media, in the universities, and among the Left, favor "progressive" states and the Third World and are inclined to ignore or indulge their crimes and misdeeds. Thus, at Harvard, in all the eight years that Idi Amin ruled Uganda — during which time Amnesty International estimated he was responsible for the deaths of 250,000-300,000 people, in circumstances that were well known and at a time when there were weekly demonstrations against corporations doing business in South Africa — there was not a single demonstration against such business in Uganda. This is all the more astonishing in light of the fact that the United States bought one-third of the Ugandan coffee crop, the earnings from which were the main source of Amin's support.[16]

These tendencies are reinforced by the extreme timidity with which race relations are addressed in the United States. There is a notable lack of candor in discussion some aspects of race relations that amounts to self-censorship. Some of the more profound observers of the South African scene acknowledge the lack of success throughout the world in dealing with the problems of ethnicity and race relations: "Among undogmatic observers there can be little doubt that the Marxist and liberal hopes of increasing color-blind societies, with autonomous individuals relating to each other on the basis of common class interests rather than ascriptive characteristics, falls far short of reality everywhere. In fact, a revival of nationalist, racial, and sectarian appeals has been authoritatively diagnosed as a global tendency, despite increasing economic interdependence, better education, and contact of formerly isolated groups."[17] Yet, little of this realization is echoed in the press or in the universities of the United States.

South Africa has become a useful weapon in other battles. It has become standard equipment in the fight against business, as

[16] Judith Miller, "When Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1980, p. 119.
[17] Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized* (New Haven: 1979), p. 34.

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an illustration of the amoralism of big corporations. Because South Africa is a uranium supplier and has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, it has been adopted as an issue by those opposed to nuclear power. It can be used to embarrass university administrations or to lend emotion to almost any black issue, from discrimination to the lack of a black-studies program.

The South African polity is always considered an issue of pre-eminent concern to blacks, although there is some doubt about the validity of that supposition. Senator Dick Clark, former chairman of the Africa subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, once confided, a year before his 1978 defeat, that in all the time he had been chairman of that subcommittee he had not received a single representation from a black group asking him to hold hearings or to take any action against South Africa.[18] There is reason to think that most blacks are at least as uninterested in foreign affairs and as preoccupied with their own interests as whites. Moreover, there is evidence that black leaders (or at least those recognized as such by the news media) are out of touch with the mass of black people. A gulf appears to be growing between the black community and those who represent themselves, or are represented, as its leaders.[19] Opinion polls have shown marked divergences between the views of the black community at large and those of its major organizations.[20] Professor William Julius Wilson, chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, has charged that it is in the self-interest of more-privileged blacks to keep the focus on racial justice rather than on economic justice. It is not difficult to see how a distorted view of South Africa could be used by them to strengthen their own interests.[21]

Nonetheless, with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and with the growing number and influence of black votes, there has been growing sensitivity to what might be perceived as a black issue. That sensitivity goes far beyond the obvious interests of candidates seeking election or re-election. Even in the bureaucracy, in such relatively insulated departments as the CIA, there is great sensitivity to any strategy thought to be "politically unacceptable." There is considerable caution even about discussing or asking for consideration of a strategy that includes South Africa, lest it be leaked to the press by a dissatisfied employee. Thus, a former chief

[18] Private communication.
[19] *New York Times*, June 29, 1980.
[20] Louis Henri Bolce III and Susan H. Gray, "Blacks, Whites, and 'Race Politics,'" *The Public Interest*, September 28, 1978, pp. 61-75.
[21] Murray Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," *Commentary*, June 1980, p. 51.

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of naval operations who believed that the U.S. Navy should use the South African naval base at Simonstown confided that when he was in office he would not even have asked for a study of its desirability.[22]

One of the chief guides in the appraisal of what is or is not politically acceptable is the importance of various interest groups in U.S. politics. This is a well-documented fact. There has been considerable concern about the decline of political parties, about the growing reliance of political candidates on personal appeal rather than on party loyalty, and about their consequent reluctance to offend any minority or interest group that might be mobilized against them. In general, it is more important for a politician to avoid irritating a minority that is passionately concerned with one issue than to satisfy a majority that, although on the other side of the issue, is rather apathetic when it comes to action.

Not only is there a reluctance to offend blacks and a militant white minority on policy toward South Africa, but the issue is seen as an easy one on which to take a strong stand. South Africa's minerals may be critically important to the United States and her position strategic but, short of a crisis that would in itself justify a policy switch, there is little likelihood of these being at risk. It is thought that there is no significant interest group likely to be offended by an anti–South African policy.[23] It is seen as a peripheral issue, and a tough attitude toward South Africa is regarded as far less costly, in domestic political effect, than other policy stances that may appeal to the black community.

Prudence dictates a similar attitude within the State Department. It is, of course, always difficult to generalize about institutions. They are not monolithic, the balance of power and opinion within them is constantly changing, and the relative power of departments and bureaus will reflect the personalities and priorities of different administrations. During the Kennedy administration, consequently, the Africa bureau was at the end of the line; during the Carter administration, it was near the main terminal. As a general rule, however, it is safe to say that one of the worst failings of the State Department has always been "clientitis," the wish of bureaucrats to keep those countries for which they are responsible happy.

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[22] Private communication.

[23] This may not be completely true, though. In 1976, the largest volume of mail received by the State Department on any one subject was in protest against the Kissinger speech at Lusaka vowing "unrelenting opposition" to the Smith government, and several news reports from Texas suggested that the speech was a factor in President Ford's overwhelming defeat by Governor Reagan in the Texas primary a few days later.

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There are two bureaus that have been especially concerned with the South African issue: the Africa bureau and the International Organizations bureau. Both are under constant pressure from their clients to take a tougher attitude toward South Africa. At the same time, few State Department officers have intimate knowledge of South Africa.

The African nations concluded at an early stage that their greatest hope for overthrowing the present government of South Africa lay in persuading the United States to take decisive action in that direction. They have been remarkably successful in acquiring influence and in manipulating the sense of guilt felt by some American liberals. Thus, they have been able to achieve first a voluntary and then a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa; total nonrecognition of South Africa's position on South-West Africa, Walvis Bay, and the three South African territories that have taken independence; a U.S. naval boycott of South African ports and a ban on contacts between the armed forces of the United States and South Africa; a restriction on Export-Import Bank dealings with South Africa; and dozens of smaller and less noticed actions. One senior U.S. official has noted that the responsible desk officer for each country would tend, in discussions within State, to put forward the view of the country to which he was assigned. There were only two exceptions to that rule, he said: Albania and South Africa. If the desk officer for either of these countries were to defend the positions of those countries, he would soon be regarded as "having lost his objectivity" and would be reassigned.[24]

The main elements within the State Department that have acted as a brake on the recommendations of the Africa bureau or USUN have been the European bureau, which has had to worry about the fears of its clients with respect to the Cape route or the supply of strategic minerals, and those having wider responsibilities for the general conduct of U.S. foreign policy.[25] The influence of the State Department — except during the period when Henry Kissinger was national security adviser — has generally been decisive within the executive branch. The influence of the Defense Department has been considerably less than is often supposed, and, particularly since the Vietnam War, it appears to have been most cautious about asserting its own interest in a strong, pro-Western South Africa. This appears to be true of the CIA, as well.[26] Only the Commerce Depart-

[24] Private communication.
[25] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (London: 1965), p. 507.
[26] Although there have been some exceptions to this generalization, as is indicated by John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: 1978), pp. 187-190, 218.

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ment, traditionally lacking bureaucratic clout in Washington, has protested (ineffectually) some of the measures affecting U.S.–South African trade. The Treasury, strongly committed to an antigold position, has not been helpful to the Commerce Department (with some exceptions: for example, when it was concerned with the orderly marketing of gold).

Nor has there been much resistance to the State Department within Congress, except during the Nixon administration when a policy of dialogue with South Africa was agreed upon (though, typically, not announced). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs have both been controlled by liberals, and the subcommittees on Africa in both houses have been chaired by congressmen committed to measures more drastic than those initiated by Democratic administrations.

During the Carter administration, therefore, there was, on this subject, little of the usual tension between the executive and the legislative branch, at least insofar as their foreign affairs committees were concerned. On the contrary, both were disposed to seek more far-reaching action against South Africa. Their principal disagreements were likely to be over what was practicable at a given time. By the end of the Carter years, it was clear that not much was practicable — in part because of the reaction in South Africa to the early rhetoric of the administration, in part because of the growing threat to the United States. The range of U.S. interests is so extensive and the crises that press on its decisionmakers so insistent and unceasing, that there is generally little enthusiasm to add to these crises. The time when action tends to be taken against Pretoria is when South Africa becomes part of a crisis.

There is also a greater sense of realism within the Congress than its rhetoric might suggest: a sense of the complexity of race relations and an awareness that standards are being applied to South Africa that few of the most vociferous complainants could meet. This sense of fairness is suspended when South Africa is seen as guilty of outrageous actions, but at other times it serves as a barrier against punitive action. The views of committees other than the Foreign Affairs Committee serve as a similar protective barrier. The Armed Services Committee and the Mines and Mining subcommittee of the House, for example, have provided appraisals of the significance of South Africa — from the point of view of defense or of the supply of strategic raw materials — that can be of great value, particularly at a time of deep concern over U.S.-Soviet rela-

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tions. By contrast, the AFL-CIO, which has been conspicuous in its alertness to the menace posed by the Soviet Union, has been quite wary of welcoming the changes that have taken place in trade-union legislation in South Africa. In part, this reflects the personal attitudes of the late George Meany, but the AFL-CIO has also been held back by the fervor of its anticommunism, which has caused the organization such problems in its international relations that it has been careful about taking any action on South Africa that could increase its difficulties.

Carrots and Sticks

The overwhelming Republican victory of 1980, including the capture of the Senate, serves as a timely reminder that not all these barriers to communication need be permanent. Although there is little sympathy within either major party for what is perceived as racism, there are different priorities and differences in emphasis. The Republicans, for example, have accused the Carter administration of an excessive concern with the alleged frailties of America's allies and a corresponding neglect of its enemies' faults. The relationship between Congress and the executive branch over the past several years may well change. Indeed, it is conceivable that, under its new management, the Senate may change more than the Africa bureau, and that conservatives in the Senate may be very critical even of noncommittal action by the Reagan administration.

It is likely that a policy will be developed by the present administration that will use more carrots than sticks, more encouragement than condemnation, more understanding of the assistance that a country like the United States can provide in creating a nondiscriminatory society, and far less self-righteous judgment of South African inadequacies. It may be that, from just such a constructive relationship between our two countries, the realization will come that the barriers to communication are not insuperable.

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LESSONS FROM AEROSPACE: THE PROSPECTS FOR RATIONALIZATION IN NATO*

by Bernard Udis

For several decades, concern within the Western alliance over the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact forces has been assuaged by a belief that the higher quality of Western technology would maintain the overall balance. As Soviet technology has improved under a forced draft program of military spending, the view has grown that Western forces can no longer enjoy the luxury of wasteful duplication and proliferation of weapon systems. This has led to a major drive by the United States to encourage its NATO allies to adopt a program of Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RS&I) in weapon systems design and procurement.

Rationalization: Definition and Meaning

The compound term "Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability" has experienced a meteoric rise to prominence in NATO circles in the past three or four years and the initials RS&I were well on their way to becoming a standard fixture in the literature. Disagreement particularly over the term "rationalization" has

* An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the Defense Science Board's 1978 Summer Study "Achieving Effectiveness Through Armaments Collaboration." It is based on extensive research in Europe, including many interviews with aerospace executives and government officials conducted over several years, most recently in May-June 1978. While the paper focuses upon the aerospace industry, the findings are generally applicable to trade relations in many different industries. The author's role in the latest study was as a consultant to Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co. and to the General Research Corporation, prime contractor, in support of their research on the rationalization of European defense industry for the U.S. State Department. The research findings are available in Robert A. Gessert (project director), Roger A. Brooks, J. Ross Heverly, William C. Pettijohn, and Bernard Udis (consultants), and Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co., Inc. (subcontractor), *The Impact on the Rationalization of European Defense Industry of Alternative U.S. Approaches to Transatlantic Defense Cooperation: Final Report* (McLean, Va.: General Research Corporation, April 1979), submitted to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State under contract no. 1722-720107. Extended study in Western Europe, in 1972 supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation, the Berghof Stiftung für Konfliktforschung GmbH of West Germany and the Agnelli Foundation of Italy and in 1977 supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, provided valuable background and perspective.

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recently led to agitation to drop it from the parlance in favor of a more easily understandable term. Such disagreement about meaning, however, did not prevent the U.S. Department of Defense from developing a standardized definition: "Any action that increases the effectiveness of Allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the Alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher Alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support, improved interoperability or greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons/materiel resources and non-weapons military matters."[1] This definition is hardly a definition at all, encompassing as it does any action which might conceivably strengthen the alliance.

The Meaning of Rationalization in Europe

Among Europeans, both in industry and in government, there is no standard definition of the term rationalization. To most, it seems to imply a reduction of "excess" production capacity or of possibly redundant weapon systems. While capacity indexes are not generally available, the number of competing aerospace firms in Western Europe has been drastically reduced in the past quarter century. The "Big Three" European states of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany have moved toward a single "flag company" by encouraging an extensive series of mergers, consolidations, and, in the first two countries, nationalization of firms in the aerospace industry. Thus, the Hawker-Siddeley group and British Aircraft Corporation, the two principal organizations which were combined (together with Scottish Aviation) to form the nationalized British Aerospace Corporation in 1977, were themselves the result of a series of mergers of eleven separate aircraft and aviation firms that operated in 1955.[2] The British aeroengine giant, Rolls-Royce, which was nationalized in 1971, traces back to six independent firms that operated in the mid 1950s.[3] The nationalized Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale (SNIAS) in France represents a consolidation of seven firms that had operated in the mid 1950s.[4] Today SNIAS and its private competitor, Dassault-Breguet, constitute

[1] *Rationalization/Standardization Within NATO: A Report to the United States Congress by Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense* (Fourth Report), January 1979, p. 129.
[2] C. J. E. Harlow, *The European Armaments Base, A Survey. Part 2: National Procurement Policies* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 18. (This study was no. 2 in the series Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance.)
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., p. 33.

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the French airframe industry. This trend toward merger is seen also among private firms, such as Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) and Dornier in West Germany.

The aerospace industries of the smaller Western European states are also consolidating, despite differences in the legal niceties surrounding ownership form. Thus, the Italian government orchestrated a series of mergers in the Italian airframe industry which resulted in the establishment of a single nationalized company, Aeritalia. There is a mixture of ownership forms in Norway but the major firm, Kongsberg, is nationalized. The private system remains dominant in Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and West Germany. Despite the West German pattern of private ownership, a recent report on the German aerospace industry recommended a move toward a smaller number and, perhaps ultimately, one large company.

Of course, views sharply diverge on the wisdom of nationalization or merger into single firms. Many argue that competition is too expensive for most European countries at the moment; that it is a luxury which only the U.S. can afford. Further, European aerospace firms are often seen as too small and fragmented to compete or even collaborate effectively on an equal basis with their large U.S. competitors. Those holding this view see no solution short of joining together into a relatively large enterprise in each country or, perhaps, in all of Western Europe. Others disagree vigorously and consider this view a mistake, seeing the absence of competition as certain to have serious negative technical and economic effects. Such critics question whether the move toward either nationalization or a single large merged firm is, in fact, "rational." There is the further administrative question about whether private and nationalized firms can collaborate effectively on the same project. It should be noted, however, that a public-private partnership mix has been proceeding successfully in the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), now designated Tornado, and in the Roland surface-to-air missile project.

Given the extensive record of consolidation and merger traced above, it would appear that the limits to merger of aerospace companies at the national level have been approached, if not reached. Significant further efforts at consolidation would appear to be limited to corporate merger across national boundaries or collaboration by independent national firms on common cross-national projects. The first approach was attempted in 1969 in the merger of

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the West German firm VFW (Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk) with Fokker of the Netherlands into VFW-Fokker. The effort is conceded to have failed and, early in 1980, the merger was terminated.[5] While generalization from a single case is probably unwarranted, many in the Western European aerospace industry view the VFW-Fokker example, at the very least, as illustrative of the substantial difficulties facing efforts at cross-national merger.[6] Under the circumstances, it is likely that additional attempts at consolidation at the alliance or intra-European level will concentrate on collaboration at the level of particular aircraft or weapon systems. The remainder of this paper shall be focused on project collaboration.

Motives for Collaboration

(1) *Reduced Costs*

The first logical question might be why collaborate at all? What are the anticipated gains and likely costs? Collaboration is generally seen as a means to reduce duplication of development costs and to provide longer production runs. If this results in lower unit costs, the armed forces can buy larger numbers of weapons within a fixed budget.

Substantial disagreement has surfaced in recent years, however, regarding the economics of collaboration. It is generally agreed that several of the costs associated with collaboration are higher than those involved in a single national effort. The overhead costs are clearly higher, involving the duplication of drawings, translation into different languages, and extra transportation and communication costs. Transaction costs incurred in resolving disputes over what constitutes "fair share for all partners" must also be included. Finally, collaborative efforts are also viewed as more time-consuming. The hope is that larger product runs will permit a reduction in unit costs of production that will more than offset increased overhead and, perhaps, development costs, as well. Some RAF

[5] See "Way Cleared for VFW-MBB Merger," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 18, 1980, pp. 24-25. For details of the labyrinthine process of corporate merger and divorce, see "VFW Shareholders Near Agreement on Sale to MBB," ibid., July 21, 1980, pp. 26-27, and "Prospect of United Technologies Owning Chunk of Messerschmitt Ruffles Germans," *Wall Street Journal*, February 25, 1980, p. 16.

[6] The VFW-Fokker merger agreement specified a 50/50 approach, but with the national character of both firms to be preserved. Government funds used for military work and development financing had to be used in the country whose government provided them. This requirement prevented the joint firm from transferring work across the border to utilize available capacity most efficiently. Strong national feelings also contributed to a reluctance to cross the border with production and design work.

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spokesmen in the United Kingdom concede that collaboration must be more expensive in terms of administrative costs, but expect life-cycle costs to be lower. For example, the MRCA-Tornado is replacing five different aircraft types in the RAF with consequent savings in supply, maintenance, training, and ground support. Strictly viewed, such savings appear to flow from the adoption of a general-purpose aircraft capable of performing several missions rather than from collaboration, but the prevailing opinion in the U.K. is that the British could not have developed the Tornado on their own.

In aeroengines, there is a rough parallel to the concept of the multirole or multiuse aircraft, which also may lead to reduced costs through the reduction of excessive variety. The West Germans have a common engine in their F-104s and F-4s. The Pratt & Whitney F-100 engine powers the twin-engine F-15 as well as the single-engine F-16 aircraft and, despite the well-publicized difficulties encountered by that engine, there are obvious economic and logistic gains in common engine use in different aircraft. Here again, before these savings can be attributed to collaboration, it would have to be demonstrated that such high-performance engines are unlikely to be developed by a single state acting on its own.

Those familiar with collaborative projects have their own rules of thumb to calculate the resulting cost consequences. A German aerospace executive, for example, suggests that collaborative costs increase by the square root of the number of partners. Thus, moving to two partners increases costs by about 40 per cent. (Presumably, the penalty costs of coproduction are somewhat less than those encountered in codesign.) Not often noted, but of possible importance, is the related question of the economies that derive from collaborative experience. In other words, even if the square root rule prevails initially, does it continue at that rate or is there a decline as greater experience in the collaborative process is acquired?

There also seems to be a substantial difference of opinion in Europe about the minimum requirements for efficient size production. As a general rule, most European weapon producers believe that a doubling of output will lead to a reduction in unit costs of 10 to 20 per cent. The anticipated gains shrink, of course, as common configuration fades and individual states make their weapon systems more specialized to meet national need or convenience. While the British are taking about 380 MRCA-Tornado aircraft, some mavericks in the British government establishment feel that Britain

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could have handled a production run of this size more cheaply alone. Similar doubts concerning the presumed economic gains from collaboration were raised in an important British electronics and avionics firm by a top executive who felt that the necessity for collaborative work in military aircraft had not been adequately established and was a form of "conventional wisdom." Another British observer has gone further by emphasizing the "economics of politics," and suggests that "budget-maximising bureaucracies in partner nations, supported by scientific-technical interest groups in the form of weapons firms, have deliberately exaggerated both the R&D and production savings on joint ventures in order to persuade vote-conscious governments to undertake such work."[7] Occasionally, such doubts about the cost of collaboration or coproduction develop into the hypothesis that buying off-the-shelf in the U.S. would be cheaper than coproduction and might then free funds for other projects — military or civil — out of limited budgets. Nevertheless, buying off-the-shelf from the cheapest source is only infrequently encountered, particularly when the buying country possesses sufficient aerospace capability to participate in the production process through an offset agreement. The policy followed in such circumstances clearly illustrates the interplay of economic and political influences.[8]

[7] Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Joint European Aircraft Projects* (York, England: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of York, Discussion Paper no. 18, 1978), p. 17.

[8] The March 1980 announcement by the Dutch government that it was considering a substantial increase in its F-16 order, the additional planes possibly to be acquired directly from General Dynamics in the United States rather than through the European F-16 consortium, appeared to provide an interesting counterexample. The case was complicated, however, by other considerations. Since no additional F-16 orders from the other consortium states were immediately in prospect, the Dutch felt that the acquisition of additional aircraft from the consortium would, in effect, constitute a subsidy to the industries of Belgium, Denmark, and Norway that the Dutch were reluctant to grant. They were left, therefore, with two options: to purchase the additional F-16s directly from General Dynamics or to work out some sort of bilateral arrangement whereby Dutch industry would receive offsets from General Dynamics on additional aircraft. The second option appears to have been adopted; in December 1980, it was revealed that an additional twenty-two F-16s have been ordered by the Dutch and that an order for approximately eighty additional F-16 aircraft is likely to follow in the near future. Presumably, the new F-16s will be coproduced in the Netherlands at Fokker and in the United States at General Dynamics. The bilateral coproduction program is estimated as likely to cost the Dutch $30 million more than if the aircraft were bought "off the shelf" from General Dynamics, but Dutch Defense Ministry officials indicate that General Dynamics will place more than $100 million of offset orders with Dutch industry. As of this writing, top executives of General Dynamics still believe that the final arrangement may include participation by the other European consortium states. The important point, though, is that what momentarily appeared to be a rare example of purchase from the cheapest source has not materialized. See "General Dynamics Order from Dutch May Top $1 Billion," *Wall Street Journal*, March 27, 1980, p. 15, "Off-the-Shelf F-16 Buy Urged," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, May 12, 1980, p. 20, and "Dutch Order Additional F-16 Fighters," ibid., December 15, 1980, p. 23.

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A distinction is sometimes drawn between the possibilities for independent production of aircraft on the military side and on the civil side. It may be easier for the Big Three states in Europe to develop military aircraft alone rather than civil aircraft for reasons involving regulation, size of product run, and logistics. Thus, no FAA-type requirements for military aircraft exist. Also, the domestic air force usually buys 150-200 aircraft before the first foreign customer appears on the scene. Thus, by the time export production begins, as many as 200 aircraft may already have come off the assembly line. This contrasts with recent European experience with extremely limited markets for civil aircraft, only a handful being produced for domestic use. Finally, the importance of having adequate spare parts on hand all over the world is also a more demanding problem for civil aircraft, especially in peacetime.

Despite this view, there are few current independent efforts to develop high-performance military aircraft in Europe. France and Sweden, each with quite different records of accomplishment, provide the two principal exceptions. While both nations have designed and produced impressive aircraft in the Mirage series and the Viggen, the French have attained substantial export sales, while the Swedes have not. In part, this differential export success reflects widely divergent national attitudes about arms exports and the problem of weapons proliferation. Saab encountered a much more restrictive policy in Sweden than that encountered by Dassault-Breguet in France. In addition, the Viggen was designed explicitly to meet Swedish defense needs, which, in terms of geography and politics, may limit the usefulness of that aircraft in other areas of the world. Its attractiveness to potential Third World buyers is also said to be limited by its high cost and complexity. The erosion of an originally planned domestic purchase of some 800 Viggens by the Swedish Air Force and the very limited export potential have led to sharply increasing costs and much soul-searching about Swedish capacity to continue as an independent producer of such high-performance aircraft. In the past two years, at least three designs of Viggen successors have been considered and rejected, and the most recent account of Swedish planning suggests that the aircraft will be developed in cooperation with a foreign aircraft industry partner.[9]

By way of contrast, the success of the Mirage series of aircraft in export markets is legendary. While the French government has been an active partner in the encouragement of exports of mili-

[9] See "Supersonic Aircraft Development Favored by Swedish Military," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 11, 1980, pp. 20-21.

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tary aircraft, the combination of good performance and relative simplicity provided by Dassault's excellent design staff has made the Mirage a most attractive prospect in world markets. While the two newest additions to the Mirage family, the 2000 and 4000 models, appear impressive at this early stage in their development, doubts are being expressed more often about the ability of Dassault to continue its successes. Some who see nationalization as an inhibition to innovation fear that the likely nationalization of the firm following the departure of the company's founder, Marcel Dassault, from an active role will bring the curtain down on the remarkable record of this firm and its Mirage line. Others who see collaboration as a necessary instrument for technological stimulation and advance believe that a French decline is inevitable and already evident, owing to its self-imposed isolation in the design of advanced military aircraft.

In April 1980, a trilateral industrial study proposing joint development of an advanced tactical fighter was prepared by Dassault-Breguet, British Aerospace, and MBB of West Germany and submitted to the three governments.[10] The British and Germans have been eager to obtain French participation both as a move toward standardization and a means to expand the product run substantially. Although it may be premature to draw hard conclusions from this development, it is at least suggestive of a serious shift away from independent efforts by the French.[11] As these developments evolve in Sweden and France, additional clues will be available as to the likely future of independent national efforts to develop advanced military aircraft in Europe.

(2) *Export Sales*

The export of military weapon systems is often seen as important for balancing the trade accounts. Aerospace products, in particular, are looked upon in Europe as providing an attractive export line to exchange for oil and other essential imports. As Asian competitors with low labor costs increasingly dominate world markets for low- and medium-range technology products, official European policy leans to the support of sophisticated technology with

[10] See "Bonn Warns of Rising ECA Cost," pp. 16-18, and "Eurofighter to Use Advanced Concepts," p. 19, ibid., May 5, 1980.

[11] Should this three-way effort not materialize, however, the West Germans might abandon a purely European scheme and reexamine possible collaboration with the United States. MBB and McDonnell-Douglas have already done some preliminary work on a fighter for the 1990s, and, among the Europeans, the Germans are closest to the U.S. Air Force in logistics, hardware, tactics, and maintenance procedures.

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export potential. Aerospace industry has become a major beneficiary of such policies. If such high technology capability is acquired through projects viewed as too costly to undertake alone, then collaborative efforts are seen as leading to enhanced export potential. This potential may provide feedback to the export of civilian goods. Thus, in several NATO states, particularly in Italy, it is reported that Third World countries have tied their purchases of civil products to their requests for arms. Inability to meet such arms requests may threaten much larger commercial deals.

Export marketing is also widely viewed as a possible way to lower unit cost of production for the domestic armed forces by lengthening the production run. However, the current tendency on the part of some buyers to demand coproduction or some form of offset compensation somewhat reduces the hopes for this wider market. With respect to production economies on military orders from abroad, several points should be kept in mind. If these foreign orders follow the completion of the production for the domestic armed forces, they will not be of much aid in reducing the cost of those particular units because they come in too late. Thus, they contribute little to economies of scale. On the other hand, they keep the assembly lines going during interim periods, when orders from the domestic armed forces are small or nonexistent. This makes it easy for domestic military orders to be reinstated without the need to reopen the assembly line, which is likely to be very expensive. It also keeps the work force familiar with the project and provides for continual improvements on the job — typical gains from volume economies.

There is an additional link between domestic and export sales, since sales to the armed forces of the producing states are useful as reference points for potential customers. Thus, the fact that the domestic armed services of the producing states are using the weapon system suggests both that the "bugs" are out of it and that resupply will be easy. The European members of the F-16 consortium indicated that, aside from comparative performance, their selection of the YF-16 over the YF-17 (later to become the F-18) was significantly influenced by the decision of the U.S. Air Force to adopt the F-16 for its own inventory.

To the extent to which rationalization or standardization reduces the variety of military systems available for export, it inhibits the development of unique export lines for a particular country. In Italy, the view has often been expressed that such a result of ra-

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tionalization would be harmful to the national interest. Italy has done quite well in the development and export of the Macchi 326 and 339 jet trainer/light attack aircraft as well as in a wide range of naval weapons and would be highly reluctant to give up such markets in the name of rationalization or standardization.

(3) *Technology Spinoff*

The possibility of technology spinoffs to aid the broader national economy is another expected gain from collaboration on high technology military products, especially where extensive military research programs are viewed as too expensive to be undertaken on a unilateral basis.[12] The prevailing view is that military sales are more important than their sheer volume indicates, because military orders tend to be more sophisticated, requiring advanced technologies with much to be learned from them. In addition, the demanding nature of military systems in terms of tougher standards of quality and performance is seen as good discipline for industry with applications outside of the military market. This point has been well expressed by a Norwegian executive whose firm is participating in the F-16 coproduction effort:

My company has never made aircraft and we have no intention to do so. Our intention to participate in this program was purely in relation to technology transfer. . . . [O]ur objective was to help technology transfer to support our existing production of defense material, which is ammunition, and to have some new technology for our civilian production. We have gained system management, which I think is important. We have some jobs in NC (numerically-controlled) machines which we did not have before. We have learned about forging high strength aluminum, which is important to us for our civilian production. We have learned about nondestructive testing, more than we knew before, and we have learned about the U.S. Air Force quality control system, which we also think is important. And, not least, we have gained close cooperation with new firms in the United States.[13]

[12] The widespread desire among potential buyers of aircraft to improve their technological capabilities by participating in the project through some offset arrangement is well recognized by sellers and is increasingly being used by them to enhance the attractiveness of their offers. Thus, while the European F-16 consortium states were disappointed in their earlier expectation of an opportunity to acquire skills in advanced carbon-fiber technology, the new Dutch bilateral arrangement with General Dynamics calls for Fokker to produce vertical fins and leading edges, horizontal stabilizers, and rudders from composite material. The offset value of providing this capability with composites has been estimated at $4-$5 million. See "Dutch Order Additional F-16 Fighters," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, December 15, 1980, p. 23. (One General Dynamics executive described the composite work as a "pot sweetener.")

[13] See Mr. Nils Chr. Tommeraas's comment in "Discussion of Bernard Udis, 'Technology Transfer in the Case of the F-16 Military Aircraft,' " in Sherman Gee, ed., *Technology Transfer in Industrialized Countries* (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), pp. 245-262, esp. pp. 258-259.

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The generalized assumption of spinoff gains is not universally accepted, however. Some argue that big science, including aerospace and nuclear work, when undertaken in a state like Britain, has actually been detrimental to the general economy by diverting money and skilled manpower from other industries where they could perhaps be better used. There is evidence on both sides of this argument. Certainly where valuable spinoff appears, it should be exploited, but one should not lose sight of the fact that the basic rationale for military spending is national defense and that military expenditures have real opportunity costs associated with them.

(4) *Reduced Risk of Cancellation*

An argument frequently made in favor of international collaboration is that such projects are much more difficult to cancel and are therefore more stable than purely national projects. One must examine the reasons for the proposed cancellation before concluding that its reduced likelihood is, in fact, an advantage to the nation. Clearly, if the project continues despite the absence of convincing economic justification, then other considerations have been dominant and the best interest of the nation may not have been served.

While each of the foregoing motives (plus others not specified) is usually present to some degree in most collaborative ventures, their relative weights will vary from case to case. Nations participate in modern aerospace projects for goals usually far more complex than the acquisition of an aircraft. In the case of the MRCA-Tornado, for example, each of the three partners is pursuing a particular set of objectives. Italian participation is aimed at obtaining advanced electronic skills, while the Germans are seen as highly interested in restoring the capabilities of their aircraft design teams. The United Kingdom has clearly traded some of its aerospace technology in return for German financial assistance on this aircraft. Such approaches are supported by the organization of Panavia, the Tornado management organization, which is structured to share the technology rather than to apply it in a specialized way.

Requirements for Successful Collaboration

All persons with experience in collaborative projects have their own pet list of prerequisites for success. The array of successful projects suggests that there may be many effective approaches and that the essential thing is to be aware of the problems.

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(1) *Agreement on Common Military Requirements*

The standardization of weapon systems appears to require that the military staffs of allied states first agree upon common operational requirements. Given differing national military philosophies, experiences and preferences, this is a substantial challenge which requires a willingness to compromise for the abstract goal of the "common good." Moreover, since, at any point in time, existing weapon systems are at a different stage of their useful lives, coincidence in time of a common requirement is unlikely. In this regard, the current Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) survey of weapon replacement schedules in NATO states is undoubtedly a useful exercise, since it may lead to better synchronization of the timing of alliance needs for a particular weapon system.

(2) *Agreement on Extent of Collaboration: Codesign or Coproduction*

There are several organizational issues of considerable importance which apply across the board in any form of collaboration, regardless of the geographic area covered. The first of these is whether the project should begin with codesign or rather should be limited to coproduction. The view generally in France, certainly at Dassault and at most American firms, is that codesign is "a disaster." To have any chance of successful codesign, the partners must avoid design by committee and choose a clear leader. Presumably, coproduction is much easier to obtain and manage successfully. On the other hand, among the buyer states, there is an almost universal desire to participate in design, because of its presumed advantages in maintaining the up-to-date status of design teams. This talent is occasionally seen as necessary in order to retain minimum capability as an intelligent buyer. There is no question that the offer of participation in design looks very attractive to European companies. This again is one of the sources of complaint about the F-16 project. When the Europeans are provided with the design, *fait accompli*, they participate only as subcontractors, or "metal-benders." As Keith Hartley has persuasively argued, however, "metal-bashing" or production work involves technology and can be quite profitable. Thus, this position may fall into Hartley's category of arguments that are "long on emotion and short on economic analysis and evidence."[14]

[14] See Keith Hartley, *Joint European Aircraft Projects*, pp. 22-23, and "NATO, Standardization and Nationalism: An Economist's View," *RUSI Journal*, September 1978, pp. 57-60.

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(3) Resolution of Problems Arising from Size Differences in Potential Partners

Another important and underexamined consideration is whether differences in the size of firms inhibit collaboration. SNECMA in France, for example, is fearful of Rolls-Royce and finds it easier to work with General Electric's engine division in the U.S., which is closer to it in size than Rolls-Royce. The same point was raised by the French missile producer, Matra, where the view is held that possible American interest in French missiles will be limited to special items and will not apply across the board. As a U.S. order might be quite large, the question was raised of how output may be expanded to ten times the normal market size but only in products that constitute perhaps one-tenth of the product line without causing serious imbalance. Customers often want full product lines from the same producer for reasons of convenience, service, and reliability.[15] This is particularly difficult for the European firm that is able to attract the American buyer infrequently and in only a small number of cases.

This leads directly to a frequently expressed view in the Big Three European states that cooperation in aerospace work will succeed only when the partners are of roughly equal competence and size. It is feared that, otherwise, what develops is a form of brain-picking or technology loss that will flow largely one way.

(4) *Allaying Fears of Overspecialization*

Standardization or collaboration is sometimes seen as carrying with it undue risk of overspecialization and interdependence. This is particularly troublesome to those that adopt the view that, over long periods of time, alliances shift. One does not have to visualize France, for example, joining the Warsaw Pact, but even its possible desire to move toward a position of greater independence would be inhibited by what it might perceive as overdependence on other states for military equipment.

French General Marc A. Cauchie, Deputy Delegate General for Armaments, expressed this position clearly in an address to the American Defense Preparedness Association in March 1979:

[15] This appears to be an area where national differences in industrial structure are significant. Thus, in the United States, "save for a few companies, such as Hughes Aircraft Co., that make missiles for all types of missions, most missile contractors . . . specialize in only one or two types of weapons among the air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-ground, and ship-to-ship varieties." See "The New Defense Posture: Missiles, Missiles, and Missiles," *Business Week*, August 11, 1980, pp. 76-81, esp. p. 77.

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I have said that the principle of national sovereignty implies independence of the necessary needs. Not only the armoured forces which come in under national control but also the tool which is defense equipment. A country which depends upon foreign countries for its military supplies is no more ensured to keep this vital tool in proper state. We discovered this with the U.S. embargo in Turkey or at the occasion of changes in U.S. foreign policy. After these examples Europe fully ally [sic] of the United States cannot afford, even in the hope of a possible better utilization of resources, to jeopardize its armament industry without taking the risk of getting disarmed some day. With this lesson of history in memory Europe must therefore maintain, I would say at all costs, its technology and production capabilities necessary to its own defense.[16]

Concern about overspecialization is often heard in Sweden, also. Here, the idea is advanced that even if a state decides that it cannot be self-sufficient in all areas and concedes that it must buy certain weapon systems abroad, it must nevertheless maintain some minimum level of design competence in order to function as an intelligent buyer.

In this context, a healthy relationship between prime and subcontractors in the aerospace industry is important. A source of real concern has been the fear that the opening of the U.S. market might be detrimental to European prime contractors if the European industry became transformed essentially into a subcontractor to American aerospace firms. Such a circumstance could lead to the atrophy of European capabilities within ten to fifteen years. The maintenance of a European "home" market for European prime contractors is viewed as essential in preventing the development of such a circumstance. To do this, however, would require intra-European collaboration to offset the present transatlantic imbalance in market size.

(5) *Building Trust and Mutual Understanding*

Trust between partners is essential. Each partner must have confidence in the other's dependability and quality of work, for the partner not responsible for development is risking his reputation on a product that he has not developed. The attitude that such a risk requires complete confidence in one's partners is particularly prominent in France.

The complement to trust is mutual understanding. According to the Europeans, any transatlantic operation must consider

[16] Statement of General Marc A. Cauchie in *Meeting Report: Third International Symposium on NATO Standardization and Interoperability, March 20-21, 1979* (Washington: American Defense Preparedness Association, 1979), pp. 21-26, esp. p. 22.

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the European tendency to move more slowly than their American counterparts. Moreover, decision-making procedures, accounting, and auditing differ in Europe, reflecting cultural differences. This has been a recurring problem in the F-16 project. It is frequently noted that the United States would never allow its companies' books to be examined by foreign auditors in any collaborative venture, and there is no reason to expect it to be any more palatable to European partners. It has been recommended that once the financial constraints are established for each of the countries, it should be the individual responsibility of each to audit the books of one's own home firms.

It is also important to distinguish between companies in the same European state, because it is often too gross a generalization to speak of *the* French position or *the* German position. Dassault in France and Dornier in Germany resemble one another in philosophy, approach, and size more than their larger national competitors, Aerospatiale in France and MBB in Germany. Both are also much more profit-oriented and, indeed, commercially successful. Perhaps the most significant point is that common nationality does not assure common attitudes toward collaboration in different companies. Understandably, the Europeans appear less inclined to lose sight of such differences than their American counterparts.

(6) *Maintaining Employment Stability*

Occasionally doubts are encountered about the ability of the Europeans to remain "competitive" with respect to the possibility of sales to the United States. More often than not such reservations reflect concern that the many European labor restrictions on overtime and on extra shifts and the very low mobility of labor are appreciable obstacles to the implementation of efficient production. Widespread prohibitions of layoffs of personnel also frustrate cost savings. Thus, a recent effort by Ford to reduce employment in its West German operations is estimated to cost $12,620 for each job cut.[17] This emphasis on the importance of employment stability in Europe has led many firms to stress continuity of output rather than intermittent larger orders with their associated peaks and valleys in employment. The goal, thus, seems more clearly to be maintenance of employment and not necessarily increased capacity or employment, at least without the strong assurance that such increases will be sustained over long periods of time. This factor makes the pros-

[17] See, for example, "Ford's West German Unit Offers Bonuses to Get 11% of Its Employees to Retire," *Wall Street Journal*, August 8, 1980, p. 16.

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pect of a sudden surge of large orders from the U.S. less attractive to the Europeans than one might expect.

(7) *Agreement on Third-Country Sales*

A very important challenge for any multinational collaborative venture is the resolution of questions dealing with third-party sales. Agreement must be reached on how such sales will be shared quantitatively and, perhaps even more importantly, on how political differences between the partners will be resolved regarding the eligibility of particular third countries to buy the weapon systems. A significant political obstacle to collaboration between the Europeans and the U.S. is the question of U.S. control over exports by partner states of military equipment involving American parts or components produced under license. The GE-SNECMA aircraft engine difficulties are frequently recounted as well as the unsuccessful Israeli effort to sell the Kfir military aircraft to Ecuador. (The sale was not consummated because the U.S. refused to grant Israel permission to sell the Kfir since it contained a derivative of an American engine.) The rationale for a restrictive position varies from national security and fear of technology loss to U.S. antiproliferation policy on weapon sales. The possibility that such policies might prove counterproductive has been raised by Italian industrialists, who see them as encouraging armaments proliferation by nations so constrained, by providing such nations with an incentive to develop their weapon systems independently, with a corresponding adverse impact on collaboration. Another likely consequence is the loss of orders by U.S. firms. Thus, Italy's choice of the Rolls-Royce Spey engine for its AMX light attack aircraft over the competing General Electric TF-34 is viewed, in part, as reflecting Italian desire to avoid a repetition of a U.S. prohibition of a proposed sale of Aeritalia G-222 military transports to Libya. The justification for the American action was the presence of General Electric T-64 engines on the aircraft. The Italians completed the Libyan sale by substituting Rolls-Royce Tyne 20S engines.[18]

(8) *Development of a Workable Management Structure*

Views are divided on whether collaboration requires a separate managerial organization like Panavia, which administers the joint British-German-Italian Tornado aircraft project, or whether re-

[18] See "Italian Industry Seeks Partners, Licenses," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, June 11, 1979, pp. 271-279, esp. pp. 277, 279.

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sponsibilities can be divided among the members without provision of such an organization, but with clear designation of a lead company instead. All agree that a failure to designate a lead company was a major source of trouble on the Concorde project and on several of the European space satellite efforts. European aerospace officials feel that considerations of prestige and politics were so pronounced in the Concorde project that neither partner company was willing to allow the other to lead. There are similar complaints about the Sepecat organization, which was established to manage the Anglo-French Jaguar project. The story (perhaps apocryphal) is often heard that the Jaguar contains British bolts in one part of the fuselage and French in another, requiring different tools for maintenance work. On the other hand, the relatively simple understanding between Dassault and Dornier on the Alpha Jet appears to be working very well. Similarly, in the civil aerospace area, the Airbus Industrie organization is viewed as quite successful, enabling operation with a minimum of organizational superstructure.

Criticism of excessive numbers of governmental personnel has been directed at both Panavia and the F-16 System Project Office. In Panavia, there is a belief that the staff size can be reduced on future projects. The large staffs were viewed as a start-up phenomenon. It is also freely acknowledged at Panavia that the stress on documentation is borrowed directly from the U.S. style. Further, Panavia started as a "Tower of Babel" with three languages in use; thus, it was essential that all procedures for production and design changes be very carefully formulated. English has since been adopted as Panavia's official language. Another interesting detail of the Panavia system is that all contractors are paid in their own national currencies. No money crosses international borders. Trust accounts in the currencies of the three states have been established and are drawn upon to pay contractors in their own currency. This simplifies problems arising from exchange rate variations and changes in the purchasing power of different currencies.

While only West Germany and Britain are producing all the Tornado's parts, assembly is taking place in each of the three countries. Italian opinion appears to prefer the Tornado experience to that with Boeing on the 7X7 civil aircraft, principally because the Italian participant received design assignments on the MRCA, while Boeing offered only work sharing. However, while all partners are producing most major items on the Tornado, most of the special components, subcontractor accessories, and special parts are being

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produced in the U.K. Similarly, most of the test pilots in the project are British. This reflects the presence of unique capabilities in Britain. It has also led to a gradual increase of the British share of the work beyond the originally agreed-upon percentage, which has caused some concern among the other two partners.

Whatever difficulties Panavia has been through, it now exists and functions to the satisfaction of all the partners. Some have expressed the view that it would be a pity not to use the organization for other projects. This, of course, does not mean that it would operate unchanged; it has been suggested that if Panavia moved into multiproject operation, divisionalization would surely be considered.

The F-16 project management has also been the target of complaints from some of the European partners to the effect that their agreed-upon shares of offsets are being attained much too slowly. European partners in the F-16 project also occasionally express disappointment at their inability to gain some of the technological advantages that had originally been anticipated.

(9) *Resolving the Issue of Changing Partners*

Yet unresolved is the issue of the extent to which economies of experience reduce the costs of collaboration below their original penalty levels, and whether such savings apply to changing partners, or whether a continuing relationship between the partners over several projects is required.[19] There is also the serious question of whether shifting partnerships can work very effectively, since today's partner may emerge as tomorrow's competitor. Such a possibility may inhibit free and open exchange of ideas, especially on design matters. The counterargument, however, is that the relatively infrequent introduction of new aircraft projects, both civil and military, means that interfirm collaboration, even on a single project, lasts a decade or more during which period the value of particular secrets inevitably will erode.

(10) *Ending Enforced European Offset Purchases*

The purchase of American weapons by Europeans to offset the costs of maintaining U.S. troops in Europe has inhibited

[19] While one might expect some generally useful skills in the art of collaboration to emerge from such projects, a rather skeptical view of such gains has been put forward by the former chairman of the British Aerospace Corporation: "[W]hen a particular program is completed the partnership ceases and the process starts all over again with a fresh piece of defence equipment, new partners, new management and the education sequences are repeated." See address of Allen Greenwood in Assembly of Western European Union, Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, A European Armaments Policy Symposium, March 1977, p. 27.

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European collaboration. U.S. demands for such offsets to the balance-of-payments costs of American forces in Europe have now largely disappeared, however.

The Question of Protectionism and Its Control

The majority opinion in Europe views U.S. protectionism, whether a demonstrable fact or not, as a major impediment to successful collaboration on a transatlantic basis or even on the intra-European level.

(1) *U.S. Purchases of Major Weapon Systems from Europe*

The psychological impact of a major U.S. purchase of European weapon systems would be enormous. In European eyes, such a purchase would demonstrate good will and would also symbolize the confidence of the U.S. that its European sources of supply are safe and U.S. commitment to keeping them so.

(2) *Past Failures of Transatlantic Collaboration*

The failure of the U.S. and West Germany to agree on a common tank or, at least, on its major components is widely viewed in Europe as an unfortunate lesson (whether we wish it to be so interpreted or not) that the U.S. will not buy major weapon systems offshore. This led to extreme frustration, especially among German government officials, and it had implications in other industries, as well. Thus, Turbo Union gave up plans to compete seriously with its RB-199 jet engine in the U.S. military market, despite earlier use of a Rolls Royce engine produced under license (the F-65 in the A-4 aircraft). It also strengthened the view that, for European countries to succeed in the U.S. market, they require an American partner (such as McDonnell Douglas on the British Harrier AV8B).

In more advanced European firms, the view is growing that compensation within specific projects should be avoided and that compensatory balance should be sought over several projects rather than within a single one. To this view, compatible with the economic theory of comparative advantage, the U.S. might consider responding by offering more general trade liberalization, even outside of the military area, but at roughly comparable technology levels.[20]

[20] For an interesting study of this possibility, see Charles Wolfe, Jr. and Derek Leebaert, "Trade Liberalization as a Path to Weapons Standardization in NATO," *International Security*, Winter 1978, pp. 136-159.

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Occasional U.S. efforts toward trade liberalization in the recent past, however, have aroused skepticism in Europe. Skepticism is pronounced when the initiative toward liberalization occurs in the executive branch of the U.S. government. Several recent examples have convinced many European observers that the U.S. executive arm is weak and that the legislature in the U.S. dominates, often changing rules and going its own way. Thus, to gain the support of the American president is sometimes not enough. In the area of military aid, the example most frequently quoted is the Congressional cutoff of military assistance to Turkey designed to force the Turks to withdraw their troops from Cyprus. Although this moratorium was lifted in 1978, its aftereffect has lingered.

(3) *U.S. Heavyhandedness in Alliance Relations*

The U.S., occasionally heavyhanded in its dealings with its European allies, appears to them to be defining standardization to mean that all should use American weapons. A chorus of complaints arose in particular over the efforts to sell the very expensive Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, offering little opportunity for Europeans to participate in designing or producing the system. The timing of the offer shortly after the unraveling of the German-American tank deal was also unfortunate. Although West German Defense Minister Leber explicitly denied a *quid pro quo* relationship between the two, the feeling in Germany was very strong against the purchase of AWACS at that time. While the West Germans finally agreed to participate in the NATO AWACS program, bad feelings remain close to the surface.

The F-16 program involving the U.S., Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway is occasionally cited as another example of the U.S. drive to have Europe standardize according to American systems. A common French view sees the F-16 as a form of Trojan Horse designed to enable the U.S. to enter Europe. Indeed, there is concern in several European states, particularly in France, that this type of project is actually destructive of rationalization. For one thing, the Europeans have difficulty in understanding why the U.S. is encouraging the development of additional aerospace capacity when existing European aircraft industries are already suffering from underutilized capacity. Until about ten years ago, the smaller European states were content to import most of their major aerospace weapon systems. In the past decade, new firms or new aerospace units in existing firms have appeared, all of which aim for a share of a shrinking total market.

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This presents everyone with larger problems. When countries concentrate on getting larger shares for their own industries, perhaps to offset trade deficits, the goal of efficient production slips away. The French believe that the smaller states are seeking to emulate Germany's success in claiming larger shares of aerospace markets during the past decade. Some French observers also suspect that the U.S. is building up a group of satellite industries in Western Europe and Scandinavia to give it the appearance of collaborating with European aerospace, while, in fact, the major European industries are weakened by these efforts. This view is counterbalanced, however, by the reality of the introduction of a common high performance aircraft into the air forces of five NATO states and the associated transfers of technology to the industries of the four European partners.

In addition to the above complaints, charges of unethical behavior on the part of the U.S. are occasionally encountered. Thus, suspicions exist that the U.S. is "stealing" good European ideas. The same tendency is also attributed to the Japanese and to the Swedes. A cynical view occasionally voiced is that a feigned interest in cooperation or collaboration is often simply a tactic to keep another potential competitor out of the market by offering the bait of some joint long-term project, although no such objective is really being considered.

These occasional complaints reflect a deeper concern over the general way in which the U.S. treats the Europeans. Among Europeans, the feeling is widespread that they are viewed as technological inferiors by their American counterparts. European firms participating in the F-16 program frequently complain that they were treated as buyers under the Foreign Military Sales program rather than partners according to the provisions of the basic F-16 Memorandum of Understanding. The general view is that the top level U.S. response to Europe is sympathetic and intelligent, but that programs are often scuttled at the working level within the government or military bureaucracies. Thus, it seems clear that successful collaboration between the U.S. and Europe will require not only high level commitment to the success of the enterprise, but also the restructuring of American organizations accustomed to playing a "Big Daddy" role. Similar changes will also have to be reflected in the structure of the organization set up to run collaborative ventures.

(4) *Licensed Production and U.S. Interest*

The form of collaboration obviously should be expected to vary among projects. A major question among Europeans, how-

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ever, is whether they can realistically expect any collaborative arrangement with the U.S. other than one in which the U.S. buys the right to produce an attractive European weapon system under license. Attitudes toward production under license vary. For example, the common French view is that the economic returns on the Roland license will be low. French Ministry of Defense officials estimate that a direct sale of Roland to the U.S. would have earned 7.5 billion francs, compared with proceeds of about 150 million francs from the sale of the license.[21] In addition, annoyance is frequently expressed at the changes, perceived as reducing standardization advantage, which the U.S. has introduced into the system. Further, when the Norwegians expressed an interest in buying the U.S. version, the French and German developers of the Roland were angered, declaring: "a license fee is nice and prestige is pleasant but it doesn't provide jobs in the industry of the developing country."[22] On the other hand, when the original European product may be changed appreciably — for example, the possible conversion of the Franco-German Alphajet into a naval trainer to operate off carriers — licensed programs would appear inevitable.[23] Also, because such a use would be unique, there would be little risk to the developers that the United States might export the trainer to other states, because few other countries in the West maintain aircraft carriers. It is also conceded that, when the American need is very large and the time constraints are tight, the United States understandably would want to produce domestically.

The major question of licensing is the extent to which a European originator may participate. Thus, the French share of the Falcon-20 jet, which has been accepted by the U.S. Coast Guard as

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[21] Cited in Robert W. Dean, "The Future of Collaborative Weapons Acquisition," in Derek Leebaert, ed., *European Security: Prospects for the 1980s* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979), pp. 79-105, esp. p. 97.

[22] The extent of the actual changes introduced into the system by the United States has been the subject of much debate, the U.S. Army insisting that most of the changes were dictated by production considerations and have been exaggerated by European commentators. For a thorough treatment of the facts in this case, see Robert A. Gessert, J. Ross Heverly, William C. Pettijohn, and Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co., Inc., *NATO Standardization and Technology Transfer*, vol. 2 (main report), prepared for European/NATO Directorate, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McLean, Va.: General Research Corporation, February 1978), pp. A4-A19.

[23] Such a case would appear almost inevitably to include a relationship with a U.S. firm that has a successful record as a Navy supplier. Thus, the U.S. Navy has recently awarded grants for design studies on a new jet trainer and ground-based training system (designated VTX-TS) to ten firms, including several U.S.-European teams. These latter include a division of Lockheed working with the developers of the Alphajet (Dassault-Breguet and Dornier) and McDonnell-Douglas and British Aerospace working on a derivative of the British Hawk aircraft. See "Ten Aircraft Concerns Get Initial $2.8 Million in $1 Billion Navy Job," *Wall Street Journal*, August 22, 1980, p. 3.

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a maritime reconnaissance aircraft, is somewhere around 40 per cent; the French ship an essentially empty fuselage to Little Rock, where final assembly takes place. In the case of the Harrier, Hawker-Siddeley of the U.K. was surprised when it was permitted to produce the first U.S. Marine Corps order of about 110 aircraft. Hawker-Siddeley had earlier become resigned to the fact that the bulk of these would be produced in the U.S. The British believe that, once the very high cost involved in transferring the production line to the U.S. became known, Congress reluctantly agreed to have the small order completed in Britain. The situation changed, however, with the larger order of perhaps 350 Harriers of the advanced AV8B variety. The British expect to receive about 30 per cent of the man-hours on the airframe of the AV8B. It has been made quite clear at British Aerospace that "if we are shut out entirely from manufacturing aspects of the AV8B we will not look favourably on future American associations of that type."

(5) *Arms Trade Imbalance*

Much is heard in Europe about a wide imbalance in purchases of U.S. and European weapon systems among the members of NATO. The discussion proceeds under the heading of the "two-way street" or, more correctly, its absence. The magnitude of "imbalance" between U.S. and European sales of military equipment depends very much on whether the accounting is done on an overall basis or country by country. In the latter case, the variation is extreme. How realistic it might be to expect a smaller nation with a limited industrial capability to balance its military purchases from the U.S. is a question which should be examined frankly, however.

A related question is whether U.S. policy can legitimately distinguish between the Big Three and the smaller alliance partners. This is significant with respect to the series of general bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) which have been negotiated with nine European allies and Canada. Negotiations are currently underway designed to reach similar agreements with Greece and Turkey. Basically, these are agreements to reciprocally waive "Buy National" policies which limit defense trade, where possible. There is a strong view in some of the smaller states that, until such a memorandum of understanding is negotiated with all of NATO Europe, there will not be a meaningful "two-way street" in military trade, but rather twelve "back streets" through a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and each of the industrialized NATO partners.

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Such a view may be interpreted, in part, as reflecting a suspicion that the U.S., with its MOUs with particular states, is trying to undermine genuine efforts by our European allies to better organize themselves for cooperative efforts. Major General Richard Bowman, director of the European Region of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, directly and persuasively addressed this issue in a March 1979 speech. He noted:

> If that was our goal . . . we would not have general MOU's; we would have various kinds of limited offset agreements which would tie the European countries to specific purchases from the United States. That would go a lot further toward breaking up any chance for European cooperation. We do not do that. Second, we would not be advocating a family of weapons [See p. 193, below] because [it] by definition, permits and encourages Europe to have the lead on half of these efforts . . . That encourages European teaming and European agreement on the leadership of a program. And the Europeans know that that means not only involving the three large producers, but also the other good producers and developers that are scattered around Europe. So we're not undermining united Europe. Europe is our ally. We are half the alliance, they are the other half . . . . If their half doesn't do its best in armaments, we lose.[24]

In the same speech, however, General Bowman took a position on general MOUs and the "two-way street" which served to confuse the issue. He emphasized that "our objectives are to provide a better defense, to have interoperability of forces and to save some resources that could be put into more development and more weapons. . . . We're not talking about economics and balance of payments. . . . people who talk about this in terms of economics and balance of payments are doing a great disservice, because that's not the objective. The objective is interoperabilty in resources."[25] This may be an accurate presentation of U.S. objectives in offering MOUs, but it is not an accurate presentation of the objectives and priorities of the NATO allies. With them, it is very much a matter of economics and balance of payments.

This position is supported by the heavy emphasis of European commentators on military trade imbalance. In Italy and Britain, an interesting recommendation has been offered to reduce the existing trade imbalance. The scheme very much resembles the offshore procurement arrangement which the U.S. introduced during the Korean War. Under this program, large contracts were placed with

[24] Statement of Major General Richard Bowman in *Meeting Report: Third International Symposium on NATO Standardization and Interoperability*, pp. 191-196, esp. p. 196.

[25] Ibid., p. 192.

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European firms for military equipment, partly for use by U.S. forces, but also to meet American commitments to other nations which could not be met at the time because of the heavy demands on U.S. industry for the war in Korea. The specific proposal is that the U.S. consider establishing machinery whereby its allies would supply third-country markets with military equipment on behalf of the U.S. These orders for third countries would be charged as U.S. purchases from Europe in calculating the two-way flow between the U.S. and Europe.

It is also regularly pointed out that the U.S. dominance of European markets for civil and military aircraft in the last thirty years or so is purely a postwar phenomenon, with nothing "natural" about that overwhelming share. Many Europeans take pains to indicate that the U.S. had no particular marked advantage over European aero-engine or airplane production at the beginning of World War II. Now, when the European aerospace industry has regained much of its earlier confidence, it is still viewed by the U.S. as a junior partner, if partner at all. Nevertheless, once most airlines are using the products of one nation, they are unlikely to change overnight, because investments in tooling, support facilities, maintenance, and crew training would be sacrificed. This explains why the breakthrough of the Airbus into the U.S. market is viewed as so important. Europeans are also frustrated and angry at the complaints of U.S. aerospace firms regarding the sales of the Airbus to Eastern Airlines under favorable financial terms. The Europeans are quick to point out that the U.S. Export-Import Bank has been providing similar financial aid to support U.S. exports for years and that it ill behooves companies like Boeing, which so strongly dominates world markets, to complain at the first sign of European penetration into the U.S. market. Clearly, not export credits, but the terms involved have become a source of controversy. This competition in providing export credit financing has become a major irritant in the trade relations of members of the Atlantic Alliance.

In view of the growing significance of the debate over export credit terms, recent developments are worth relating in some detail. On several occasions, high level U.S. Treasury officials have warned of the danger of a "self-defeating export credit war." On July 1, 1976, the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada "adopted Consensus Guidelines designed to reduce counter-productive competition in government supported export credits. The Consensus was subsequently adopted

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by other OECD member countries and there are now twenty participating countries."[26] The current number of participating countries has grown to twenty-two. In the fall of 1978, it was clear that the U.S. government was still concerned over what it considered to be "aggressive government financing practices . . . [involving] the element of subsidy in official export credit financing."[27] In mid September 1978, the president directed the secretary of the treasury to immediately begin consultations with U.S. trading partners designed to "expand the scope and tighten the terms of the arrangement. . . . [In October 1978, Congress] amended the Export-Import Bank Act to authorize the President to begin negotiations . . . to end predatory financing programs and other forms of export subsidies."[28] The president was "required to report to the Congress . . . on progress toward meeting the goals of this section of the Eximbank Act,"[29] and a report was presented on March 16, 1979.

In his message, the president reported that, despite extensive negotiations within a working group of the twenty-two nations participating in the International Arrangement on Export Credits and in bilateral meetings as well, no mutually acceptable agreement for modification of the arrangement could be reached. Negotiations were recessed, and the president issued a veiled threat of vigorous U.S. export credit competition "until such time as there is more willingness among our trading partners to impose the needed self-discipline on export credit practices."[30]

After the annual review of export credits at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 1980, U.S. Treasury officials expressed optimism about moving closer to market-related interest rates and to reduction of government intervention. However, substantial political hurdles remained. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury Gary C. Hufbauer noted that export credits are used by some nations as a "tool of internal economic management" to boost employment. Hufbauer recommended that

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[26] Statement by the Honorable C. Fred Bergsten, assistant secretary of the treasury for international affairs, before the International Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, March 13, 1978, *Department of the Treasury News Release*, pp. 9-10.

[27] Remarks by the Honorable C. Fred Bergsten, assistant secretary of the treasury for international affairs, before the National Foreign Trade Council, New York, November 13, 1978, *Department of the Treasury News Release*, p. 19.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] *Message to the Congress of the United States from President Jimmy Carter Together with an Annex Detailing U.S. Government Actions to Improve the International Arrangement on Export Credits and Provide Competitive Official Export Credit Financing*, March 16, 1979, p. 2.

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the U.S. Export-Import Bank "should seriously consider extending maturity terms beyond the agreed guideline limits if Europeans undercut the U.S. on loans, especially on aircraft."[31]

The importance of this issue was recognized as warranting the attention of the heads of government of the principal industrial states. Thus, the text of the Declaration of the Venice Economic Summit Meeting, issued on June 23, 1980, carried an article on trade in which the signatories reaffirmed their "determination to avoid a harmful export-credit race," and committed themselves to reach by December 1980 a mutually acceptable solution which would strengthen the international arrangement on export credits. The text specified as goals the agreement on terms "closer to current market conditions" and the reduction of "distortions in export competition."[32]

The negotiators failed to meet the December 1980 target, however, and "U.S. officials announced immediately after the breakdown of talks that the U.S. would depart from the existing credit arrangements . . . and extend the maturity of loans to foreign customers beyond those offered by major European competitors." Robert Cornell of the U.S. Treasury, who headed the U.S. negotiating team at the Paris talks, avoided diplomatic language in describing the Common Market position as "grossly inadequate" and "most unsatisfactory." Another review of export-credit arrangements was scheduled for May 1981.[33]

The next blow in what increasingly appears to be an international battle to win export sales was seen in a Canadian announcement early in 1981 that it was offering special low-rate financing for export sales.[34]

As the conflict over export credits indicates, the major European states are strongly committed to the maintenance of industries that they consider crucial. This is true whether crucial is defined principally in terms of pride and politics or in terms of a belief that these are critical industries with spinoff potential. For example, the German aerospace and electronics industries have been described by German government officials as critical sectors that must be maintained at almost all cost. Determination of just

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[31] See "Export-Import Bank Changes Urged," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, May 19, 1980, p. 23.

[32] *New York Times*, June 24, 1980, p. A7.

[33] See "U.S. and Allies Fail to Agree on Credit Terms," *Wall Street Journal*, December 22, 1980, p. 22.

[34] See "Canada to Begin Export Financing at Special Rates," ibid., January 6, 1981, p. 26.

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what is meant by the maintenance of an industrial capability is important here — an across-the-board ability to compete and supply a full product line or rather a willingness to specialize on particular components. It may well be that international cooperation is easier to attain at the component level than at the final product stage where national identity is most obvious. One may point to the substantial success of British auto components — carburetors and other parts — despite the general lack of success of exports of British automobiles. This collaboration, however, may be easier to attain for smaller states, where considerations of pride and grandeur are less demanding.

This section ends appropriately with a familiar European admonition; namely, that the U.S. as leader of the NATO alliance must demonstrate the political will to keep its industrial interests in check — in the broader interest of the alliance. It is further argued that the protectionists must be controlled and the Buy American Act and subsidiary legislation, like the Specialty Metals Act, repealed or substantially amended. More than the elimination of protectionist legislation is involved, however, in moving toward a "two-way street" in armaments procurement. U.S. Defense Department acquisition procedures are so complex that potential foreign suppliers require assistance in making their way through the maze of regulations. Imaginative ways to provide such assistance might be established as a goal worthy of consideration. Some guidance here might be taken from the example of the Northrop attempt to meet its obligation under the offset requirements of its F-5 sale to Switzerland. There are perfectly competent Swiss industrial firms that have not had much experience in selling to the U.S., in particular to the DOD. In effect, Northrop has undertaken to "take them under its wing," until they learn their way around the U.S. defense market.

(6) *U.S. Responses to European Complaints*

The chorus of complaints from U.S. allies has been heard and acknowledged in the U.S. Perhaps more important than any specific policy adopted to improve the situation has been the change in attitudes. Thus, highly placed Pentagon officials can dare to be outspoken at public meetings concerning the counterproductive effect of the Buy American Act.[35] With respect to specific policy measures, the series of reciprocal defense procurement memoranda of understanding, referred to above, must be singled out as potentially sig-

[35] Bowman statement, p. 193. (See fn. 24, above.)

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nificant. Their purpose, that is, waiver of Buy National and other restrictive nontariff barriers to military trade, could lead to a seeking out of outstanding cost-effective weapon systems, regardless of national origin.[36] Such an ideal arrangement probably is still out of reach, however. Defense officials have limited authority to reach such agreements and the "specialty metals" and other legal restrictions can be waived only with congressional authorization. Clearly, pressures against such liberalization will grow in times of economic recession.

Three amendments to the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 will also prove helpful. These provisions —

(1) "authorize the President to provide without charge to NATO allies quality assurance, inspection and contract audit defense services on contracts for defense articles or services if the ally also agrees to provide such services on a reciprocal basis.

(2) "facilitate NATO cross-servicing or lead-nation procurement by relaxing the requirement for Congressional review, and

(3) "facilitate cooperative projects involving pooled resources by permitting the waiving or reducing of certain surcharges on sales such as nonrecurring research and development and production cost recoupment charges, asset use charges, tooling rental charges and administrative cost charges for sales."[37]

With the goals of reduced duplication in R&D, efficient production lines, and getting the best technology into the field as soon as possible, the U.S. has pressed for two additional approaches to collaboration: dual production and the Family of Weapons program.[38] Under the first of these, alliance partners who desire to produce a weapon system developed elsewhere are authorized to do so and are provided technical data packages. The developing country receives a fee, but loses the potential for that export sale. An early example of dual production is the AIM 9L, the latest generation of the heat-seeking, air-to-air Sidewinder missile being produced for U.S. forces. Data packages for this system have been provided to the Federal Republic of Germany, which has formed a European industrial consortium to produce the missile for European forces. The Germans also abandoned their competitive development program when they accepted the U.S. design.[39]

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[36] Ibid., pp. 193-194.

[37] See "U.S. Spurring NATO Standardization," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, July 14, 1980, pp. 93-101, esp. p. 93.

[38] This section borrows heavily from the remarks of Dr. William J. Perry, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, before the Third International Symposium on NATO Standardization and Interoperability, pp. 3-8. (See fn. 24, above.)

[39] It should be noted, however, that the West German side is not completely

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The Family of Weapons program has also been strongly advocated by Defense Undersecretary Perry. It would have as its objective more efficient use of alliance R&D expenditures presumably attained through specialization on particular weapon systems by different members of NATO. Thus, the U.S., for example, is developing the next generation of advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, designated AMRAAM, while the Europeans will concentrate on the advanced short-range air-to-air missile, or ASRAAM.[40] A similar agreement has been reached which calls for the U.S. to develop the man-portable, indirect-fire system for antitank guided missiles, while the Europeans will concentrate on the vehicle-mounted system.[41]

Several innovations in the weapons planning process have also been adopted in the alliance to advance standardization and interoperability; among these, the periodic armaments planning system (PAPS) and a NATO Armaments Planning Review (NAPR).[42] Under the PAPS, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) considers mission-need documents submitted by NATO or national military authorities. Thereafter, detailed military requirement statements covering technology and cost considerations are prepared, followed by the establishment of ad hoc steering groups, composed of members from the countries cooperating on the specific programs.

The NATO Armaments Planning Review (NAPR) is designed to review national equipment plans and to identify potential areas for standardization and interoperability. These innovations in the planning process, it is hoped, will lead to a rationalization in the weapons acquisition process within the alliance, with a greater awareness of alliance needs.

While the foregoing developments have a clear bearing upon the process of NATO RS&I, their possible effectiveness as responses to the protectionist charges leveled against the U.S. is problematic. Much hinges on European perspectives of such U.S. initiatives. If the U.S. actively seeks the rights to produce European

satisfied with this arrangement. German defense officials who participated in the negotiations point out that, after they abandoned development work on their Viper missile, it took several years before the U.S. Navy released the technology for the AIM-9L to them, and even then, all of it was not transferred.

[40] A specific memorandum of understanding was recently signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany calling for just such a division of labor. France has agreed to become a full participant in the European consortium, if its needs can be met by these missiles. See "NATO Weapons Family Begun," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 25, 1980, pp. 14-16.

[41] "U.S. Spurring NATO Standardization," ibid., p. 97.

[42] Ibid., p. 101.

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weapon systems under dual production arrangement beyond the present programs (Roland and MAG-58), shows a willingness on occasion to buy European weapon systems outright, and further commits itself to accepting European developed weapon families, much of the present skepticism may dissipate.

Conclusions

All agree that better use of alliance resources is a reasonable goal for rationalization in NATO. On the other hand, there is widespread fear that, if rationalization results in a single source for a particular weapon system, particularly on the other side of the Atlantic, this would be politically intolerable. Also, rationalization that forces the abandonment of particular markets is viewed as a threat; any loss of jobs or research and design capabilities resulting from rationalization is seen as unacceptable in Europe.

Three highly placed Ministry of Defense officials from the United Kingdom, West Germany and France have reiterated these points in unmistakable language. The statement of Victor Macklen, deputy chief scientific adviser of the British MOD, concisely summarizes these views:

> While it is certainly true that if all the allied forces used American-designed equipment, the effectiveness of the allied forces might well be higher in purely military terms, the economic balancing factor in that equation is just missing and the strength of the alliance might be severely damaged if we try to go through such a process in the absence of an absolute threat of immediate war. . . . I don't think an equitable arrangement in the sort of transatlantic sense could ever be based on us in Europe doing some research and development to find the major production occurring on this [the American] side of the Atlantic.[43]

These views are remarkably close to Scherer's warning in a completely different context:

> Yet even when joint profits are increased through rationalization and profit-pooling is feasible, it is by no means certain that high cost firms will participate willingly. Agreeing to reduce one's output substantially, or to shutdown completely, has been likened to disarming. [William Fellner, *Competition Among the Few* (New York: Knopf, 1949), pp. 218-220, 232.] One never knows whether firms producing most of the output under rationalization will take advantage of their position in the future, demanding a higher share of total profits. Maintaining production capabilities intact is a good bargaining counter against such demands. As a result, few

[43] Statement of Victor Macklen in *Meeting Report: Third International Symposium on NATO Standardization and Interoperability*, pp. 11, 13. (See fn. 29, above.) See, also, statements of Dr. Heinz B. Glaser and General Marc A. Cauchie, ibid., pp. 17, 22, 25.

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cartels have gone very far toward the rationalization of production, even when profit-pooling is accepted.[44]

It remains to be seen if rationalization among member states of the North Atlantic alliance will ultimately be viewed as a sufficiently attractive goal to be worth the associated costs and risks of interdependence. A useful clue is to be found in Robert Dean's definition of collaboration as "the pursuit of national ends through international means."[45] Thus, actions which promise broad gains for NATO, but which impose substantial national costs and limited national gains are unlikely to be undertaken.

Clearly, progress is being made toward a greater degree of standardization and interoperability in NATO. However, the issue is a delicate one involving matters of the highest national priority. It would be tragic if further progress toward such a crucial alliance goal were to be frustrated by a heavyhanded approach by the United States or an unrealistic view of just how far the goal of RS&I can be advanced in an alliance of truly sovereign states.

[44] F. M. Scherer, *Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980), p. 175.

[45] Robert W. Dean, "The Future of Collaborative Weapons Acquisition," in Leebaert, ed., *European Security*, p. 80.

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THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT REVISITED

by Seymour Maxwell Finger and Nina Hanan

The United Nations Secretariat has drawn increasingly sharp criticism of late as a result of acknowledged problems in its management, recruitment, and promotion practices. Several studies have criticized existing personnel policies at the Secretariat.[1] These studies emphasized the need to raise the quality of the personnel through improved recruitment, training, and career-development practices. They did not, however, focus on the chief cause of those problems: namely, the political pressure and interference exerted by member governments at all levels of the Secretariat in the areas of recruitment and promotion.

A 1975 study by S. M. Finger and J. Mugno[2] stressed this major issue. The authors made ten recommendations to improve the recruitment and promotion process in the Secretariat and to minimize political pressure from the member states. This inquiry is a follow-up on that study. We had hoped to find concrete changes made and new policies enacted since 1975 but have found instead that the situation has not improved. In fact, it has deteriorated further.

Our interviews were done over a period of eighteen months (February 1979–July 1980). We conducted separate inter-

[1] Robert Rhodes James, *Staffing the U.N. Secretariat* (Sussex, England: Institute for the Study of International Organizations, 1970); *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the U.N.*, A/8454, October 5, 1971 (New York: UN, 1971), usually referred to as the Bertrand Report; Richard Gardner, ed., *The Future of the U.N. Secretariat* (New York: UNITAR, 1977).

[2] "The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat," ORBIS, Spring 1975, pp. 117-145. Two recent books have included, as part of their comprehensive approaches to the study of the UN Secretariat, some reference to political influence: Theodor Meron, *The United Nations Secretariat: The Rules and the Practice* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977); Norman A. Graham and Robert S. Jordan, *The International Civil Service: Changing Roles and Concepts* (New York, Pergamon, 1980).

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views with 60 UN employees. In order to maximize the range of representation, we met with people from various departments and at different job-classification levels. The 60 people interviewed had also been employed for different lengths of time. Half of the interviewees belonged to the lower echelon; the rest had high-ranking posts up to and including undersecretaries and assistant secretaries-general (ASGs).[3] Of the 60 people we interviewed, 30 came under the category of General Service (secretaries, office workers, cleaning people, and the like). Of the remaining 30 employees, 15 were in the Professional category and 15 were at the Director and ASG level.

Our interviews and observations show that the situation at the United Nations has deteriorated since 1975. According to lower-level staff in the Secretariat, the United Nations has become a corporatelike structure where many employees feel alienated from one another, from their own work, and from the institution's *raison d'être*. Also, the United Nations has become more and more a political arena in which high-ranking officials engage in political give-and-take and where "interest groups" lobby for their country's interests. Consequently, a feeling of helplessness is widespread. In most cases, the only effective incentives left to induce employee responsibility and hard work, say high-level officials, are such negative reinforcement as threats to the security of their jobs. Thus, the fundamental concept of the ideal civil servant is being eroded; dedicated, motivated, hard-working officials are clearly in the minority. Political appointees are frequently loyal not to the United Nations but to their respective governments, to which they look for reward or punishment. Many of these political appointees reach high positions of power but are incapable of using that power constructively for UN purposes. Often the result is disorganization, inefficiency, waste of resources, personal disputes, and useless transfers of incompetent employees from one department to another.

This deterioration is reflected in various ways. The desire of employees to carry out their work effectively has waned. The absence of enthusiasm even to fulfill basic responsibilities is widespread. The rift between management and workers is widening to such an extent that many employees in the General Service category feel like second-class citizens. The relationship between the Professional category and the General Service category has acquired the

[3] The interviewees were presented with a questionnaire including more than forty questions and divided into four sections: (1) Recruitment Policies and Practices; (2) Attractiveness of UN Employment; (3) Major Problems and Possible Solutions in the Recruitment Process; (4) Changes Since 1975. We met with some of the interviewees more than once; all were guaranteed anonymity.

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characteristics of a class or closed system in which movement from the lower (General Service) to the upper (Professional) level is rare.[4] A climate of indifference and apathetic conformity pervades much of the Secretariat, both among lower- and upper-echelon personnel. Many interviewees complained that the organization is becoming more and more bureaucratic and Kafkaesque.

Although the views of *some* high-ranking officials diverge from those of the rest of the interviewees, the preponderant majority believes the United Nations is losing the unique character it is supposed to have. Such responses are a symptom of a long process whereby the values and ideals upon which the United Nations was created have been undermined. Forthright criticism of the functioning of the Secretariat, however, should not be interpreted as antagonism to the United Nations. Even interviewees who were most critical of current Secretariat operations expressed a strong belief in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Lowell Flanders, the persident of the Staff Union and an ardent critic of the leadership and practices at the Secretariat, affirmed at a meeting of the UN Community Forum that "the United Nations . . . a body representing international authority and order, is the only alternative if the human species is to survive into the next century."[5]

We are in agreement with that statement. Our purpose is not to question or doubt the values and benefits that the United Nations can and does provide. For this very reason, we are concerned with those personnel practices at the United Nations that obscure and weaken UN goals. Mainly, we are intent upon addressing the grave problems created by growing political influence and interference from member governments in UN personnel and administrative decisions, and by the weak resistance of the Secretariat to such pressures. These pressures have led inevitably to a significant decline in the independence of the international civil service.[6] An increasing number of states seem less willing to observe in practice the obligations stated in the Charter. The willingness of states to adhere to the concept of an independent civil service appears to have succumbed to a vicious circle: no state is ready to be the first

[4] Statement by the chairman of the Staff Committee to the members of the Fifth Committee, A/6.5/33/CRP.7, December 7, 1978, p. 4.

[5] *Insight*, February 14, 1979.

[6] Lowell Flanders, *An Independent International Civil Service*, May 30, 1979. A very high-ranking official in the international civil service made this point during our interview, describing the UN Secretariat as a ball kicked by all governments.

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to honor its obligations for fear of being alone in this move and, consequently, losing its stake and power in the Secretariat.[7]

The Effect of Political Pressure

Two concepts of the role of the UN Secretariat are in conflict here. The first perceives the United Nations as a mirror image of what goes on in the international arena. Accordingly, it is only to be expected that many key officials and other personnel will have received their jobs through the influence of member governments to which they owe loyalty. On the other hand, internationalists have envisioned the Secretariat as an independent international body, with a permanent staff recruited from different countries and all walks of life. Their allegiance should be to the organization and so transcend national interests, as stated in Articles 100 and 101 of the UN Charter.[8]

Advocates of the internationalist approach hoped that political pressure would be minimized and that parochial interests would be replaced by a Rousseauian General Will.[9] Unfortunately, the former concept seems to dominate the United Nations' operations. Too many officials feel dependent upon their governments and see themselves merely as delegates of their respective countries.[10] Moreover, people in high-level positions often choose to help friends, relatives, and those who support their special interests instead of promoting competent people who are dedicated to the ideals and goals of the United Nations.[11]

Political pressure has been evident in the recruiting and promotion process. Some countries seem to regard specific posts as

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[7] Finger and Mugno, "Politics of Staffing," suggested that states examine individually the costs and benefits of their use of political pressure. They further state that the fact that some members do not restrain themselves should not serve as a pretext for others to join in the corruption. Unfortunately, it has.

[8] C. Wilfred Jenks, writing about the experience of the League, noted that "the need of world organizations cannot be adequately met by a miscellaneous collective of officials, temporarily associated together, but viewing their primary loyalties to the countries where they expect to continue their careers." Thus, "political appointments made at the instance of governments of particular countries always have a disintegrating influence upon a permanent international service and should be avoided at all costs." (Quoted by Flanders, *An Independent International Civil Service*, p. 3. See, also, Graham and Jordan, *Changing Roles and Concepts*, pass.)

[9] In the *Social Contract*, Rousseau distinguished between the Will of All (i.e., the sum of individual wills) and the General Will, the true will that reflects the interests of the community as a whole, transcending particular interests.

[10] Lowell Flanders, *How to Avoid Strikes at the U.N. (or Who's Afraid of Theodore Kheel)*, p. 5.

[11] Wahid Tarzi, "Response to Mr. Flanders' Letter to the Fifth Committee," *Secretariat News*, January 16, 1979.

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their exclusive preserve.[12] They insist on the replacement of departing employees with their own appointees.

The Soviet Union has, from the outset, been the most determined practitioner of the thesis that Secretariat officials ought to reflect the views of their governments and should be appointed or retained at the pleasure of those governments. The USSR has never embraced the concept of an international civil service. Moscow regards the UN Secretariat as an *intergovernmental* body that provides conference services when nations meet for discussion and, consequently, regards the use of political pressure to affect personnel decisions as legitimate. The Soviet Union normally provides only fixed-term appointees, serving for three to five years, rather than career personnel. (Many East European countries have followed this practice.) Remarkably, the USSR has controlled the post of undersecretary-general for political and security affairs since 1945, having designated each successor.

As new African and Asian nations joined the UN and became a majority, many saw high-level posts in the Secretariat as a key to influence. Consequently, they have pressed for more representation, particularly at the higher levels, both from within the General Assembly and through contacts with the secretary-general. Because many of these countries cannot spare their best people for permanent contracts, the tendency (with a few notable exceptions) is either to send qualified people for fixed-term contracts only or to propose candidates that the national government does not need or want.

Adherence by the Soviet Union and other countries to the principle of fixed-term appointments presents special recruitment problems. Referring to figures in the secretary-general's report to the General Assembly on personnel questions, the assistant secretary-general for personnel noted that the evident underrepresentation of certain countries did not reflect a failure to recruit personnel from those nations during the reporting year. Rather, a large turnover of staff from these countries had negated the progress made in recruitment.[13]

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[12] The Twenty-ninth Session of the General Assembly (December 11, 1974) attempted to fight this practice: "The principle of equitable geographical distribution should be applied to the Secretariat as a whole; and to this end, no post, individual department, division or unit in the Secretariat should be considered as the exclusive preserve of any individual Member State or any region." See J. Vambery, *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1974* (New York: Oceana, 1976), p. 355.

[13] Statement to the General Assembly's Fifth Committee by James Jonah, assistant secretary general for personnel affairs, December 8, 1980.

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Initially, the Western countries were the principal advocates of a career international civil service, appointment and promotion being based on merit. Many of their nationals have made the UN a lifetime career and have been loyal to the UN rather than to any national government. As these people reach retirement age, they have become an endangered species. In the face of political maneuvering for top jobs by the Soviet Union and the newer nations, even the United States has taken to zeroing in on key posts for its nationals. According to the assistant secretary for personnel, however, the former U.S. Permanent Representative Donald McHenry offered in 1980 to forgo political pressure on personnel appointments if the secretary-general could offer reasonable assurance that pressure from other delegations would be resisted.

The Office of Personnel is generally held in low esteem at the United Nations, and some of the officials running it are known to have contributed to its deterioration. Particular responsibility for "playing politics" with Secretariat appointments and promotions has been attributed to the former Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Mohammed Habib Gherab. Concern over the erosive effect of excessive political pressure was expressed in the following statement of the staff Committee, representing staff only, to the Joint Advisory Committee, representing management and staff:

> We believe that the decline in the independence of the international civil service and the increasing reliance on political pressure and influence must be checked if we are to restore a healthy working environment to the Organization. The appointment and promotion system within the United Nations has become so tainted with suspicions of political and personal favoritism that special measures must be taken to restore the confidence of the staff in the integrity and objectivity of the system.[14]

Secretariat officials now openly acknowledge the influence of political pressure, the importance of which they mentioned privately when interviewed for the 1975 study. Wahid Tarzi, a high-ranking Personnel Department official concerned with recruitment, answered stiff criticism by citing "political pressures and political influence in the making of personnel and administrative decisions" and the actions of important Secretariat officials "who feel they should help friends and relatives and those who support special interests." Tarzi noted further that "it is the Departments (not Personnel) that propose recruitment and that have the final say in the choice of a candidate. Replying to complaints of low morale among

[14] *Secretariat News*, January 31, 1979.

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General Service staff, Tarzi wrote: "The apathy and demoralization referred to so often apply to *all staff*."[15]

The new Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Services James Jonah, appointed in 1979, is a career Secretariat member who enjoys a reputation for courage, integrity, and high standards. Jonah stunned many assembled staff members by stating that he knew of no government that was not guilty of interfering in the workings of the Secretariat, usually by putting pressure on the secretary-general to hire or promote one applicant or another. He charged that most governments now seem to regard the Secretariat as a dumping ground for officials unwanted at home, and he complained that many staff members having grievances or private ambitions had made it a practice to turn to their government's delegation for help. Jonah said he regarded his own appointment as recognition by the secretary-general that there was an urgent need for reform.[16]

Another linkage, though different in purpose, between posts and nationality has become a controversial issue. Some states are overrepresented while others are either underrepresented or unrepresented in the United Nations Secretariat in relation to the "desirable range" established by the General Assembly. To remedy that situation, the Assembly has directed that, where there is a vacancy, preference be given to underrepresented or unrepresented states, so long as the candidate's competence fits the requirements of the job.

Indeed, as part of its special recruitment efforts, the General Assembly has declared that geographic distribution of its staff is to be the overriding factor in hiring decisions. It requested that the secretary-general establish a target whereby 90 per cent of all job vacancies arising in the Professional category during 1979-1980 would be filled with appointees from unrepresented and underrepresented states.[17] The secretary-general accepted this decision, but he asserted that the only realistic way to achieve progress is to

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[15] Tarzi, "Response." (Emphasis added.) See, also, Staff Council report to the secretary-general, UNGA doc. A/C.5/35/17, 1980.

[16] See Kathleen Teltsch, "Personnel Chief Scores Patronage in Staffing of U.N.," *International Herald Tribune*, July 23, 1979.

[17] In Resolution 33/143 of December 20, 1978, the General Assembly reaffirmed that the chief considerations in employment of staff are high standards of efficiency and competence together with the principle of equitable geographic distribution. At the same time, the assembly expressed its concern about the urgent need to improve representation of the developing countries at senior policymaking levels and reiterated its objective of achieving adequate representation of unrepresented and underrepresented states. Although there is no inherent contradiction, political pressure based on the criterion of equitable geographic distribution has frequently been used in support of less-qualified candidates.

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fill vacancies created by new posts or by attrition of staff.[18] Many observers, though supportive of the principle of geographic balance, have pointed out that competence, integrity, and dedication have often been sacrificed in order to meet the desirable mix.[19]

Some of the negative effects of political pressure are easily observable. Frequently, the appointees nominated by governments are not qualified for the particular tasks which they are assigned at the UN, and since their motivation to perform well is nonexistent, the subordinate staff must carry the burden.[20] Even when such appointees are genuinely willing to master their jobs, they often do so at about the same time that their terms of service are ending. Their replacements have to learn the job anew, and so the coherence, efficiency, and orientation of their offices and of the organization as a whole are undermined.

Obviously, this situation has devastating effects on the staff, many of whom have become compliant, demoralized, and even desperate. In general, the interviewees from the lower echelons acknowledged that they entertain little hope of progressing in the organization, especially when they know that criteria of merit are subordinate to political clout. When so many high-level officials set a poor example for the other employees, and when employees lack the motivation to excel, it can hardly be expected that high standards of performance will be established.

The role of the secretary-general is particularly important and sensitive. He must not allow himself to be too politically vulnerable. The Finger and Mugno study recommended that "the Secretary-General should avoid involvement in appointments below the Office Director (D-2) level, except for his personal staff. It should be understood that he will not even discuss such appointments with Permanent Representatives or their subordinates. Such a policy would better allocate his time and energy for the crucial tasks of executive leadership, policy direction and crisis management."[21]

For a number of years, the present secretary-general allowed himself to be drawn into the personnel selection process, even at the lower levels, by government representatives. While such involvement by the secretary-general may be understandably tempting as a means of winning friends, it encourages governments to use

[18] Secretary-General's report, A/33/176.
[19] Tarzi, "Response," p. 3. See, also, Graham and Jordan, *Changing Roles and Concepts*, pp. 28-79.
[20] Flanders, *An Independent International Civil Service*, p. 4.
[21] "Politics of Staffing," p. 144.

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political pressure in even more cases, sets a bad example for other Secretariat officials, and diverts the secretary-general's energies from more important tasks of leadership and conciliation that are his special province. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim has now recognized the gravity of the problem, warning that

> the international civil service is at present at a critical juncture. Underlying this situation is the fact that an increasing number of Member States seem less willing to observe, in practice, the obligations they assumed under the Charter with respect to the independent nature of the Secretariat. This trend is self-sustaining in the sense that, if one State or group of States does not honour these obligations, other States follow suit for fear of losing their stake in the Secretariat. These developments put at risk the noble and essential experiment outlined in the Charter of building a truly international Secretariat working together with a common purpose for the United Nations.[22]

Waldheim's acknowledgment of the problem is a good sign, as is his appointment of James Jonah, a civil servant of unquestioned integrity and courage, as assistant secretary-general for personnel. In light of the fact that an election (or re-election) of the secretary-general will occur in late 1981, it remains to be seen whether he will back Jonah fully against political opponents. Another formidable obstacle is the well-established precedent for department heads, often playing politics, to bypass the Personnel Department in recruiting appointees. Jonah fought this practice during his first year in office and acknowledges that he has made little progress but vows to continue the struggle.[23] Finally, there is serious doubt that states will show more willingness than they have shown in the past to honor their Charter obligations and cooperate in reversing the political corruption of the Secretariat.

In the fall of 1980, newspapers reported another type of corruption. Officials were accused of taking payoffs from individuals seeking jobs. These allegations are currently under investigation by a Secretariat committee. As a result of a preliminary investigative report, Mr. Gherab left the employment of the Secretariat.

Staff Grievances

Morale is particularly low among the General Service staff. There is strong resentment of the unequal treatment, salaries, promotion practices, and prestige that stem from the formidable hier-

[22] Kurt Waldheim, *Building the Future World Order* (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 209-215.

[23] Interview with S. M. Finger, December 12, 1980.

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archial gap between the General Service staff and the Professional staff.

One suggestion offered to remedy the situation is a unified job-category system. Its advocates believe that such an approach would help create an environment conducive to staff creativity and participation, perhaps even a milieu where human values are protected and nurtured. The hope is that it would establish a true community, and engender a sense of belonging and commitment on the part of previously neglected staff members.[24] Prospects for the adoption of such an approach are not promising, however.

For a long time Secretariat personnel, despite their grievances, remained passive. At the beginning of 1979, however, they began to strike. From the remarks of Theodore W. Kheel, a lawyer representing the United Nations Staff Union, the depth of their feeling is apparent: "The United Nations' managers are paternalistic, even authoritative. . . . United Nations administrators function as a modern day court of King Henry VIII."[25] From the general discontent apparent during the strikes and from the dissatisfaction expressed by our interviewees, we can conclude that high-ranking officials have tended to reinforce conformity, complacency, acquiescence, and indifference. As early as 1947, when employees asked that their grievances be addressed, Trygve Lie, the first UN secretary-general, responded: "Everything you said will be used against this Organization by the enemies of the United Nations."[26] Consequently, a tradition has been perpetuated: one of fear to criticize the organization and reluctance to innovate.

Effective operation of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, implies true consultation and cooperation between management and subordinates, not only on substantive issues and problems facing the organization but also on issues concerning individual career development. If morale and performance are to be improved, credible channels for criticism of superiors must be institutionalized and protected. Under present conditions, most employees feel powerless. Channels must be established — and used — so that suggestions, complaints, ideas, and criticism are heard and ac-

[24] The Staff Union has repeatedly suggested such a system. See the United Nations Study Group II's report *Suggestions for Personnel Reform*, May 22, 1979, which suggests that consolidation of all categories into a single scale of civil service may alleviate the frustrations caused by the rigidities of the present system until the stigma in belonging to one category or another is removed. See, also, Graham and Jordan, *Changing Roles and Concepts*, pp. 110-114, for a considered and balanced appraisal of the proposal.

[25] Quoted in Morton Mintz, "Labor Unrest at the U.N.," *Washington Post*, February 18, 1979.

[26] Ibid.

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knowledged. In the past, management-staff communication has been, at best, restricted to explanations to the staff of management decisions already taken. Such an attitude can only antagonize the dissatisfied. Instead, there must be meaningful consultation among employees at all levels, allowing for discussion and dissent before policies are adopted. Staff members must be partners in this process, particularly when the decisions will directly affect their lives and their duties. Furthermore, responsibilities should be distributed at all levels so that decisions are not made exclusively by the elite. Employees must instead share power, initiative, and control over their work and must be able to observe how their own contributions connect with those of their colleagues and fit into the operation of the organization.

As early as December 9, 1971, U Thant stated in a formal letter that unit representatives must be made an integral part of the decisionmaking process at the local organizational level. Secretary-General Waldheim reaffirmed this principle in a bulletin he issued in 1978 to all department heads, officers, and units. Obviously, positive statements by managers are plentiful, but until the strike by the General Staff in 1979, nothing was accomplished.

After the strike, the principle of joint consultation was established for six agencies in Geneva, and this raised the hopes of all United Nations employees. Also, the right to strike was recognized. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ingrained habits of senior officials will change. More than 70 per cent of our interviewees were dissatisfied with the slow pace of personnel reform and with the fact that pronouncements calling for change were not followed by action. In general, they attributed this failure to a lack of determined and imaginative leadership. On the other hand, top Secretariat officials tended to blame the member governments (and with good reason).

Fundamental changes are needed, particularly in recruitment and promotion. The approach to recruitment programs has been a passive one. Instead of waiting for member states to forward their candidates, it is imperative to seek out skillful, dedicated, and resourceful people from different backgrounds and with varied experience.

The Staff Union recommended to the General Assembly's Fifth Committee (on administration and budget) a recruitment program using modern techniques for identifying, attracting, screening, and hiring candidates from all possible sources. This broad search

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can be furthered through advertising and contacts with universities and professional societies, through vacancy announcements in the bulletins of all United Nations departments, through the use of computerized rosters, and through the preparation of effective competitive examinations.

A recent UNITAR study has made similar proposals, as part of a human-resources planning system. After reviewing the recruitment practices of the various organizations in the UN system, the authors of the study conclude that "none of the organizations possesses a genuine recruitment policy. The work is carried out on [an] ad hoc basis . . . without any methodology or guiding principles. It is therefore obvious that great progress could be made if more rational methods were employed." They then propose an excellent program for modernizing and improving recruitment practices.[27] What is most needed is the political will of governments and the secretary-general to proceed with such improvements. While costs might increase initially, the improvement in Secretariat efficiency and morale would bring about substantial savings in the long run.

[27] Graham and Jordan, *Changing Roles and Concepts*, pp. 28-79.

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ISSUES IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS: CONFERENCE REPORT

prepared by Nils H. Wessell

A group of leading Soviet and American scholars held a conference during December 10-13, 1980, focusing on American-Soviet security issues. Sponsored jointly by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Institute of the USA and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences, the meeting was the first in an annual series designed to enhance the exchange of views on important international issues. The second conference is to be held in 1981 in the Soviet Union.

Ambassador William R. Kintner, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, chaired the conference. The Soviet co-chairman was Academician Georgii A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, since elevated to full membership in the Communist Party Central Committee. The American delegation included Paul Nitze, former U.S. representative to the SALT talks; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former counselor, U.S. Department of State; Robert Scalapino, Richard Burt, Richard B. Foster, Gaston Sigur, Richard Sneider, Richard Stilwell, W. Scott Thompson, and Nils H. Wessell. From FPRI, and also part of the American delegation, were Harvey Sicherman, Roy U. T. Kim, and Richard E. Bissell. The Soviet delegation included Vitalii Zhurkin, first deputy director of the USA Institute; Genrikh Trofimenko, head of the USA Institute's Foreign Policy Department; Alexander Chicherov, from the Oriental Institute; Alexei Arbatov, from the Institute for World Economy and International Relations; and V. I. Trifonov, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Other representatives from the Institute of the USA included Boris N. Zanegin, E. G. Mironenkov, Valentin Berezhkov, and Sergei M. Rogov.

Observers were Adam Garfinkle, George Ginsburgs, Bradley Hahn, Allen H. Kassof, James Kuhlman, Ivo John Lederer, Chong-Sik Lee, Herbert Levine, Daniel Matuszewski, Norman Palmer, Alvin Rubinstein, Lyushun Shen, John Stremlau, Shirin Tahir-Kheli, and Yasumasa Tanaka.

The conference agenda was divided into two areas: (1) SALT and Soviet-American relations and (2) the problems of international security in Asia. Conferees also addressed general problems

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of instability in the Third World and means of enhancing security in Europe.

SALT, Regional Conflict, and Soviet-American Relations

The discussion was initially characterized by pessimism, a tone established in the opening remarks by Soviet delegates. A member of the Soviet delegation argued that "both nations are very security-minded, raising problems for a clear definition of *mutual* security." The only avenue that offers hope for resolving strategic issues was said to be the SALT process, but the Soviet Union, he insisted, would not contemplate revising the SALT II draft. The Soviet delegate placed blame for the hiatus in SALT negotiations on inconsistency in U.S. policy; if this were to be a chronic problem, the entire negotiating process would have to be scrapped.

The opening statement for the American side emphasized those elements in SALT II that would have to be revised to make the treaty acceptable: (a) the treaty would need to run longer than 1985 to provide stability; (b) the issue of superior Soviet capabilities codified in the treaty would have to be addressed; and (c) to ensure stability, stricter limits would be required on certain capabilities in order to rule out the danger of a pre-emptive first strike. It was argued that, in the future, compensation for forward-based systems should go to the American rather than the Soviet side.

The Soviet representatives acknowledged that duration was a serious problem, particularly with respect to the protocol, due to expire at the end of 1981. Both sides would have to be "as restrained as possible during the period of regrouping" prior to the formal opening of any SALT III talks.

In the Soviet view, it would be foolish for the Reagan administration to divide SALT II into "retrievable" and "irretrievable" elements. Such a selective approach would destroy the balance of what were said to be offsetting asymmetries.

An American participant maintained that SALT II need not necessarily be revised. The essential point was not whether we had an agreed treaty; instead, the issue was the maintenance of the status quo or its improvement as a basis for negotiating a SALT III accord. Further Soviet testing of the SS-18 and other new programs made the start of SALT III more difficult. The speaker urged a long-term moratorium on testing the Soviet Union's heavy, MIRVed ICBM and cautioned that, once breached, the qualitative limits on missile modernization in the SALT II treaty could not be retrieved. In addition,

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it was remarked that strategic doctrine and strategic defense play an underestimated part in the SALT negotiations. That neither was comparable in the two countries would continue to impede the process of arriving at an agreement.

Another American participant warned against relying on estimates of Soviet intentions in negotiating the terms of strategic arms limitation accords. It is more prudent, he said, to measure capabilities, thus bypassing conflicting estimates of intentions. A third American noted the difficulty of fixing weapons balances when the geopolitical map was sufficiently fluid to make the two countries' security demands change continuously. The current SALT negotiations were said to be at a dead end, the only solution being a more selective approach, involving the negotiation of particular, rather than general, issues. A lowering of expectations was called for in the interest of achieving agreements more modest in scope than those of SALT I and II.

In this view, the SALT negotiating process could not be relied on to overcome the asymmetries threatening strategic stability as a result of unilateral strategic arms deployment. The Soviet threat to the vulnerability of U.S. land-based forces would require, in response, the kinds of U.S. strategic programs that the Soviet Union would object to. Beyond the inability of SALT to compensate for weaknesses in the U.S. strategic posture, the negotiating process had resulted in the delay and distortion of needed strategic programs. Because the SALT process had not succeeded in devising methods of verification with respect to land-mobile missiles, the United States had allowed itself to be driven in the direction of a land-basing system for the MX ICBM that was a "monster" and that might never be deployed.

The Soviet side ended the morning session by declaring that it was up to the American side to formulate SALT initiatives. The United States should keep in mind, however, that the Soviet Union could more easily lower expectations on its side and could, indeed, live without SALT. A Soviet participant argued that since Moscow had concluded SALT I under strained circumstances resulting from the Vietnam War, there was no reason why the United States could not go ahead with SALT II in the aftermath of Afghanistan. SALT was said to have enormous symbolic significance.

At the close of the conference, participants returned to strategic arms limitation. Foreshadowing General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's indication to the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in Febru-

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ary that it might be possible to renegotiate the terms of the SALT II accord, a Soviet representative suggested that the SALT process should continue with the two sides saving as many elements as possible from the SALT II treaty. Despite differences in approach, both countries considered many provisions of the treaty to be important to national security. These elements could provide the basis for a mutual policy of de facto recognition of SALT II, the Soviet spokesman argued, while the two sides begin discussion of larger issues and widen the scope of negotiations to include some issues that were passed over in the past two years.

Turning to the relationship between SALT and issues of regional conflict, an American participant declared that it was an illusion to believe that the negotiating process at the strategic level could remedy problems of Soviet-American rivalry caused by instability at the local level. For one thing, the instabilities and inequalities that have gradually developed at the strategic level exacerbate the instabilities endemic in various regions.

Moreover, another American observed, instability in these regions can have more immediate impact on the Soviet-American balance of power than changes at the strategic level, where long lead times will prevent rectification of the growing strategic imbalance for several years. The newly elected U.S. administration may well act more decisively in the so-called Third World than its predecessor. It may even consider lending aid to the anticommunist liberation struggle in such countries as Afghanistan and Angola. In the past, nonalignment meant that large parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were a kind of Western bull pasture where the Soviet Union could roam, striking at targets of opportunity as they arose. Now that so many of these self-proclaimed nonaligned countries have become "neutral, leaning towards the Soviet Union," the United States has an interest in challenging Moscow's claim to leadership of "national liberation" struggles.

An American participant, pointing out that the very term "Third World" was conceptually misleading because of the diversity it camouflages, argued that the region from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian subcontinent called for special treatment analytically and politically. The enormous importance of its resources to the world economy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and internal instabilities make it a unique element in the global balance. Moscow's sensitivity to instability on its borders and to the opportunities for enhancing its influence beyond them creates a potentally dangerous

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intersection of interests between the Soviet Union and other countries. Other areas, such as East Asia, southern Africa, and Southeast Asia, have their own important characteristics, of course. For the United States, the Caribbean is of special concern, particularly since Cuba is, in military terms, a Soviet protectorate.

The Soviet side concurred with the view that the growing diversity of nonaligned countries had rendered the term "Third World" inappropriate. A Soviet participant suggested that conflicts in various regions might be moderated by Soviet-American, or even multilateral, agreement on ground rules governing external involvement. He noted that the 1973 bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was an example of an early — perhaps premature — attempt to establish such principles. The decade of the 1980s, he suggested, might be more propitious for such an approach.

An American participant responded that developments indigenous to both the Soviet Union and the United States may increasingly lead to regional confrontations in this decade. Because the Soviet Union has fewer political and economic instruments of influence and has lost its ideological appeal as a revolutionary and developmental model, Soviet diplomacy increasingly relies on the projection of military power to influence change in the Third World. Not only outright invasion, as in Afghanistan, but growing arms transfers and the use of surrogates in the form of Cuban troops and East German security police are aspects of the projection of Soviet military power. This phenomenon had become all the more alarming since it was occurring against a backdrop of declining American involvement abroad and self-imposed limits on arms transfers. At the same time, the United States and its allies have committed the classic strategic blunder of allowing themselves to become dependent on oil from one of the world's most volatile regions — and one that is adjacent to the Soviet Union. In light of the asymmetrical interests that the two sides have in the Persian Gulf, Soviet proposals for negotiations on equal access to the Gulf are unlikely to be accepted by any American president.

In reply, a member of the Soviet delegation noted that the appeal of his country as a model to the Third World was greater than the foregoing suggested. The Soviet model of economic development, based on a large state sector and central planning, had been widely imitated by many countries even as they might criticize certain aspects of the model. Moreover, it was said to be a myth that the United States possesses effective nonmilitary instruments of influ-

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ence in the Third World. Recent events in Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were cited as examples of the limits to American nonmilitary influence.

Another Soviet participant stressed the difficulty of devising "rules of the game" to restrain Soviet-American involvement in the Third World. One source of difficulty was said to be the fact that the United States had adopted much more ambitious security objectives than the Soviet Union. The United States, having established a military presence in areas close to Soviet borders, had then argued that the Soviet Union, because of its proximity to those regions, was so much stronger that the United States must engage in a local build-up of forces in order to create parity. It was as if the Soviet Union were to establish a naval presence in the Gulf of Mexico, express alarm that the United States was stronger there, and then seek to increase its presence in search of parity in the region.

The American side replied that the American military presence near Soviet borders was a consequence of geography, the vital interests represented by these areas, and the threat perceived by states in close proximity to the USSR. Directing attention to the Middle East, an American participant noted that the potential of Soviet-American ground rules was limited by the inability of the superpowers to compel their local allies to go along with agreed measures of restraint. In 1967 and again in 1969, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to a framework for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict only to witness Moscow's inability to win Egypt's agreement. In October 1977, the tables were, in a sense, turned when the United States proved unable to persuade Israel to accept the joint Soviet-American communiqué. With respect to the Persian Gulf, Western dependence on the Gulf's oil creates an asymmetry of interest that poses a serious obstacle to measures of mutual restraint. Such limits would, in effect, prevent the United States from ensuring the security of vital oil supplies.

The conference next turned its attention to the problems of the superpowers' being drawn into regions not of primary importance to their national interest. An American speaker noted that, for the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia was one such region. Soviet involvement there had gradually escalated during the Vietnam War and now had become a part of a strategy of containment of the People's Republic of China. The growth of the Soviet military position in Vietnam and Vietnamese expansionism in Southeast Asia had prompted a growing harmony of views among the member states of

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the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Since the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the perception had grown markedly throughout the region that the Soviet Union posed a genuine threat to the security of noncommunist states. Singapore had taken an especially jaundiced view of Soviet motives. Thailand, feeling directly threatened, had sought closer ties with the PRC as a safeguard against a Cambodia completely controlled by Vietnam. Indonesia, on the other hand, concerned over future Chinese power in the region, had played down the Soviet threat.

In this regard, it was noted by two American participants that almost every assumption made by American critics of the Vietnam War had been proved wrong. One million refugees had fled Vietnam since 1975, far exceeding the flow during the war. The Buddhist and other leaders whom U.S. antiwar critics expected Hanoi would include in a united front government had been jailed or had suffered even worse fates. Vietnam, despite debunking of the domino theory, has exerted imperial claims over Cambodia and Laos. Moreover, few argue any longer that Southeast Asia, having re-emerged as a focal point of major power relationships, was an area of no strategic importance.

A Soviet representative suggested that Chinese activity was the principal source of tension in the region. He found evidence of Sino-American collusion in the visit to Beijing by Defense Secretary Harold Brown early in 1980, and saw reason to believe that a Sino-American understanding had been reached to coordinate policy on Afghanistan and Indochina. Specifically, the United States had agreed to support Chinese actions from Thailand against Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Although Hanoi was winning militarily in Cambodia, an American pointed out, it cannot completely suppress armed opposition. Chinese officials have told visiting American scholars that they intend to support the opposition to Vietnam for years if necessary. They would rather hold the line in Cambodia than have to fight in Thailand. Since Hanoi appeared unwilling to negotiate a compromise and the PRC was not prepared to codify the status quo, low-level violence was likely to continue in Cambodia. This issue could only complicate any future attempts at a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

In the view of an American scholar, the Soviet Union faced the prospect of having acquired in Vietnam a "Southeast Asian Cuba." The Vietnamese economy is in a shambles, requiring an enormous subsidy. Vietnam's aggression has isolated the country

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politically, the Japanese refusing to provide any further economic assistance. In response to a Soviet inquiry concerning the possibility of U.S. economic aid to Vietnam in light of the fact that the United States had destroyed much of the Vietnamese economy during the war, an American participant predicted that recent Vietnamese expansionism and brutality toward the "boat people" would bar any such assistance for the foreseeable future.

As the focus of discussion moved to sub-Saharan Africa, an American speaker commented that southern Africa had been a crucial region in undermining American support for U.S.-Soviet understanding. He expressed puzzlement that the Soviet Union appeared not to understand that the strategic location of the Cape of Good Hope for oil-tanker traffic and the region's very significant natural resources necessarily made the United States sensitive to external military intervention in the region's affairs. The past or present provision of Soviet arms and assistance to Joshua Nkomo's forces in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and SWAPO in Namibia was a source of instability in the region. In Angola, 18,000 Cuban troops continued to intervene in the civil war in behalf of the Marxist faction seeking to dominate the country.

East Asian Regional Conflicts

Northeast Asia, an American conferee pointed out, is the area where all the major powers are in closest interaction with each other physically, economically, and strategically. The region's importance is further enhanced by the economic dynamism of the area, especially among the free-market countries. In the security field, the Japanese-American security treaty represented the foundation of stability in the area, though here, too, change was occurring as Japan gradually moved toward rearmament and a higher degree of independence in its foreign policy. The Korean Peninsula remained a locus of potential conflict although North Korean restraint was unlikely to change so long as the U.S. commitment to South Korea remained credible. Nor do the Soviet Union or China, in this view, wish to see the Korean War repeated. China's foreign policy must now proceed from internal weakness stemming from unresolved issues of internal conflict within the party, the relationship of the military to the party, and the proper role of market forces in the economy. According to the American analyst, the PRC was likely to maintain its united front strategy aimed at a broad alignment with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan against what the

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Chinese term "Soviet social imperialism." For personal, geostrategic, and historical reasons, this generation of Chinese leaders was not interested in a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Because an attack by the PRC on Taiwan was neither politically nor militarily feasible and Taiwan's populace had little interest in reintegrating with the Mainland, the process of Taiwanization (i.e., the creation of an independent country de facto if not de jure) was likely to continue.

A Soviet delegate responded by asserting that the situation in Northeast Asia was closely linked with global trends. The negative U.S. attitude toward détente, it was said, had led the United States to enlarge the geographic area of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Legitimate American security interests in Northeast Asia were not in conflict with those of the Soviet Union, and Sino-American reconciliation was said not to be, in and of itself, a concern. What troubled Moscow was Washington's changing strategic conception of the region. In particular, "active American utilization of Soviet-Chinese contradictions" was a cause of alarm. The American effort to expand the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact from one to two fronts through a search for coalition ties with China bothered the Soviet Union very much. Afghanistan was said to be one of the "brightest examples" of coordination of these anti-Soviet actions between American and Chinese leaders. If this coordination were to be extended to include "military links" between the PRC and the United States or other Western countries, it would "create for the Soviet Union a very dangerous situation in which we must act in different ways" from before.

American participants stressed that the U.S. relationship with the PRC was not directed in any aggressive manner against the Soviet Union and that, indeed, any movement toward an American-Chinese alliance would be only in response to Soviet aggression in the region or elsewhere. Expanding Soviet naval deployments in East Asia were subjected to extensive criticism. Moscow's recent acquisition of basing facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam had dramatically increased the operating range of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

The Soviet response stressed that the PRC represented a real threat to the Soviet Union, if only for the chronic instability that threatened to spill across the borders. Numerous contradictions were emerging in China as a result of the challenge of modernization, the death of Mao, and the trial of the "Gang of Four." The

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symptoms were corruption and economic inefficiency. Given the tendency of regimes in trouble to strike out at neighbors, the Soviet delegates suggested that the Soviet military build-up in the Far East was actually quite modest.

The PRC's foreign policy provoked a long list of complaints from the Soviet side. Since 1976, the PRC had "globalized" its objectives to include mobilization of NATO and support of the United States in Africa to block national liberation forces. The PRC had also developed a "doctrine of active defense" to wage war outside Chinese territory. Even in those attempts by the Soviet Union to develop a dialogue with the PRC, talks were broken off over a priori PRC conditions (e.g., the Chinese demand that Moscow recognize disputed territories as such).

Two other Soviet commentators expressed optimism that in time Sino-Soviet relations would improve as a result of modernization and the pursuit of less ideological policies on the part of the PRC leadership. The increasing tendency of the Chinese to pursue a balance-of-power foreign policy, based on pragmatic realism, would help to create a more normal Sino-Soviet relationship. Sino-Soviet trade was already increasing, but normal state-to-state relations involving recognition of boundaries was conceded to be a long-term objective.

A Soviet representative argued that the build-up of Soviet capabilities in the Far East was irrelevant. Intentions were more important. Indicative here was the absence of any territorial claims by the Soviet Union on its neighbors. Tension between the USSR and Japan could be attributed almost exclusively to the existence of American military bases in Japan. The Soviet naval build-up in the Pacific could be explained by the strategic need to protect both the ballistic missile submarines home-ported in Kamchatka and the sea lines of communication between the western part of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Far East. It was remarked that the situation in the Far East was quite unstable, and that Soviet-American actions in the area should aim for political agreements on nonuse of force, zones of peace, and eventually arms limitation agreements for the Far East.

Economic cooperation and development in Asia and the Pacific was agreed by both sides to be an important common interest. One Soviet commentator saw significant possibilities for cooperation in the Pacific Community concept, particularly if it is not structured along political-security lines designed to exclude the

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Soviet Union and North Korea; indeed, the Community was seen as a potentially useful vehicle for Soviet-American cooperation on economic projects in the Pacific region. The economic development of Siberia was a major objective of the Soviet Union. Completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline railroad in four years would aid in the exploitation of natural resources and increase exports to the Far East. In this area, the complementarity of Soviet and Japanese economic needs was noted. The Japanese needed energy and natural resources while the Soviet Union required capital and technology. A Soviet speaker complained that while Japan was now involved in a wide variety of projects such as exploring for oil offshore Sakhalin and using high-technology equipment in mineral and gas exploration, the PRC was pressuring Japan to slow economic cooperation with the Soviet Union on the grounds that it served to develop Soviet strategic resources. Japanese companies were also said to be reluctant to participate in large-scale compensation deals — for example, to construct a gas pipeline from Siberia to serve Japan — without the involvement of American partners, whose own reluctance had halted the development of the project.

An American participant noted that the growing military strength of the Soviet Union in the Far East had resulted in worse relations with its neighbors. The consistent get-tough policy toward Japan, for instance, had created unhappy results from the Soviet standpoint.

A Soviet representative declared that it was very important to understand that he and his colleagues now perceive a turning point in Japanese foreign policy exemplified by the "resurgence of its military forces." Japan's "militarization" was said to be evident in Japanese plans to modernize the air force and navy with missiles and other technologically advanced weapon systems. Contradictory statements by Japanese leaders had created an impression in Moscow that influential forces were re-examining the possibility of acquiring nuclear arms. Moreover, the Japanese press carried reports of plans to produce arms for export.

On a broader level, these purported developments were said to cause apprehension with respect to three related matters. First, the modernization of Japan's armed forces would give the United States the opportunity to transfer elements of the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean and other strategically important areas. Second, Japanese "militarization" created the foundation for "further cooperation between Japan and China in the military sphere."

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Expanding contacts between Japanese military leaders and their Chinese counterparts were being accompanied by Japanese assistance in modernizing the military branches of the Chinese economy. Third, Japan's rearmament could be "directly connected with its expansion in Southeast Asia," the significance of which could be judged by what were claimed to be parallel attempts by influential Japanese circles to "rehabilitate the instigators of the war in the Pacific."

In response, an American participant stated that the Soviet Union should not be disturbed by the U.S.-Japanese relationship, for it had contributed to peace and stability in Asia for more than three decades. A Soviet delegate replied that in time Japan may find that tensions with the PRC will grow, necessitating closer relations with the Soviet Union, even without the return to Japan of the islands offshore Hokkaido that are now part of the Soviet Union.

A Japanese observer at the conference was invited to address this array of issues. He pointed out that Japan perceived itself as weak and as surrounded by three "big brothers." He distinguished between militarism and militarization, observing that it was the right of any state to create armed forces for its own defense. Japan had been slow to rearm; witness the fact that the defense budget was only 1 per cent of the Japanese gross national product compared with 15 per cent for the Soviet Union. Having ratified the nonproliferation treaty, Japan had pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution forbade transfers of arms to third parties. In fact, a Japanese company had recently canceled a plan to export a computer to the PRC on the grounds that one of its multiple uses might be military-related.

A Soviet delegate argued in response that the 1 per cent limit on Japanese defense expenditures was somewhat deceptive, in that such a figure in itself would readily make Japan the most advanced regional military power in East Asia (excluding the superpowers), and when added to American strength in the region, would create a dangerous imbalance. The pressure to eliminate the 1 per cent barrier was even more worrisome, particularly in light of the precedent set in the 1930s, when rapid militarization occurred.

American and Japanese speakers estimated that planned increases of 7 per cent in the Japanese defense budget would not fully compensate even for the rate of inflation. It was noted that 50 per cent of the budget went to cover personnel costs and that there were tremendous domestic inhibitions against the use of force. Indeed, one would be more likely to see a resurgence of Japanese militarism if the United States were to withdraw from the region.

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An American participant directed attention to the dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula where North Korean military capabilities far exceeded South Korea's and where North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung was pursuing an expansionist policy. Another American speaker noted North Korea's changing relations with China and the Soviet Union. After decades of coolness or hostility in Soviet–North Korean relations, Moscow had clearly made an effort in the preceding year or so to improve its relations with Pyongyang, partly to aid in the encirclement of the PRC. Kim Il-Sung, after a decade of tilting toward China, had begun to move in Moscow's direction but to an as yet uncertain degree. While proclaiming nonalignment, he had coupled support for the Moscow-installed government in Afghanistan with hostility toward the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, a close Soviet ally. A consensus between the Soviet and American participants appeared to emerge with respect to the shared interest of the great powers in preventing the outbreak of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Conferees briefly addressed the question of Taiwan and its future status. A non-Soviet speaker asserted that the process of "Taiwanization" was inevitable as the island acquired characteristics of a new legal entity. He noted that prospects for the development of Taiwan-Soviet relations had improved. The "Soviet option" was no longer unthinkable in Taiwan, and the Soviet Union had begun to signal its interest. Soviet periodicals sometimes referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China, and it was disclosed that Taiwanese observers, unlike their PRC counterparts, had not run into any visa problems when they sought to attend the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

A Soviet delegate declared that "the reality of Taiwan is evident" and that Soviet attitudes recognize this reality at the unofficial level. He added that he "did not know if the Soviet Union would recognize a Republic of Taiwan if it were declared. But the right of self-determination is the major principle of Soviet foreign policy in this respect." He noted that two Taiwanese seeking to attend a conference on the Pacific in Khabarovsk in 1979 had received visas in twenty-four hours.

Assessing the PRC's military capabilities to pressure Taiwan into association, a non-Soviet analyst asserted that, although Beijing had no amphibious forces, the PRC had only to blockade Quemoy and Matsu, where two-thirds of Taiwan's forces were stationed, in order to force Taipei to negotiate. An American observed that the PRC was unlikely to act on its rhetorical claim to Taiwan. Military threats by Beijing might prompt Taiwan to accept a Soviet military presence on the island, the last thing the PRC wants.

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Europe

The two sides began with a statement of the central importance of Europe in light of the commitment of the United States to NATO and the Soviet Union to the Warsaw Pact. In the past several years, important changes had taken place in Europe. On the military side, an American observed, Soviet forces had been modernized and the deployment of the three-warhead SS-20 IRBM had sharply altered the balance of theater-nuclear weapons. A Soviet representative acknowledged the modernization of Pact forces but argued that the SS-20s were to perform the same mission as the SS-5s they were replacing. By contrast, he said, planned deployment by NATO of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles would involve the new mission of striking the territory of the Soviet Union.

Extension of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act was recommended by a Soviet delegate as a means of furthering East-West restraint in areas of tension. The confidence-building measures (CBMs) enacted at Helsinki might be pursued along four dimensions: (1) intensification of existing CBMs, involving, for example, more advanced prior notification of smaller-scale military maneuvers than at present, (2) extension of CBMs to new types of military activity, such as naval and air maneuvers, (3) new qualitative and quantitative limits, and (4) enlargement of the geographic area where CBMs apply, perhaps to include the Mediterranean. These approaches (which anticipated General Secretary Brezhnev's call for expanded CBMs in his address to the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in February 1981) were said to be potentially applicable to other regions of the world.

Conferees discussed confidence-building measures, the political implications of military capabilities, and analysis of incipient crisis areas as three topics meriting further discussion by the two delegations in future meetings. It was suggested that since only slow progress could be expected on devising ground rules of restraint, critical attention should be fastened on incipient crisis areas. Discussion of the political implications of military deployments might serve to advance mutual understanding of the concept of "legitimate security interests," providing a basis for discussion of a code of restraint at some time in the future.

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

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reader feedback

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Gorshkov and His Navy

TO THE EDITOR:

Your recent article by Admiral Zumwalt ("Gorshkov and His Navy," Fall 1980 ORBIS) needs clarification on a number of points before it can be considered an accurate part of our growing volume of material dealing with the Soviet state and Soviet military forces. In the main, the article fails because Admiral Zumwalt does not make a sufficiently penetrating analysis of what Admiral Gorshkov actually wrote in *The Sea Power of the State*.[1]

Gorshkov comes from the "socialist realism" school of historiography. He makes a variety of statements that are indicative of his nationalist and communist worldview. While there are numerous examples of this tendency in Gorshkov's book, two will suffice to illustrate the point.

Gorshkov states in *The Sea Power of the State* that "in 1820, the Russian expedition of F. F. Bellingshausen and M. P. Lazarev on the ships *Vostok* and *Mirnyi* discovered a new continent — Antarctica."[2] This simplistic analysis does a great disservice to history and to Fabian von Bellingshausen.

Neatly put aside are the pioneering voyages of French Royalist explorers as well as the better known voyages of the colonialist Admiral Cook in his first deliberate crossings of the Antarctic Circle. Gorshkov's account further avoids controversy by ignoring the *Williams* expedition of January 1820, which is now generally believed to have charted a portion of the continental landmass, as well as the strongly documented landings of Nathaniel Palmer, during November 1820, on the peninsula that bears his name. It does its greatest disservice to the memory of von Bellingshausen by ignoring his very real feat of seamanship in circumnavigating the Ant-

[1] Admiral S. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976).
[2] Ibid., p. 18.

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arctic continent and by making posthumous claims that von Bellingshausen never made.[3]

In addition, in an attempt to provide historical continuity and significance to the tsarist Russian Navy, Gorshkov deliberately distorts the role of the Russian Navy in the American Revolution by claiming that, after a declaration of armed neutrality by the tsarina, the mere existence of the Russian fleet served to break up the British blockade on the North American continent.[4] The facts in the matter are at considerable variance with what Gorshkov presents. The Russians were decidedly the junior partners in the effort to "even the score" with Britain. The Dutch, the Spanish, and especially the French all made major contributions to the eventual American victory far in excess of what the Russians accomplished. In point of fact, there would have been no victory at Yorktown had the French not been heavily involved.

Gorshkov also demonstrates his weakness as a military historian and interpreter when he allows his nationalism to overcome his grasp of history. This is especially evident when he initially dismisses the role of the British Navy in the Napoleonic Wars as being "enormously exaggerated by Anglo-American ideologists,"[5] then contradicts himself by stating that the Battle of Trafalgar was of major importance in its political consequences.[6]

Admiral Zumwalt (p. 491) errs in accepting the idea that the tsarist Russian Navy had changed its plan of operation from a basically coastal defense role, as was traditional for the Russian Navy, to that of a true "blue water" navy capable of projecting its force beyond the confines of Russian coastal waters. While it is very nice to be able to plan the development of a "blue water" fleet *in vacuo,* reality must intrude in these plans or they will merely be a waste of time and resources.

Thus it was with the Russian plans for a major fleet. While seamanship improved enough to enable the Baltic Fleet to sail halfway around the world to meet its doom at the hands of the Japanese Navy in the Straits of Tsushima in 1905, the base of competent military seamanship was almost totally lacking. This was demonstrated by the incident at the Dogger Banks, when the Russian Fleet, in an orgy of self-induced panic, managed to beat off the deadly attack

[3] Paul A. Siple, "Antarctica," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1965), vol. 2, s.v.
[4] Gorshkov, *Sea Power,* p. 64.
[5] Ibid., p. 65.
[6] Ibid., p. 66.

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of a British fishing fleet.[7] Disaster followed disaster until finally the Russian fleet was put out of its misery.

But did the Russian planners take heed of the root causes of this disaster? It appears not, since they went right ahead and began the construction of a new fleet, again designed for the projection of force far beyond the confines of the Russian Empire. Unfortunately, the problem of building a fleet under the conditions that prevailed in the Russian Empire was almost impossible to solve. The design of the ships was foreign, the boilers and turbines came from Germany or Great Britain, the heavy guns had to be manufactured overseas, the diesel engines that made small vessels practical were imported from Germany, and the technical manpower needed to supervise the construction came from overseas as well.[8]

Even the yards in which these vessels were to be constructed needed extensive modification before they could produce a modern warship. The rest of the support facilities (the channels for navigation, for example) were equally unsuited to the vessels. Massive dredging and widening plans were undertaken, but few were completed. Equally, all the other naval support facilities had to be enlarged and rebuilt to accommodate the larger vessels planned for them. The cost in manpower and material, as well as in time, was far too steep for the primitive Russian industrial complex.

The results of the elaborate plans that were made prior to the First World War were useless because the planning failed to take into account the available technical manpower resources (i.e., the supervisory and skilled personnel necessary to complete naval construction), the material resources (e.g., heavy guns, armor plate, boilers, and turbines), and the ability of the support facilities, including training facilities, needed to keep a major fleet in operation. The planning also failed to solve the problem of geography, a situation that still plagues the modern Soviet Navy, by failing to consider how this "blue water" fleet would manage to reach blue water and, once there, sustain itself.

The abortive sailing of the Baltic Fleet to Tsushima from its main bases should have taught the Russians a lesson concerning the need for overseas support facilities. The problem of passage through the Baltic, past the shore of Russia's most probable enemy, where the whole power of the German fleet was avail-

[7] David Walder, *The Short Victorious War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 186-206.

[8] The Viscount Hythe, *The Naval Annual: 1913,* reprint (New York: Arco, 1976), esp. pp. 56-58.

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able, seems to have been neglected, as was the question of passing through the Sea of Marmara out into the Mediterranean. Thus, no matter how brilliant and thorough the Russian plans may seem to be in isolation, the reality of the situation is that the Russian Navy did little to justify its existence, preferring to become a "fortress fleet," supinely hiding behind the protection of heavy defenses in the Baltic and engaging in naval operations in the Black Sea only when absolutely sure that the *Göben* and *Breslau* were safely in port. Even then, the Russian Navy proved to be incapable of neutralizing the Turkish-Bulgarian forces that opposed it.

The navy that Gorshkov joined in 1927 was basically an obsolete force consisting of badly worn, archaic vessels. This situation was further aggravated by the series of purges that swept through the Soviet Navy. The physical condition of the navy was appalling; Gorshkov's first vessel is a case in point. The *Frunze* (ex-*Bistry*) was nearly twenty years old in 1931, and had seen service in commerce raiding against defenseless Turkish coasters, high-speed minelaying, gunfire attacks against the Romanian oil facilities, and some fleet operations. After the Russian Revolution, the vessel's history is obscure, but it appears to have fallen into White or British hands and been scuttled and salvaged later. As if to underline the impotence of Russian and Soviet naval abilities, the *Frunze* was a German-designed diminutive of the Novik class and was equipped with what must have been badly worn foreign boilers and turbines.

Equally, the Soviet cruisers that Gorshkov commanded could hardly have been an inspiration to a young officer. Most of the vessels were built on tsarist hulls laid down before the First World War and not completed for many years thereafter. Even the *Krasnyi Kavkaz,* the most modern of these units, had been twenty years in the building because Soviet industry was incapable of completing the vessel expeditiously. The modern cruisers of the Kirov class could not have provided much of an inspiration either, since they were designed by Fascist Italian yards and their construction was supervised by Italian technicians.

Not only were the material resources trying for any officer, especially for a "comer" like Gorshkov, the political climate could hardly have been comforting. This was the time when even Marshals of the Soviet Union were arrested and put on the stand in show trials. Gorshkov clearly had credentials that were acceptable to the Soviet secret police, for he not only remained alive but received rapid promotion. The adaptation of Gorshkov to this environment can still be seen in his slavish use of the sacred writings

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of Marx and Lenin to justify his opinions. Even after the end of the "Great Patriotic War," when many marshals were once more removed from command, Gorshkov survived and prospered.

It is surprising that Admiral Zumwalt (p. 495) accepts unquestioningly the contention that the Soviets held command of the Black Sea and prevented it from being used for supply by the invading German Army. The facts of the matter are quite different from the unsupported contentions of Admiral Gorshkov and can easily be verified; the only time the Soviets dominated the Black Sea was before June 22, 1941, and after January 1945.

Most of the major surface units of the Soviet Union were destroyed or so badly damaged by the middle of 1943 that Stalin himself ordered them to remain in port. It was just as well, because the light surface units and small submarines available to the Romanian-Bulgarian-German naval command and the intermittent support given by the Luftwaffe had transformed the Black Sea into virtually an Axis *mare nostrum*.[9]

As for the amphibious landings that seem to have such a fascination for the Soviets, few had any but a tactical significance. The Germans and their allied troops managed either to contain or eliminate each Soviet beachhead. Perhaps the fact that the most successful of these landings was commanded by a then-obscure political commissar named L. I. Brezhnev has something to do with this fascination.

Later in the book, Gorshkov wags an admonitory finger at the German conduct of the Battle of the Atlantic, blaming the Axis leadership for failing to protect their submarines against Allied ASW (antisubmarine warfare) measures and for not waging the war against the sea lines of communication with enough vigor early in the war. Once more, Gorshkov errs by selective omission. The first few years of the war showed the highest kill ratio per U-boat at sea as well as the lowest loss ratio. During the first three to three and a half years of the conflict, the U-boats were destroying more vessels than were being produced; by no stretch of the imagination, except perhaps the Soviet imagination, can such a campaign be considered a failure.

In point of fact, now that we are gaining greater access to the Allied records, we see that much of the success of the ASW campaign was directly influenced by the ability of the Allies to read coded German messages. Obviously, when you know where an

[9] J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, *Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939-1945* (New York: Arco, 1974).

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enemy is, the ability to saturate that section of the sea will produce a kill; given the method of control used by the wolf packs, the ASW efforts had to be a success.

Rather than criticizing the Germans, Gorshkov should take a careful look at his navy's theory of bastions and defense of limited areas. While the German Navy sank about 12,500,000 tons of shipping at the cost of approximately 700 boats (scuttlings are exempted), the Soviets lost about 100 boats in exchange for only 250,000 to 260,000 tons of Axis shipping. The Soviet record is not inspiring.

Thus, only by becoming aware of the accidental or deliberate misinformation provided by Gorshkov can we get on with analyzing the actual significance of these writings. Given the considerable distortions and deliberate falsifications, we may assume that this document is merely a propaganda piece and does not, to any significant degree, give insight into Gorshkov's thinking. Furthermore, we can see that the Soviet concept of bastions is being eroded by the development of certain classes of vessels whose design makes them most suited to overseas projection of naval force. A vessel of the nuclear-powered Kirov class is not suited to the passive role of a fortress fleet; nor are the aircraft carriers under construction in the Soviet yards suited to operations in the ice-choked Arctic Ocean or even the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland (during winter). They are strategic equipment and have no other purpose.

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In Reply:

Mr. Robert C. Smith's comments on my essay "Gorshkov and His Navy" are appreciated and provide additional interesting background. The overall thrust of Mr. Smith's comments is to challenge Admiral Gorshkov's credibility as a historian and, as a result, to picture him primarily as a propagandist. Yet, understanding Russian and Soviet history and Marxism-Leninism, Gorshkov renders an interpretation of history that is understandable, if not accurate in all cases. Moreover, Mr. Smith himself might be accused of peering through nationalistic-ideological lenses specially ground for a maritime state history buff. To dismiss Gorshkov as a propagandist because of ques-

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tions of historical accuracy or differences in interpretation is to miss the point of his book, and the point of my essay.

Admiral Gorshkov's book is an intelligent analysis of sea power, particularly sea power in the nuclear age. It is also a claim to great-power status for the Soviet Union based on nuclear power and sea power. The point of my essay is this: in order to understand the uses to which the Soviet Navy may be put, we must go beyond analysis of bureaucratic battles of doctrine and force structure in the Kremlin and attempt to undertsand the thinking of the Soviet Navy's greatest leaders. As a former chief of naval operations, I share with Admiral Gorshkov the knowledge that naval forces and sea-power concepts sometimes have to be justified to a government bureaucracy (for the good of the state) for reasons other than their real value or optimum use.

In interpreting Admiral Gorshkov's writings, we can forgive him his historical inaccuracies in order to understand his views on uses of the Soviet Navy. These views are quite different from those that result from analysis of bureaucratic dialogue and force structure alone.

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reviews

POLAND, THE PERMANENT CRISIS

August 1980: The Strikes in Poland. Edited by William F. Robinson. Munich: Radio Free Europe Research, 1980. n.p.

Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland. Edited by Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 418 pp. $27.50.

The Road to Gdansk: Poland and the USSR. By Daniel Singer. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981. 256 pp. $15.00.

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The recent crisis in Poland, sparked by the strikes in the summer of 1980, is one of the most important developments — perhaps the most important — in Eastern Europe during the past twenty-five years. Eastern Europe has, of course, witnessed upheavals before: East Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1956, 1970, and 1976. But none of these threatened the bases of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe as profoundly as the events in Poland since August 1980.

The Polish experiment differs from past challenges in several key ways. The Hungarian and Czech upheavals were "revolutions from above," led by dissident intellectuals and disaffected party members; the Polish experiment represents a broad-based "revolution from below," led by workers. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the impetus for reform came from within the party; in Poland today it comes from outside the party. Whereas Nagy and Dubcek spearheaded the drive for reform, Kania has sought to limit it and, where possible, to slow it down.

The repercussions for Moscow's security from any major change in Poland would be enormous. Poland is the largest and most

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important country in Eastern Europe. Traditionally it has acted as a buffer between the USSR and its Western neighbors. A major change in Poland would remove this buffer and leave the Soviet Union — as well as the GDR — exposed.

Moreover, it would have a major impact on Soviet military strategy in Europe. The Polish Army is the largest and best-equipped non-Soviet military force in the Warsaw Pact and has been earmarked for a rapid offensive role in any conflict with NATO. A change in Poland would call this role into question and have important implications for Moscow's ability to conduct a war in Europe.

The unrest in Poland also has important economic implications for the Soviet Union and its allies. The countries of Eastern Europe are heavily dependent on Polish coal and semifinished goods for their industries; a major disruption of Polish deliveries could cause serious problems, forcing the countries to use much-needed hard currency to buy coal and other goods in the West.[1] It would also create big problems for long-range planning within COMECON.

Lastly, over the long run, the success of the Polish experiment could have an infectious effect on the rest of Eastern Europe, and even on the Soviet Union. Romania has already begun to experience signs of labor unrest, and in 1980 there were reports of labor unrest in several Soviet cities. Though such unrest is not widespread at the moment, Soviet leaders, given the problems facing the Soviet economy in the 1980s,[2] cannot help being concerned about the possible long-term implications of the turmoil in Poland, both for its own stability and for that of many of its allies.

The Roots of the Crisis

The strikes that sparked the current upheaval in Poland and led to Gierek's fall in early September 1980 did not erupt out of the blue. As the excellent contributions in *Background to Crisis* make clear, the strikes were the culmination of a process of ferment that had been smoldering for years and that had its roots in the policies and politics of the Gierek era.

It is ironic that Gierek, who came to power in the wake of the unrest in Gdansk during 1970 that toppled Gomulka, should himself be deposed by so similar an expression of popular discontent only a decade later. Like Gomulka before him, Gierek was swept

[1] This is particularly true in the case of East Germany, which is already feeling the impact of the sharp drop in Polish coal production this year.

[2] For a good discussion of these problems, see Seweryn Bialer, "The Politics of Stringency in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, pp. 19-33.

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into power on a wave of popular sentiment for reform and began his reign on a note of great promise and hope.[3] On assuming power, Gierek moved quickly to defuse popular discontent and win the trust and confidence of the workers. He adopted a new political style that emphasized greater respect for citizens' rights and displayed a willingness to enter into dialogue with the Church and the people.[4] On the foreign-policy front, he sought to expand ties with the West, particularly in the economic sphere.

Gierek introduced a "new development strategy" designed to raise the standard of living and increase productivity.[5] This strategy relied heavily on large infusions of Western technology, financed by Western credits, and was predicated upon the assumption that, as Polish industry grew, the disequilibrium in favor of imports would eventually be overcome by an expansion of exports to the West. Initially this strategy worked. Between 1971 and 1975, there was a notable improvement in the standard of living and real wages grew markedly. Owing to a program of artificial, government-supported subsidies, social services expanded and prices of basic foodstuffs remained stable. The expansion of the economy and the rise in living standards served to help Gierek acquire an important measure of genuine popular support.

By the mid seventies, however, this strategy had begun to founder; mounting difficulties plagued the Polish economy. The reasons for these difficulties are well analyzed by Zbigniew Fallenbuchl in his chapter in *Background to Crisis*. Among the most important were (1) the worldwide energy crisis, which forced the Soviet Union to raise the price of oil, (2) the recession in Europe, which adversely affected Poland's ability to sell its goods in the West and expand its export sector, (3) an unrealistic investment policy, (4) several bad harvests, and (5) a failure to introduce meaningful economic reforms. In addition, the economic prosperity of the early seventies had created a climate of rising expectations. Poles expected not only to maintain their standard of living but to improve it.

The deterioration of the economy was accompanied after 1974 by a move toward greater ideological and political orthodoxy, which contributed to growing friction with the intellectuals and the

[3] For the early policies of the Gierek era, see Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, eds., *Gierek's Poland* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

[4] On this point, see Adam Bromke, "Poland Under Gierek: A New Political Style," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972.

[5] For a good discussion of this strategy, see Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970's," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, 1977.

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Church.[6] This friction was symbolized by the dispute over the Constitution: protests by intellectuals forced the government to modify key amendments, particularly a reference to the "unshakable bonds" between the USSR and Poland. At the same time, the Church, particularly Cardinal Wyszynski, began to speak out more forcefully against government policies.

The 1976 riots in Radom, sparked by an attempt to raise the price of food, was an important turning point in the process of inner erosion that ultimately led to the collapse of the Gierek regime in 1980. After the riots, the number of dissident movements and publications expanded greatly, and important links were established between workers and intellectuals, most notably the Committe for Social Self-defense (KOR).[7] These links were to prove important during the initial phase of the unrest in 1980. In the first weeks after the outbreak of that unrest, KOR served as the main source of information about the strikes, both for the West and within Poland itself, and cooperation between KOR and the workers contributed significantly to the expansion and success of those strikes.[8] In the late seventies, peasant discontent also began to manifest itself openly over the issue of pension rights.

By the close of the seventies, there were growing signs that the Gierek era had run its course. The Polish economy was beset with serious difficulties: rising inflation, growing foreign debt, and a decline in the national income.[9] Discontent among the public was growing, and the opposition was becoming more open and vocal; within the party, pressure for reform was increasing and dissatisfaction with Gierek's leadership was increasing. Indeed, by 1979, discontent and pressure for change had reached the point that, as Adam Bromke prophetically noted in his excellent introductory essay in Simon and Kanet, Gierek risked being "deposed by a palace revolution in the upper echelons of the party or by a popular explosion, or both."[10]

It was against this background of growing economic decline and political bankruptcy that the most recent period of unrest

[6] Adam Bromke, "A New Juncture in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1976, pp. 1-17.

[7] For a detailed discussion of the growth of the opposition in Poland, see Adam Bromke "Opposition in Poland," ibid., September-October 1978, pp. 37-51.

[8] On the links between the workers and KOR during the August strikes, see the excellent analysis by Jan de Weydenthal, "Workers and Party in Poland," ibid., November-December 1980, p. 6.

[9] Polish national income fell by about 2 per cent in 1979, a development unprecedented in postwar Poland.

[10] "Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland," p. 21.

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broke out. As in 1970 and 1976, the event that triggered the outbreak of unrest was the government's decision to raise the prices of meat and meat products. This precipitated sporadic work stoppages and wildcat strikes, which gradually spread across the country and eventually led to the formation of the Interstrike Committee (MKS) in Gdansk on August 16. The formation of the strike committee was a turning point. In contrast to the earlier period, which had been marked by spontaneous local actions, the strikes after August 16 were characterized by greater coordination and purposefulness.[11] The demands of the workers also broadened quickly from primarily economic issues to include political themes, and increasing emphasis was placed upon worker participation in the decisionmaking process on issues that affected their vital interests.

Two recently published books provide useful perspectives on the outbreak of the strikes and the current unrest. One of these, *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland,* is a collection of documents and analyses published by Radio Free Europe shortly after the signing of the Gdansk agreement (August 31, 1980). It presents a blow-by-blow account of the development of the strikes and of their evolution from a group of disjointed, spontaneous actions to an organized expression of mass discontent that shook the system to its foundations. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. It gives the reader a good feel for the ebb and flow of daily events, but it fails to provide perspective on the crisis as a whole. The book needs a good concluding essay to provide that perspective. Nonetheless, *August 1980* provides the most comprehensive coverage of those strikes that we are likely to see for some time; it is an invaluable source for anyone seeking to understand the historic events that led to the current stage of Polish politics.

The Road to Gdansk, by Daniel Singer, a Polish-born freelance journalist, deals more with internal trends in the Soviet Union and Poland than with the strikes themselves. As with the Simon and Kanet book, the chief value of Singer's book is the light it sheds on developments that contributed to the recent crisis. Although completed before the outbreak of the strikes in 1980, *The Road to Gdansk* does contain a postscript on the strikes and on the events leading up to the Gdansk agreement, which recognized the right of the workers to set up their own self-governing trade unions.

[11] de Weydenthal, "Workers and Party," p. 7.

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A New Era

The signing of the Gdansk agreement was a historic milestone. Not only did it lead to Gierek's replacement as first secretary by Stanislaw Kania on September 6, it opened a new era in Polish political life. Since then, the party — often under pressure from the workers — has been compelled to institute several far-reaching reforms: Solidarity has been legally registered and allowed access to the state-controlled media; censorship has been reduced; university course requirements in Marxism-Leninism and in the Russian language have been reduced; the Church has been allowed to conduct its own religious broadcasts; a leading Catholic member of the Sejm has been appointed deputy premier; and the peasants have been allowed to form their own trade unions. In addition, in a number of areas such as Radom and Bydgoszcz, Solidarity has forced the dismissal or removal of local party officials considered corrupt or incompetent.

In short, a fundamental shift in the internal balance of power has occurred. Where once the party reigned supreme, now it must engage increasingly in a complex bargaining process in order to govern. While Solidarity has disclaimed any desire to become a political party, in practical terms the distinction is meaningless. As it stands, Solidarity holds virtually a veto right over the government's ability to perform. Without the cooperation and support of Solidarity, the party cannot govern.

Over time, moreover, Solidarity's demands have taken on a sharper political focus. While economic issues remain important, the real issue is political participation. In order to ensure that its interests are safeguarded, Solidarity believes, it has to have a say in the decisionmaking process. This poses a direct challenge to the party's monopoly of power.

At the same time, the power of the Church has been enhanced. The government was forced to grant important concessions, such as greater access to the news media, and increasingly the Church has been compelled to play the role of mediator between the government and the workers. For instance, at the height of the tensions of August 1980, the Polish Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, appeared on nationwide television to appeal for calm and restraint — a vivid demonstration of the Church's prestige and the party's weakness. Similarly, the intervention of Bishop Dabrowski appears to have been crucial in settling the Bielsko-Biala dispute in early February. Cardinal Wyszynski also played a key role in the late-

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March compromise between Solidarity and the government that led to the cancellation of a planned nationwide strike and to the diffusion of tension at Bydgoszcz.

The Church's intervention in all these instances is indicative of the political role that the Church has come to play since August 1980. The only institution that has the trust of the workers and the authorities, its major concern is the maintenance of Poland's sovereignty and the avoidance of bloodshed. If unrest continues, the Church is likely to feel increasingly compelled to play the role of broker between the party and the workers.

One of the most disturbing features of the situation in Poland since November 1980 is the degree to which the control and restraint that marked the early phases (from mid August until the end of October) has begun to break down; more and more, events have taken on a dynamic of their own. Several factors contribute to this dangerous tendency.

The first is the growing disarray within the party. The rapidity and impact of the changes that occurred after August 1980 have led to a serious weakening of the party's cohesion and authority. Pressure for change has been growing at the grassroots level, and a serious division has emerged between the rank and file, on the one hand, and the party leadership on the other. Since August, the party rank and file have openly begun to express their dissatisfaction with the autocratic manner in which the party had been run in the past. This has resulted in increased demands at the local level for a democratization of the party structure and for the replacement of personnel occupying positions of authority. In particular, there has been a growing demand, especially in the large industrial centers, for the election of all party officials, at all levels of party affairs, by secret ballot. Party members have been particularly vocal with respect to electing delegates to the forthcoming Congress. In several provinces, such as Gdansk and Szczecin, activists are reported to have succeeded in setting up their own commissions to prepare proposals for the Congress and to have secured acceptance of the commissions by local party officials.[12]

The party leadership has been reluctant to accede to this pressure, though, for fear it might lead to a radical reorientation of the party and a further weakening of its leading role. As a result, the party Congress, which was supposed to have been held in December

[12] Jan de Weydenthal, "Ferment in the Polish Party," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report (Poland), March 3, 1981.

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1980, has been postponed several times and is unlikely to be held before late summer at the earliest. If and when it is held, it will provide an important indication of the strength of internal factions and of the direction that Polish political life is likely to take in the future.

Moreover, the leadership itself is also divided. Kania must steer a difficult course between pressure from Moscow to hold the line and pressure from the rank and file to broaden and accelerate the process of reform. Although Kania has succeeded in removing some of Gierek's closest associates, he has not completely consolidated his hold on the party. As late as April, he still faced considerable resistance to his policy of gradual, limited reform from members within the middle ranks of the party bureaucracy (who would lose their jobs and privileges if his policy were implemented). At the same time, he faces opposition from Politburo hardliners[13] centered around Stefan Olszowski, the former foreign minister and Central Committee secretary who was removed from the Politburo by Gierek in February 1980 but was reinstated after the Gdansk strikes.

While Kania seems to enjoy the support of the majority of the Politburo and Central Committee,[14] should he prove unable to overcome the disarray in the party, the Soviets might try to build a coalition around Olszowski in an effort to unseat Kania. Alternatively, they might turn to General Mieczyslaw Moczar, the former security chief who was ousted from the Politburo by Gierek in 1971. Moczar has made a remarkable comeback since August, and his speeches were given prominent play in the East German and Czech news media — which suggested that Moscow might view him with favor.

The second factor contributing to the growth of instability since November 1980 is the diffusion of power within Solidarity itself. As Solidarity has grown in strength and numbers, power has devolved more and more to the local chapters, which are less susceptible to control from the center. While Walesa remains

[13] The exact membership of this group is not known, but in addition to Olszowski it is thought to include Tadeusz Grabski, Andzrei Zabinski, and Henryk Jablonski.

[14] In late March, during the crisis precipitated by the police suppression of a demonstration in Bydgoszcz, the hardliners appear to have pressed for the introduction of a "state of emergency" — an action that was forestalled by Jaruzelski's threat to resign. The resolution adopted by the Central Committee plenum on March 29, emphasizing the need to resolve the crisis by "political means through negotiations," represented a victory for Kania and the moderates. Olszowski and Grabski were reported to have offered to resign, but their resignations were not accepted — apparently because the situation was regarded as too tense for a shakeup. See John Darnton's piece in the *New York Times*, March 31, 1981.

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the paramount figure within the movement, his word is by no means fiat, and he has continually had to exercise his considerable talents as a mediator to overcome opposition from other more militant Solidarity leaders. Some of the more militant leaders, however, resigned or were ousted after the Bydgoszcz settlement in late March, and this may help to reduce friction within the Solidarity leadership.

A third factor compounding the situation is the sense of euphoria that has emerged since August. The changes that the workers have been able to wrest from the party since August are heady stuff and have given the workers a taste of power. Moreover, there is a widespread belief, shared at many levels of society, that the Soviets will not invade. While to some extent this belief has been shaken by Western reports of the gradual Soviet build-up along the Polish border, it has not entirely dissipated and adds to the volatility of the situation.

Lastly, there is the economic crisis, which interacts with and exacerbates the political crisis. Since August, the economic situation has deteriorated significantly. Coal production has fallen sharply, and this has had a major impact on Poland's exports, especially to the GDR. Domestic meat production has also fallen dramatically,[15] and in mid March the Polish government announced it had enough food reserves to last only twelve days.[16] The continued deterioration of Poland's economy could aggravate consumer discontent and fuel further unrest, thus raising the risk of Soviet intervention.

What Poland needs is a period of tranquillity so that the trade unions can consolidate their gains and the party can begin to address the serious problem of economic reform. The dilemma, however, is that any serious economic reform would of necessity involve the introduction of additional austerity measures and would require even greater sacrifices from the workers, at least in the short term. Because distrust of the party is so high, it is likely the workers would be reluctant to make such sacrifices. However, if the worker's demands for greater political participation are met — a big if — and if institutions such as the Western banks and the Paris club (and eventually perhaps the IMF) do tie the granting of future credits to a step-by-step reform of the Polish economy, the workers might be willing to accept greater austerity. This pre-

[15] In January 1981, domestic meat production reportedly dropped 18 per cent from last year. (*Times* [London], February 23, 1981.)

[16] Radio Warsaw, March 18, 1981.

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supposes, however, a greater degree of flexibility and farsightedness that the party has exhibited to date — or is likely to exhibit.

Soviet Policy and Interests

The Soviet Union watches the unfolding of events in Poland with a mixture of uncertainty and alarm. While Moscow initially appeared willing to give Kania time to bring the situation under control, as the crisis has intensified the Soviets have hardened their line, stressing in particular that the party would have to maintain its leading role and that "all other organizations must work under its leadership."[17] Such statements can be seen as a direct warning to the Polish party that it must reassert its leading role and arrest the erosion of political power that has occurred over the preceding few months. At the same time, there has been an increasing emphasis by the Soviet news media on "external interference" and the danger of "counterrevolution." In his speech to the Soviet party Congress, for instance, Brezhnev noted specifically that in Poland "opponents of socialism, with the support of external forces, are creating anarchy and striving to turn the unfolding of events there into a counterrevolutionary course."[18]

Such statements have been part of a visible campaign by the Soviets to pressure the Polish leadership into taking a firmer line toward Solidarity and halting the process of inner erosion that has beset the party since August 1980. Thus, at the Twenty-sixth Party Congress, Brezhnev stressed the determination of the Warsaw Pact countries "to secure our interests and to defend the socialist gains of the peoples"[19] — an oblique reference to the Brezhnev Doctrine and Moscow's self-proclaimed right to intervene whenever it believes the "achievements of Socialism" are being threatened. It was reported, moreover, that at a special meeting at the conclusion of the Congress, Kania came under strong attack by Moscow for his handling of the unrest during January and February.[20] The communiqué issued at the end of the Moscow meeting made unmistakable allusion to the Brezhnev Doctrine[21] and called upon the

[17] *Pravda*, March 8, 1981. The quotation appeared in a long theoretical article that cited arguments used by Lenin in 1921 to defeat a trade-union faction within the Soviet party. Its relevance to the contemporary situation in Poland was made quite clear, however.

[18] *Pravda*, February 24, 1981.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Bernard Guetta in *Le Monde*, March 10, 1981.

[21] The relevant portion of the communiqué states that "the Socialist community is indissoluble, and its defense is a matter not only for every single state but for the entire socialist coalition." (*Pravda*, March 5, 1981.)

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Polish leadership to "reverse the course of events and to eliminate the peril looming over the socialist achievements of the nation."[22]

Since early autumn 1980, the Soviets have also upgraded the readiness of their troops in the western military districts and held several military maneuvers near Poland's borders. In part, these moves have been designed to put pressure on the Polish leadership and to remind the Poles that Moscow has other options. They also have a military rationale. As unrest began to intensify last autumn, Soviet leaders appear to have concluded that at some point they might have to intervene militarily, and that they had to be prepared if and when that moment arrived. At the Warsaw Pact summit, December 4-5, Kania apparently succeeded in buying more time. The resurgence of instability early in 1981, however, clearly heightened Soviet anxiety about the course of events in Poland.

Soviet anxiety reached a new peak in late March at the time of the Bydgoszcz crisis, precipitated by an attack on several Solidarity members by local police. Though Kania was able to defuse the crisis and avert a threatened nationwide strike, he did so at a price. The party was forced to accept partial responsibility for the excessive use of force and to accede to other Solidarity demands. Moreover, the party emerged weakened and more divided than ever. During the Central Committee meeting of March 29-30, which approved Kania's moderate approach to crisis management, the hardliners (notably Olszowski and Grabski) came under strong attack and were reported to have offered their resignations — the acceptance of which was apparently prevented only by the personal intervention of Brezhnev himself.[23] While Brezhnev's intervention may have prevented the resignations of Olszowski and Grabski, the plenum demonstrated that their views had little support and that there was strong sentiment within the Central Committee for moving ahead vigorously with greater democratization of the party.

[22] Ibid. The wording of this statement is confusing and could be taken to suggest that the Soviets were demanding a "reversal" of the process of "renewal" begun in August 1980. It seems more likely, however, that it refers to a "reversal" of the disarray and disunity within the Polish party, rather than of the process of renewal itself. This is also the interpretation given to the statement by many Poles. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 20, 1981.

[23] John Darnton, *New York Times*, April 14, 1981. According to Darnton, Olszowski and Grabski were retained after a letter from the Soviet Central Committee was read, urging that, for the sake of "party unity," no changes be made in either the Politburo or the Central Committee. The letter, it was reported, was backed up by a phone call from Brezhnev to Kania during a crucial two-hour recess in the Polish Central Committee meeting.

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Most disturbed by the trend of events, Moscow undertook measures designed to emphasize Soviet concern. In particular, the Soviets upgraded the readiness of their troops in and around Poland and extended the "Soyuz 81" maneuvers. Moreover, for the first time since the strikes erupted in August 1980, Moscow began openly to criticize the Polish *party* — a significant demonstration of Soviet dissatisfaction with Kania's handling of the situation. Although the relatively conciliatory tone adopted by Brezhnev in his speech to the Czechoslovak party Congress in early April helped reduce fears that an invasion was imminent, his remark that "one would suppose" (*nado polagat'*) that the Polish party is capable of suitably rebuffing the enemies of socialism in Poland suggests that Soviet confidence in Kania's ability to reassert the leading role of the party remains qualified.[24]

Among the Soviet Union's East European allies, the reaction to the events in Poland has varied. The GDR and Czechoslovakia have taken the hardest line, stressing the danger of "counterrevolution." Their reaction has been influenced both by concern over the disruption to their economies, which are highly dependent on Polish coal and semifinished goods, as well as the long-term danger of ideological contamination. The unrest in Poland has had an especially adverse impact on the GDR's relations with the Federal Republic, which cooled considerably after August 1980. Fearing repercussions for its own domestic situation, the East German leadership has retrenched, clamping down internally and curtailing contacts with the FRG.[25] Although East Berlin's attitude moderated somewhat in early 1981, the crisis in Poland is likely to cast a pall over inter-German relations for some time to come, limiting the degree of rapprochement.

The Hungarian reaction has been relatively restrained. In the spring, however, Budapest's line began to harden and to coincide more closely with that of Moscow and its other allies. Romania has been ambivalent. On the one hand, faced with serious economic problems and labor unrest of its own, Bucharest has watched the development of the crisis in Poland with some misgiving and has welcomed signs of a firmer line by the Polish party. On the other

[24] For Brezhnev's speech, see *Pravda*, April 8, 1981. (Excerpts are to be found in the *New York Times*, April 8, 1981.)

[25] The most dramatic example of this retrenchment was the GDR's quadrupling of currency-exchange requirements for visitors and the removal of exceptions for pensioners, minors, and the handicapped, undertaken in October, shortly after the West German national elections. As a result, visits dropped by half. (*New York Times*, February 8, 1981.)

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hand, in line with its principled stand on noninterference, it has made clear its opposition to any direct intervention by Moscow.[26] Similarly, Yugoslavia has openly opposed any such intervention by Moscow. At the same time, as the unrest in Poland has escalated, there has been an undertone of concern about the long-run impact of the turmoil on East-West relations — and possibly on domestic stability in Yugoslavia itself.[27]

Prospects for the Future

Right now (April 1981), the Polish situation is very much in flux, and it is difficult indeed to predict how events will unfold. Much depends on developments within Poland. There, three factors will be critical: (1) Walesa's ability to maintain support for his moderate course among the Solidarity rank and file; (2) the willingness of the Church to continue to play a role as mediator between the party and Solidarity; and (3) Kania's ability to get on with renewal and gradual democratization of the party without losing control in the process. This last point is perhaps the most important. The grassroots pressure for change is mounting steadily and, if not handled skillfully, could easily explode. As the party Congress approaches, the Soviets will be watching intra-party developments closely for signs that Kania has lost control. Remember, the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia only weeks before the convening of the Fourteenth Party Congress, which was expected to elect a strongly reformist Central Committee.

Yet, the Soviet capacity for tolerance might prove rather high. Military intervention would be very costly — far more costly than in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 — and would have major repercussions for Soviet policy. In particular, it would

(1) seriously exacerbate U.S.-Soviet relations and undermine whatever small chance might exist for their stabilization over the next three to four years;

(2) kill any hope for a resumption of SALT negotiations for the near future and lead to a new spiral in the arms race;

(3) severely strain relations with Western Europe and deal a grave blow to Soviet hopes for salvaging détente in Europe;

(4) give new impetus to increased defense spending, both in the United States and within NATO generally;

[26] See, in particular, the resolution passed by the Romanian Central Committee to the effect that Poland should be allowed to settle its problems without outside interference. (*Scinteia*, March 27, 1981.)

[27] See Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslavia Concerned over Rising Tensions in Poland," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report 24 (Yugoslavia), January 30, 1981.

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(5) virtually ensure that the decision to deploy 572 long-range Pershing-II MRBMs and cruise missiles would be implemented;
(6) increase pressure for greater collusion between the United States and the People's Republic of China, particularly in the military field; and
(7) precipitate a split with some West European Communist parties, especially in Italy.

The Soviets, moreover, would be forced to occupy Poland for an indefinite period of time and would probably face large-scale passive resistance. The costs of keeping the country afloat economically would also be enormous — especially at a time when Moscow is facing mounting economic problems of its own.

Failure to intervene, though, could have even more serious consequences. If the Polish experiment is allowed to succeed, it can have a huge impact on the rest of Eastern Europe, and eventually on the USSR itself. The 1980s are likely to be a decade of retrenchment as the countries of Eastern Europe tinker with their economies and try to adjust to the politics of austerity. As Daniel Singer suggests, this fact is likely to have significant implications for political stability throughout Eastern Europe. While the situation in Poland is in many ways unique, it does share similarities with other East European countries; and if the Polish experiment is allowed to succeed, the danger of "Polandization" is likely to grow.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. By Richard Ned Lebow. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 350 pp. $24.50. Draws upon historical experience to formulate and test hypotheses about international crisis and the nature of interstate conflict. Concludes that states are more likely to act aggressively when they perceive themselves as weak than when they see themselves as strong.

Conflict and Intervention in the Third World. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 261 pp. $27.50. Seven case studies of regional conflict in the Third World. The editor isolates common denominators among the various regions, with respect to the conflicts per se and to great-power involvement in them.

Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement. (Second edition.) By Margaret P. Doxey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 161 pp. $22.00. New topics include the effects of sanctions against Rhodesia (in force until 1979) and the use of the oil weapon by the Arab oil producers in 1973. Asserts there is little evidence that economic sanctions are effective in inducing states to live up to imposed standards of conduct.

The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique. By Richard K. Ashley. New York: Nichols, 1980. 384 pp. $30.00. Focuses upon the long-term social processes entangling the three major powers. Through world-modeling research, attempts to illustrate the socio-economic and political limits to growth.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1980. Edited by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 486 pp. $35.00. The fourteenth annual edition of the single most comprehensive and authoritative reference on communist parties and their

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activities worldwide. Current through 1979, the yearbook provides invaluable data on membership, personnel, and domestic and international policies of communist parties in ninety-four countries. Also, scholarly essays by sixty-five contributors deal with such issues as the impact of the pope's visit to Poland, the succession problem in the Soviet Union and China, and the persecution of dissidents in Eastern Europe.

Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Developing Countries. Edited by Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd. New York: Pergamon, 1980. 530 pp. $42.50 ($12.95, paper).

Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War. By David Wilkinson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 206 pp. $18.50.

Elitism. By G. Lowell Field and John Higley. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 135 pp. $18.50.

The Evolution of the International Economic Order. By W. Arthur Lewis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. 81 pp. $10.00.

Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics. (Fourth edition.) By John Spanier. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981. 614 pp. n.p.

Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies. Edited by Ved P. Nanda, James R. Scarritt, and George W. Shepherd, Jr. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 318 pp. $30.00.

Indicator Systems for Political, Economic, and Social Analysis. Edited by Charles Lewis Taylor. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgesch Larger, Gunn & Hain, 1980. 242 pp. n.p.

In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics. By Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 559 pp. $25.00.

Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International Relations. By Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Anderson Cruickshank. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 403 pp. $40.00.

Peace Against War: The Ecology of International Violence. By Francis A. Beer. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981. 447 pp. $19.95 ($9.95, paper).

Reform and Resistance in the International Order. By Ian Clark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 202 pp. n.p.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

The Dependence Dilemma: Gasoline Consumption and America's Security. Edited by Daniel Yergin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs. 167 pp. $4.95. Yergin, who is director of Harvard's International Energy Seminar, maintains that

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a reduction of perhaps 20 per cent in U.S. gasoline consumption is essential for American security. He views such a reduction as the most important step the United States can take to ease worldwide inflation.

The Development Gap: A Spatial Analysis of World Poverty and Inequality. By J. P. Cole. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981. 454 pp. $49.50. A geographer's perspective on economic development.

The International Economic Policy of the United States: Selected Papers of C. Fred Bergsten, 1977-1979. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980. 398 pp. $28.95. Public speeches and testimonies of a former assistant secretary of the treasury for international affairs. Seeks to explain the rationale for, and the results of, U.S. international economic policies during the 1970s. Also included are presentations by Undersecretary of the Treasury Anthony Solomon on monetary policy.

The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity. By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980. 349 pp. $12.95. Speculative attempt to relate presumed future scarcities of basic resources to the evolution of national and international political relations.

Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order. Edited by Kamal Hossain. New York: Nichols, 1980. 285 pp. $32.50. The product of a 1978 International Law Association conference whose participants included some of the most knowledgeable observers around.

Money and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Nations. By Ralph C. Bryant. Washington: Brookings, 1980. 584 pp. $29.95 (paper, $12.95). A manual for designing monetary policy.

The Poverty of Nations: The Political Economy of Hunger and Population. By William W. Murdock. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 382 pp. $22.50 ($7.50, paper). Malthusianesque study of population growth, food supply, and prospects for economic development, by an environmental biologist; short on political analysis but a useful rendering of scientific data for the lay reader and policymaker.

Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order. By Richard N.

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Gardner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 423 pp. $25.00 ($7.50, paper). A revision of the 1956 edition; evaluates the major international economic institutions since World War II. Recounts the negotiations leading up to the creation of the IMF and GATT and lays out the challenges facing those institutions in the eighties.

The Theory and Structures of International Political Economy. Edited by Todd Sandler. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 280 pp. $25.00. On the breakdown of national boundaries and the implications of that phenomenon for the global economy.

Trading Blocs, U.S. Exports, and World Trade. By Penelope Hartland-Thunberg. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 197 pp. $22.00. Mostly statistical evidence on the dimensions of trading blocs; includes an analytical essay suggesting that little damage occurs to U.S. trade because of the existence of trading groups.

Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. By Charles P. Kindleberger. New York: Basic Books, 1980. 271 pp. $5.95 (paper).

The World Energy Triangle: A Strategy for Cooperation. By Thomas Hoffmann and Brian Johnson. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1981. 217 pp. n.p.

MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL

Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. By Louis Rene Beres. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 315 pp. $20.00. Doomsaying and proposals for salvation with respect to the dangers of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism; foreword by Paul C. Warnke.

Arms, Men and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981. By Francis P. Hoeber, William Schneider, Jr., Norman Polmar, and Ray Bessette. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980. 185 pp. n.p. The fourth edition of the National Strategy Information Center's analysis of the military issues and budgetary dimensions of U.S. security policy.

Defense Policy Formation: Towards Comparative Analysis. By James M. Roherty. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1980. 315 pp. $14.95. Essays on policy in Australia, South Africa, India, Japan, and France.

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Destruction of Nuclear Facilities in War. By Bennett Ramberg. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1980. 201 pp. $19.50. Current practices, policies, and regulations concerning the vulnerability of nuclear energy facilities to hostile military action.

Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. By Stephen S. Kaplan et al. Washington: Brookings, 1981. 733 pp. $29.95 ($14.95, paper). Must reading. Examines 190 post–World War II incidents in which the USSR used ground, sea, or air forces in order to attain foreign-policy goals; complements a 1978 work by Kaplan and Blechman, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument,* also from Brookings.

Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies. By Cynthia H. Enloe. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980. 276 pp. $19.00. A well-documented and valuable study of the relationship between military organization and ethnic identity. The author argues that national minorities have historically played a highly strategic military role on behalf of the major powers.

The FY 1981-1985 Defense Program: Issues and Trends. By Lawrence J. Korb. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, Foreign Policy and Defense Review, July 1980. 63 pp. $2.50 (paper). A detailed analysis of the last of the Carter administration's five-year defense plans by a highly regarded scholar; indispensable for anyone who wants to compare the Reagan approach with that of his immediate predecessor.

Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy. Edited by Joseph A. Yager. Washington: Brookings, 1980. $22.95 ($8.95, paper). Essays arranged according to geographic region. The case study approach begs for an integrative essay, which is missing.

The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader. Edited by Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980. 508 pp. $35.00 ($10.95, paper). A companion volume to Perlmutter's *The Military and Politics in Modern Times,* this compendium offers selections from books, articles, monographs, and documents that deal with issues raised in the earlier work. A most important contribution to the growing literature on the military.

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The Soviet Union and SALT. By Samuel B. Payne, Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 155 pp. $19.95. An exposition of the Soviet attitude toward arms control negotiations, nuclear strategy, and the future of the SALT process. Sensitive to Soviet bureaucratic politics, the author makes extensive use of Russian-language sources.

How Little Is Enough? SALT and Security in the Long Run. By Francis P. Hoeber. New York: Crane, Russak, 1981, 53 pp. $5.95 (paper).

Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment Since 1945. By Michel Louis Martin. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 424 pp. $29.00.

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

American Security Policy and Policy-Making: The Dilemmas of Using and Controlling Military Force. Edited by Robert Harkavy and Edward A. Kolodziej. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980. 268 pp. $25.95. An important work on arms control, strategic planning, and national security problems. The contributors attempt to integrate the use and control of military force into a single conceptual framework; essays treat the issues historically, topically, and theoretically.

Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates. Edited by Roy Godson. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980. 223 pp. $7.50 (paper). Second offering in an outstanding series. Proceeding from the premise that intelligence activities directed against totalitarian elites may be morally necessary, these scholarly essays appraise the current state of intelligence analysis and suggest avenues of improvement.

Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence. Edited by Roy Godson. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980. 339 pp. $7.95 (paper). Third volume in a series. An extremely useful collection of papers and discussions treating an oft-misunderstood subject. Particular attention is paid to Soviet intelligence and U.S. attempts to counter it.

Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East. By Wilbur Crane Eveland. New York: W. W. Norton, 1980. 384 pp. $14.95. A personal memoir of U.S. policy in the Middle East from 1949 to 1975 from the perspective of a former CIA operative. Fascinating reading.

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American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process. By Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 512 pp. $16.95 ($9.95, paper).

Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy. (Revised edition.) Edited by Abdul Aziz Said. New York: Praeger, 1981. 242 pp. n.p.

Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations. Volume II: Patterns and Trends in Resource Supplies and Policies. Edited by Carl E. Beigie and Alfred O. Hero, Jr. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 626 pp. $27.50 ($12.00, paper).

Politics and the Oval Office: Towards Presidential Governance. Edited by Arnold J. Meltsner. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981. 332 pp. $7.95 (paper).

The Post-Imperial Presidency. Edited by Vincent Davis. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980. 190 pp. $7.95 (paper).

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. (Second edition.) Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. New York: Aldine, 1980. 761 pp. $29.95. Updated and expanded edition containing new chapters on geopolitics, SALT, China, and Soviet power. More than three dozen essays contrast traditional and revisionist viewpoints.

Cooperative Movements in Eastern Europe. Edited by Aloysius Balawyder. Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1980. 211 pp. $18.00. Traces the historical development of cooperative systems in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia before communist rule.

The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Edited by Seweryn Bialer. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 441 pp. $35.00 ($15.00, paper). An eagerly awaited volume including contributions by Bialer, Adam Ulam, Franklyn Griffiths, Herbert S. Levine, and Alexander Dallin. The outgrowth of a project undertaken for the U.S. Department of State by the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University, this collection is the most reliable work available on the foreign-policy impact of Soviet domestic politics.

East European Integration and East-West Trade. Edited by Paul Marer and John Michael Montias. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1980. 432 pp. $32.50. Outlines the role of foreign trade in East European economies and the implications for future CMEA integration. A Western perspective on the field of foreign trade in centrally planned economies.

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The New Red Legions. By Richard A. Gabriel. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. **An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier.** 246 pp. $22.50. **A Survey Data Source Book.** 252 pp. $40.00. (The two volumes are available as a set for $49.95.) Incisive analysis of the caste system within the Soviet Army; concludes that the quality of officers is low and that problems of troop morale and discipline are severe.

On Soviet Dissent. By Roy Medvedev. Trans. by William A. Packer; edited and annotated by George Saunders. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 157 pp. $10.95. The prominent Soviet dissident, interviewed by Piero Ostellino in late 1979 and early 1980, on ten topics ranging from ideology to divisions within the Soviet dissident movement.

Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s: Superpower Politics and East-West Trade. By Lawrence T. Caldwell and William Diebold, Jr. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980. $10.95 ($7.95, paper). As part of the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, two American specialists argue in favor of efforts to moderate Soviet behavior by encouraging the Soviet Union to participate in serious arms control and international trade arrangements; the tacit assumption is that the world of the late 1980s will usher in an era of mutually advantageous international cooperation.

Soviet Decision-Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954. By Yaakov Ro'i. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980. 540 pp. $22.95. Meticulously documented account of Soviet-Israeli relations from the end of the British mandate for Palestine to the deterioration of cooperation between Moscow and Tel Aviv.

Soviet Policy in the Post-Tito Balkans. Edited by Phillip A. Petersen. Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, Studies in Communist Affairs, vol. 4, n.d. 157 pp. n.p. A compilation of papers given at several midwestern conferences during 1974-1976. Great-power interests and policy alternatives in the post-Tito Balkans are discussed, and Soviet difficulties there are given special emphasis.

Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era. Edited by Donald R. Kelley. New York: Praeger, 1980. 269 pp. n.p. Ten essays on various aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy over the past fifteen years.

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The Soviet Union in World Politics. Edited by Kurt London. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 380 pp. $27.50. Investigates the impact of Soviet foreign policy on the international relations and policies of other nations.

The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. By Claire Sterling. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981. 357 pp. $13.95. The best source available documenting the controversial thesis that an international network of terrorism is supported and supplied by the Soviet Union. A disturbing account by the widely respected correspondent for the *International Herald Tribune*.

The United States and Poland. By Piotr S. Wandycz. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. 465 pp. $25.00. The relationship between Poland and the United States is analyzed; from Poland's partition and the American Revolution to the present.

The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition. By Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 271 pp. $20.00.

COMECON Data 1979. Edited by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. 436 pp. $45.50.

Communist Reformation: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Change in the World Communist Movement. Edited by G. R. Urban. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. 335 pp. $19.95.

Detente or Cold War II: East-West Relations After Afghanistan. By Adam Bromke. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1980. 32 pp. $0.75 (paper).

East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. By A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1980. 205 pp. n.p.

Human Rights: Continuing the Discussion. By Samuil Zivs. Moscow: Progress (distributor: Imported Publications, Chicago), 1980. 188 pp. $4.00 (paper).

National Communism in the Soviet Union, 1918-28. By Baruch Gurevitz. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980. 121 pp. $6.95 (paper).

Political Culture and Soviet Politics. By Stephen White. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 234 pp. $22.50.

Private Sources of Income of the Soviet Urban Household. By Gur Ofer and Aaron Vinokur. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1980. 78 pp. $5.00 (paper).

The Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and the Chinese People's Liberation Armies. By Jonathan R. Adelman. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 230 pp. $22.00.

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Soviet Economic Thought and Political Power in the USSR. By Aron Katsenelinboigen. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1980. 213 pp. 22.50.

Soviet Military Strategy in Europe. By Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1980. 238 pp. $30.00.

The Soviet Navy, 1941-1978: A Guide to Sources in English. By Myron J. Smith, Jr. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC–Clio Press, War/Peace Bibliography series, no. 9, 1980. 211 pp. $23.75.

Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security. By Ivan Kovalenko. Moscow: Progress (distributor: Imported Publications, Chicago), 1979. 293 pp. $8.40.

The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank. By Marian K. Leighton. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979. 95 pp. n.p.

Soviet Urban and Regional Planning. By Paul M. White. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 276 pp. n.p.

Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy. By Michael J. Deane. Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, in association with the University of Miami, 1980. 119 pp. n.p.

Talks on Soviet Democracy. By M. A. Krutogolov. Moscow: Progress (distributor: Imported Publications, Chicago), 1980. 247 pp. $5.60.

USSR Military Expenditure and Defense Industry Conversion: An Introduction and Guide to Sources. By Milton Leitenberg. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1980. 42 pp. n.p.

Work and Leisure in the Soviet Union: A Time-Budget Analysis. By Jiri Zuzanek. New York: Praeger, 1980. 430 pp. n.p.

WESTERN EUROPE

Britain's Economic Performance. Edited by Richard E. Caves and Lawrence B. Krause. Washington: Brookings, 1980. 388 pp. $18.95 ($7.95, paper). This sequel to a 1968 study discusses the causes of Britain's economic woes in the period from 1967 to 1978.

The British People: Their Voice in Europe. Report of an Independent Working Party Sponsored by the Hansard Society on the Effects of Membership in the European Community on British Representative Institutions. Westmead, England: Saxon House (distributor: D. C. Heath, Lexington, Mass.), 1977. 207 pp. $21.50. The institutions range from Parliament to trade associations.

Eurocommunism Between East and West. Edited by Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke. Bloomington: Indiana

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University Press, 1980. 373 pp. $32.50 ($9.95, paper). A remarkable compilation of first-rate essays which places the phenomenon of Eurocommunism in the context of the worldwide communist movement rather than in that of Western Europe.

The European Community and the Third World: The Lomé Convention and Its Impact. By Ellen Frey-Wouters. New York: Praeger, 1980. 289 pp. n.p. Illuminates the most ambitious North-South experiment in international economic cooperation to date.

The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, & Britain. By Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme P. Auton. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980. 314 pp. $8.95 (paper). Traces three major sets of foreign-policy goals — security, political and economic recovery, and national self-definition — as pursued by "middle-level" powers in the postwar era.

The Other Western Europe: A Political Analysis of the Smaller Democracies. By Earl H. Fry and Gregory A. Raymond. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC–Clio Press, 1980. 251 pp. $24.75. An analysis of the political dynamics, internal and external, of the small and middle states of Western Europe; includes countries in the Benelux, Alpine, and Scandinavian regions.

Regional Policy in the European Community: The Role of Regional Incentives. Edited by Douglas Yuill, Kevin Allen, and Chris Hull. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 251 pp. n.p. A country-by-country analysis of the redistribution of economic activity to the areas most in need.

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Science and Science Policy in the Arab World. By A. B. Zahlan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. n.p. A survey of scientific activity and science policy in the Arab world, with special attention paid to Egypt. The book, written by a professional physicist, contains much data; it does not attempt to examine the cultural interplay of scientific method and worldview within traditional Middle Eastern cultures.

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Self Rule/Shared Rule: Federal Solutions to the Middle East Conflict. Edited by Daniel Elazar. Jerusalem: Turtledove Publishing (distributor: ISBS, Forest Grove, Oreg.), 1979. 259 pp. $18.00. Collection of more than two dozen essays; opens with the cultural, economic, and political framework of a federal solution, followed by discussions of relevant experiences elsewhere in the world. Three essays suggest federal solutions to the current problem of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan.

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Editorial

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Les puissances moyennes et la crise internationale — Henri Simonet
France et Grande-Bretagne: une complémentarité difficile — Geoffroy de Courcel

Etats-Unis

L'Administration Reagan: les leçons d'une victoire — Marie-France Toinet
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Les Etats-Unis et la sécurité du Golfe — Albert Wohlstetter

Bilan d'un septennat: la politique extérieure française — Paul-Marie de la Gorce
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Propositions pour une stratégie française de 1980 à 1990 — Pierre Eylau-Wagram
L'expansionnisme libyen: Machrek, Maghreb et Afrique noire — Arnold Hottinger
L'Algérie du président Chadli — Bernard Cubertafond
La signification politique du procès de Pékin — Wojtek Zafanolli

Débats

La Pologne et l'Occident: réponse à Walter Schütze — Alexandre Smolar

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

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

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